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INTRODUCTION
In December 2002, Kenyans decisively rejected despotism and kleptocracy. In one of the most
peaceful regime changes in Africa, Kenyans voted out the Kenya African National Union, the party
that has ruled the country since independence from the British in 1963. Although at first tolerant,
the Kenyatta regime became increasingly corrupt and authoritarian. By the time he passed away
in 1978, President Kenyatta had crafted a state symbolized by personal rule, a culture of nepotism,
public theft, and gross violations of human rights. Incredibly, President Daniel arap Moi,
heightened repression and perfected the corrupted state left behind by President Kenyatta. The
Moi-KANU regime was marked by shameless graft, abominable human rights violations, impunity,
and national decay. This is the legacy that Kenyans hope President Mwai Kibaki and the ruling
National Rainbow Coalition will transform.
There is no doubt that in December 2002 Kenya witnessed regime change. This was the first
fundamental change in the ideology, rationale, and philosophy of the Kenyan state since 1963.
The Kenyan state is for the first time in its history formally committed to transitional justice, the rule
of law, and democracy. The appointment in April 2003 by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Affairs of the Task Force on the Establishment of a Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission
is a milestone in the country’s quest for a transitional justice agenda. It represents the
transformation of the soul of the Kenyan state and is a significant first step in the long and arduous
journey to reclaim the moral and political fiber of the country. In this respect, it must be noted that
transitional justice is a broad program, and the truth commission is just one component of that
complex phenomenon.
The people of Kenya have spoken, and the Task Force is privileged to report that Kenyans want a
truth, justice, and reconciliation commission established immediately. The overwhelming majority
of Kenyans, over 90 per cent of those who submitted their views to the Task Force, want the
government to establish an effective truth commission, a vehicle that will reveal the truth about past
atrocities, name perpetrators, provide redress for victims, and promote national healing and
reconciliation. Kenyans believe that a truth commission will renew the country’s morality in politics,
law, in the economy, and throughout the society. They want a state founded on the rule of law and
respect for the human rights of every individual who resides in Kenya. In other words, Kenyans
want a human rights state.
The Task Force is cognizant of the fact that a truth commission is an ad hoc, temporary institution.
It is an instrument that should only be necessary once in the lifetime of nation. That is why the
government should establish an effective and credible truth commission, one that will address past
abuses, recreate the state, banish impunity, and set Kenya on an irreversible trajectory to
democracy and respect for basic freedoms. If done right, the truth commission will accomplish all
these purposes and genuinely make Kenya a twenty first century state. This would make Kenya
not only a hospitable nursery for its residents, but it would also serve as a shining example to
Africa and the world. Far too many Kenyans have been destroyed by the state. It is time to say
never again.
The Task Force, after considering the views of Kenyans, recommends that a truth commission be
established by a presidential order. The Task Force has made this recommendation because it
believes that this is the most reliable, expedient, and effective route. It also recommends that a
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truth commission be established soon, and, in any case, not later than June 2004. Further, that the
truth commission be given all available powers under the Commission of Inquiry Act, Chapter 102
of the Laws of Kenya. The truth commission should be independent and empowered to make
recommendations on lustration or barring offenders from public office, redress, and other corrective
measures, including the reform of the state and society. It should also have the power to negotiate
with perpetrators over the return of stolen wealth in exchange for recommendations of a conditional
amnesty or immunity from prosecution.
The Task Force is aware that a truth commission is a delicate and emotive institution for any
country. That is why the Task Force has designed a distinctly Kenyan institution, taking into
account the country’s history and its political circumstances. The truth commission cannot – and
must not – be an instrument of persecution or witch-hunt. But nor can it be a whitewash. It cannot
target particular individuals or communities; otherwise its purpose will be defeated. The truth
commission should be an instrument for the reform of the state, and for creating a more perfect
nation. It must heal the wounds of our citizens and reconcile the nation. But to do so, it must dig
into the past, recognize victims, provide justice, and promote national unity and reconciliation. That
is why the Task Force strongly recommends that the government heeds the sovereign will of the
people and immediately establishes a truth commission.
Finally, the Task Force believes that this report belongs to the people of Kenya. It is their path to a
new Kenya, a country that they will be proud of. The Task Force urges Kenyans to stand guard
over the establishment and the work of the truth commission. The Task Force urges all Kenyans,
especially political parties, religious organizations, civil society, the private sector, and government
officials to support the work of the truth commission. We also ask the international community to
support this monumental national endeavor. In sum, the Task Force is proud to present this report
to the government and believes that our journey to a better tomorrow will be made more certain by
the establishment of a truth, justice, and reconciliation commission.
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CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW
Section 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On April 17, 2003, the Republic of Kenya appointed the Task Force on the Establishment of a
Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission. Its mandate was to find out if a truth commission
was necessary for Kenya, and, if so, to make recommendations on the type of truth commission
that ought to be established. The Task Force has drawn its conclusions and recommendations
from a comprehensive and open process of fact-finding, research, public hearings, written
submissions, data collection, interviews, consultations, a national conference, an international
conference addressed by, among others, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, Professor Ali A. Mazrui,
Professor Henry Steiner, and Justice Albie Sachs, and deep deliberations and reflections among
its members. The process and methodology adopted by the Task Force put the sovereign will of
the Kenyan people at the centre of its activities. Above all, the Task Force has been guided at all
times by Kenya’s national interests and the unequivocal belief that Kenya must become a human
rights state so that all those who live in it can realize their full potential as human beings.
The Task Force is aware that the question of a truth commission is an emotive issue for the
country. At the same time, the Task Force believes that the quest for democracy, economic
prosperity and development are difficult tasks for which there are no shortcuts. Difficult choices
have to be made by the people and government of Kenya if democracy, the rule of law, economic
renewal, and respect for human rights are to become a reality. It is now an internationally
acknowledged fact that transitional justice is an inescapable imperative for countries emerging from
decades of gross misrule, abominable human rights violations, and large-scale plunder of public
resources, shameless graft, and theft of public wealth.
Equally indisputable is the fact that a ravaged state, such as Kenya, cannot be recreated without
an agenda for transitional justice to end public corruption and prevent human rights abuses. But
transitional justice cannot be achieved unless the mistakes and atrocities of the past are properly,
fairly, and comprehensively investigated, the perpetrators held accountable, and victims
recognized and their dignity restored. In other words, the past must be confronted, the state must
be audited, and the country must be exorcized of the ghosts of the past that still haunt it. Amnesia
would simply lead to the certain death and failure of state and society.
It is important to state, however, without fear of contradiction, that the question of transitional
justice is not a matter of theory or the concern of only academics and human rights advocates. It is
a time-tested vehicle for national recovery and reconciliation. It is the one, and the only, option for
banishing impunity from the national practice and psyche. No one, especially the head of state, or
any other official, is above the law. Respect for the rule of law must start with the chief executive,
for it is the head of state that is the embodiment of the sovereignty and legality of the state. In fact,
successful transitions in other countries have dealt with the question of impunity for former officials,
including heads of state, without fear or favor.
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In South Africa, for example, former President Nelson Mandela was subjected to sustained scrutiny
by the courts on any number of matters. It is an undeniable fact that the unrivalled reverence,
unprecedented, and iconic status that Mr. Mandela enjoys in the world today is largely attributable
to the respect that he showed for the rule of law and the transitional processes that he set in
motion. Elsewhere, in South Korea, Chile, and now in Zambia, former heads of state have been
subjected to judicial and other forms of official investigation for abuse of office and theft of public
resources. Former public officials who plundered their economies and committed atrocities have
nowhere to run because of the emerging jurisprudence of universal jurisdiction, which is evidenced
by the creation of the International Criminal Court.
The work of the Task Force has been guided by all these considerations, although it must be
clearly stated that the Task Force itself does not have any views that are independent from those
of the people of Kenya. The conclusions of the Task Force are those of the majority of Kenyans
who submitted their views to the Task Force, and which conclusions the Task Force believes are a
reliable barometer of the opinion of the majority of Kenyans. It is encouraging, and a testimony to
the maturity of Kenyans, that their views comport with the views of the international community and
those of international law. This is all the more fitting because in December 2002, Kenyans
overwhelmingly rejected despotism and kleptocracy. They peacefully brought about regime change
for the first time in forty years through the power of the ballot. A rare occurrence in the troubled
states of Africa, the December 2002 elections marked real and fundamental regime change, and
set in motion a break with a past marked by illiberalism, atrocities, and impunity.
The establishment of the Task Force, the anti-corruption campaign, the Judicial Commission of
Inquiry into the Goldenberg Affair, which has revealed the massive looting of the public purse by
officials of the former regime, the requirement for the declaration of wealth by public officials, the
determination to create a new constitutional dispensation, the reformation of the judiciary, the
dramatic shift in public discourse, and the stated commitment by President Mwai Kibaki to foster a
rule of law state are irrefutable testimonials of a break with the past and the undeniable transition
which the state has embarked on.
The people of Kenya have spoken, and it is the obligation of the Task Force to faithfully report on
what Kenyans have told it. Kenyans have asked their government to immediately establish a truth,
justice, and reconciliation commission. They have overwhelmingly said that the truth about the past
must be known, that perpetrators must be identified and punished, that victims must be accorded
justice, and that reconciliation is only possible after the truth is known and justice is done. Kenyans
want an effective and credible truth commission, an institution that will not engage in a witch-hunt
or a whitewash. Such a commission must have the powers to recommend lustration, that is, to bar
offenders from holding public office. It must be empowered to recommend redress for victims,
such as compensation, restitution, and reparations. It should be authorized to inquire into stolen
property and funds, and to recommend that they be returned to the public or the individuals from
whom they were stolen. The truth commission should investigate gross human rights violations
and economic crimes and recommend prosecutions. The truth commission should be established
before June 2004, be independent, and be fully supported by the state. It must make
recommendations on measures that must be implemented to prevent a recurrence of past abuses.
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Such a commission should last anywhere from 1-2 years and be composed of commissioners who
are beyond reproach. The truth commission must have the power to summon anyone and
investigate any person in connection with past atrocities and abuses.

Section 2. TERMS OF REFERENCE
On April 17, 2003, by a special issue of the Kenya Gazette, the Government of the Republic of
Kenya through Hon. Kiraitu Murungi, the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs, appointed
the Task Force on the Establishment of a Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission.
Professor Makau Mutua, who is also the Chairman of the Kenya Human Rights Commission,
chaired the Task Force. The Task Force was set up four months after the ascension to power of
the National Rainbow Coalition under President Mwai Kibaki.
The terms of reference of the Task Force were to recommend to the Minister for Justice and
Constitutional Affairs whether the establishment of a truth, justice, and reconciliation Commission
was necessary for Kenya. If so, the Task Force was mandated to recommend to the Minister how
and when such a commission should be established; the membership of such a commission; the
terms of reference of such a commission; the powers and privileges that should be conferred upon
the commission in the execution of its mandate; and the historical period to be covered by the
commission’s investigations. The Task Force was empowered to make such further
recommendations incidental to the foregoing, as it may consider necessary. It also was given all
the necessary or expedient powers for the proper execution of its mandate.
The Task Force was mandated to hold public meetings in any locations of its choice for the proper
discharge of its functions. Further, the Task Force was authorized to determine all questions
before it, including the adoption of its final report, which would be by a simple majority of the
members present. Among its other mandates, the Task Force was authorized to receive views
from members of the public and oral and or written submissions from any person with relevant
information. It could use any official reports of any previous investigations relevant to its
investigations, and it could carry out or cause to be carried out any such studies, research, and
evaluations of the experiences of other countries where truth commissions have been established.
The Task Force was required to submit its final report to the Minister by August 31, 2003.
The Task Force was composed of the following members: Professor Mutua, the Chairperson, Rev.
(Dr.) Timothy Njoya, the Vice Chairperson, Rev. Mutava Musyimi, Bishop (Prof.) Zablon Nthamburi,
Rev. Patrick Rukenya, Mr. John Githongo, the Permanent Secretary for Ethics and Governance or
his representative, Mr. Kairichi Marimba, Mr. Tirop Kitur, Mr. Julius Sunkuli, Ms. Raychelle Omamo,
Ms. Jane Kiragu, Dr. Josephine Ojiambo, Ms. Mumina Konso, Mr. Davinder Lamba, Dr. Amukowa
Anangwe, Ms. Zarina Patel, Mr. Kibe Mungai, Sheikh Ali Shee, and Ms. Roselyne Lagat-Korir, the
Task Force Secretary. The Secretariat staff of the Task Force was composed of three lawyers,
Ms. Jennifer Wanjiku Miano, a Senior Program Officer seconded to the Task Force from the Kenya
Human Rights Commission, Mr. Ronoh Tuimising from the Office of the Attorney General, and Ms.
Wanza Kioko, a consultant from CLARION.
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Section 3. PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY
Immediately upon its official launch on May 11, 2003, by the Minister for Justice and Constitutional
Affairs, the Task Force produced its work plan to effectuate its mandate. The main challenge of the
Task Force was to ascertain the views of Kenyans on the necessity of a truth commission. It was
then to advise the state on the institutional architecture of a truth commission according to the
views of Kenyans. The Task Force devised a comprehensive process and methodology for
establishing the views of Kenyans with respect to a truth commission. Although the Task Force
was cognizant of the fact that Kenyans had recommended the formation of a truth commission to
the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC), it nevertheless was determined to solicit
the views of Kenyans afresh so that it makes its recommendations to Kenyans without the fear of
contradiction. To this end, it conceptualized and carried out a number of activities and events to
make sure that all competing views on the subject were heard, digested, and analyzed.
The Task Force disseminated and publicized its work and mandate, which it considered to be
crucial and of national significance, through the press and other fora so as to effectively reach the
public. Hence, the Task Force immediately embarked on a public information campaign to publicize
the terms of its reference. The Task Force held its first press conference after the completion of its
work plan to advise the country of its purpose, activities, and events, and invited Kenyans to
engage it. It requested every Kenyan with a view about a truth commission to make that view
known to it. But in order to reach the widest scope of Kenyans, the Task Force produced a
comprehensive schedule of visits to every province in the country.
During the provincial visits, the Task Force held publicized and open public hearings at town halls
and other open theatres. Such visits were announced in the local, national, and even international
print and electronic media. The provincial, district, and local authorities widely publicized the
hearings. Churches, human rights groups, veteran organizations, Mosques, development groups,
women’s organizations, farmers’ groups, teachers, local and national politicians, as well as
individual Kenyans helped mobilize the citizenry for the public hearings. As a consequence, many
Kenyans turned out in large numbers in many locations to give their views before the Task Force.
On the average, the Task Force held public hearings in at least three districts in every province.
Hearings were held in Nairobi, Nakuru, Molo, Narok, Eldoret, Mombasa, Garsen, Kisumu, Kisii,
Gucha, Kehancha, Kapsakwony, Kakamega, Machakos, Meru, Wagalla, Garba Tula, Isiolo,
Garissa, Wajir, Nyeri, Murang’a, and Kiambu.
In the course of the provincial visits, the Task Force listened to hundreds of Kenyans, talked with
many more, and saw numerous sites of interest to a truth commission process, such as the
Wagalla Airstrip where the Wagalla Massacre took place. The Task Force also received views from
numerous provincial, district, and local administrators on a truth commission. Suffice it to note that
the public hearings were emotive, candid, and open. The hearings would start in the mornings and
go on until dusk. On the whole, the hearings were well attended, although the numbers of women
was low. The Task Force went out of its way to encourage and recognize women speakers and
persons with disabilities. But many important opinion-makers including common citizens, victims of
violations, few numbers of perpetrators, members of parliament, local politicians, religious leaders,
former public officials, journalists, housewives, pastoralists, the poor, the well-to-do,
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businesspeople, teachers, students, farmers, the unemployed, the self-employed, persons with
disabilities, government officials, groups representing institutions and organizations, and a host of
other Kenyans presented their views before the Task Force. Many made oral presentations and
others gave written submissions. The majority spoke in English and Kiswahili, yet others expressed
themselves in their local languages for which translators volunteered. Kenyans showed enthusiasm
for the creation of institutions to deal with the abuses of the past. After the initial introduction of the
Task Force and its terms of reference by the chair, presenters were keen to make submissions. In
all, the Task Force was extremely impressed with the decorum and civility with which the speakers
conducted themselves.
The Task Force was deeply concerned by the low numbers of women who turned up at its public
hearings to make submissions. Although the Task Force encouraged the few women present to
speak up, this problem will have to be addressed once the truth commission is set up so that the
issues that are particular to women are adequately dealt with. Kenya, like most countries, has
deeply embedded prejudices, policies, and traditions that have historically marginalized women
and made them invisible in the public square. Discrimination against women, violence, rape, and
the patriarchy have consigned women to the margins of society. Human rights violations and the
economic crimes committed by the state have a special gendered effect on women. That is why
violations against women have disproportionately multiplied adverse effects and are rarely
addressed. A truth commission must pay particular attention to the participation of women and the
abuses perpetrated against them. Otherwise, a truth commission will have little or no beneficial
value in addressing the plight of women.
The work of the Task Force was constrained by several factors, including time limitations, the wide
geographical stretch of Kenya, and limited audiences. These constraints notwithstanding, the
hearings, which were open to all, provided a reasonable barometer of the nation’s pulse. Many who
wanted to speak expressed themselves at the hearings. Speakers were recognized without any
bias, except for gender and disabilities, and only the limitation of time allotted for the hearings
prevented more presentations. Kenyans of all ethnicities and races, creeds, religions, age, sex,
education, political affiliation, and other classifications presented their views before the Task Force
without let or hindrance. By far the provincial visits reached the widest scope of Kenyans and gave
citizens the most transparent and easily accessible fora to air their views. The Task Force took
copious notes of all public hearings and tape-recorded the majority of them. It kept precise and
accurate records of all those who attended, all those who spoke, and what they said. It prepared
verbatim reports of all the presentations. It has produced statistics, charts, and other pictorial
graphics of the hearings. These statistics and views form one of the fundamental bases for the
findings, conclusions, and recommendations of this report.
Conferences have formed the other key bases for this report. In July, the Task Force organized a
highly successful national two-day conference on a truth commission in Nairobi. The conference,
which was opened by the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs, and addressed by senior
members of government, hosted speakers from civil society, the clergy, commissioners of the
CKRC, the Law Society of Kenya, members of parliament, common wananchi, victims, policymakers, women’s organizations, senior academics, the youth, and Kenyans from all walks of life.
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They vigorously interrogated the need for a truth commission for Kenya and ended the conference
with a strongly worded resolution calling for a truth, justice, and reconciliation commission. The
conference gave Kenyans a chance to publicly debate the necessity of a truth commission for
Kenya in one setting.
In August, the Task Force organized a highly successful international conference on a truth
commission. The purpose of the international conference was to allow Kenyans an opportunity to
learn from the experiences of truth commissions in other countries. The idea was to inform
Kenyans so that they can make a mature and deliberate choice given prior experiences. The
conference was addressed by, among others, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the revered cleric who
chaired the South African truth and Reconciliation Commission. It was also addressed by Professor
Ali Mazrui, an internationally renown scholar, Professor Henry Steiner of Harvard Law School and
one of the most respected human rights scholars, Justice Albie Sachs of the Constitutional Court of
South Africa, Professor Issa Shivji of the University of Dar-es-Salaam, and Dr. Alex Boraine, who
was the vice chair of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Other speakers
included leading academics, such as Professor Chris Peter of the University of Dar-es-Salaam,
renown religious leaders, senior lawyers, and human rights advocates, internationally acclaimed
academics and policy-makers from Kenya and abroad, members of parliament, and other highly
distinguished speakers. The conference was inspiring, emotive, and informative. It afforded
Kenyans an opportunity to appreciate the necessity and complexity of a truth telling and justice
seeking process. But it also made clear that a truth commission is one mechanism for cleansing
and transforming the moral and political fiber of the nation.
Written submissions have also formed a significant component of the database of this report. The
Task Force was aware that not every Kenyan could make oral submissions before it. It therefore
announced through the media, in its public hearings, and elsewhere, that Kenyans were
encouraged to send written submissions to its postal address, through its fax number and email
addresses, and in person at the Task Force offices at NSSF Building in Nairobi. In fact, written
submissions were handed in at public hearings and sent by mail, both postal and electronic, and
brought to the offices in person. Many submissions came from individual persons, religious
organizations and other organizations. Some were even sent to the Task Force from as far as the
United States. The vast majority of the written submissions are serious and considered documents
that address issues of human rights violations, economic crimes, and matters pertinent to the
mandate and terms of reference of the Task Force.
The report also draws from commissioned papers by individuals who have studied truth
commissions. These papers have been invaluable for the Task Force in its quest to understand
what benefits and problems truth commissions in other countries have yielded. The Task Force
has benefited from literature review and the compilation of an annotated bibliography on truth
commissions. The review of scholarly works and literature has therefore formed the other
foundation of this report.

16

Finally, both the electronic and print media have been an indispensable partner in disseminating
the work of the Task Force and providing civic education to members of the public. The Task
Force through the Chair has conducted numerous interviews with the media, explaining the role
and purpose of truth commissions. Different media houses have reported extensively on the quest
for a truth commission for Kenya. Many Kenyans have taken positions on a truth commission
based on these reports. There is little doubt that many Kenyans are now aware of the roles of truth
commissions.
This report is a product of all these efforts by the Task Force. The report is based on the findings
and analyses of the views expressed by Kenyans during the provincial visits, written submissions
from individuals, groups, and institutions, the national and international conferences, literature
review, commissioned papers, and individual and group conversations with Kenyans.

Section 4. RECOMMENDATIONS
These recommendations of the Task Force on the Establishment of a Truth, Justice, and
Reconciliation Commission are made pursuant to its terms of reference as follows;
1. That the Government of Kenya establishes a Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation
Commission (TJRC);
2. That the President of the Republic of Kenya establishes a TJRC pursuant to the powers
granted him by the Constitution of the Republic of Kenya;
3. That the TJRC have all the powers provided for, and contemplated, in the Commissions of
Inquiry Act, Chapter 102 of the Laws of Kenya;
4. That a TJRC must be established immediately, and in any case, not later than June 2004;
5. That the TJRC be composed of commissioners drawn from a cross-section of the sectors
in Kenya, and that it be composed of not more than 11 commissioners;
6. That the commissioners and the chair be appointed by the President of the Republic of
Kenya after consultations with all stakeholders by the Minister for Justice and
Constitutional Affairs;
7. That the commissioners be persons of high moral integrity, particular attention being paid
to their knowledge and commitment to human rights and transitional justice;
8. That the TJRC be independent, fully funded by the state, and fully supported by the state;
9. That the TJRC have the power to make its own rules of procedure and compose its own
secretariat;
10. That the TJRC have the power to determine its own schedule and work plan;
11. That the TJRC holds, unless it deems it necessary, all its sessions in public, which must be
carried live on radio and television;
12. That the TJRC have the power to summon and compel any person to appear before it and
provide testimony or answer questions;
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13. That the TJRC have the power to investigate human rights violations and violations of
economic, social and cultural rights;
14. That the TJRC have access to all government reports and other records as well as any
evidence that it deems necessary for the discharge of its functions;
15. That the TJRC have the power to recommend redress such as restitution, compensation,
and reparations;
16. That the TJRC have the power to recommend lustration or the barring of offenders from
holding public office;
17. That the TJRC have the power to track down stolen public property and funds and
recommend their return to the state or the individuals from whom they were stolen;
18. That the TJRC be empowered to negotiate with perpetrators of economic crimes for the
return of stolen property and funds in exchange for recommendations of limited amnesty
and immunity;
19. That the TJRC have the power to recommend prosecutions of offenders;
20. That the TJRC cover the period from 1963-2002;
21. That the TJRC shall endeavor to create a conducive environment for women and children
to appear before it and address it;
22. That the TJRC and its commissioners enjoy immunity from prosecution or any other liability
in the discharge of their functions;
23. That the chair of the TJRC enjoy the status of a judge of the Court of Appeal, and the
commissioners that of the judge of the High Court;
24. That the TJRC enjoy all other privileges and immunities necessary for the discharge of its
functions;
25. That the TJRC, in its final report, which shall immediately be made public, makes any other
recommendations that it deems fit for the reform of the state;
26. That the Government of Kenya establishes a committee or similar institution to examine
the atrocities of the colonial period and make recommendations on how they ought to be
addressed.
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CHAPTER 2. TRUTH COMMISSION AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
Section 5. WHY KENYA NEEDS A TRUTH COMMISSION
Political History and Governance in Kenya
The political history and governance of the Kenyan state is a catalogue of gross human rights
violations, the arrogance of power, and the commission of mind boggling economic crimes.
Constitutionalism and the rule of law, which are the central features of any political democracy that
respects human rights, have been absent in Kenya’s history. A democracy is defined by an
executive that is accountable and freely elected, a government limited by popular will, and which
the people can remove from power through the ballot. The second essential component of
democracy is a vibrant and freely and fairly elected legislature in an open contest pitting various
political parties against one another. Finally, in a state governed by the doctrine of separation of
powers, an independent judiciary, the essential guardian of the rule of law, is the linchpin of the
scheme of checks and balances through which the independence of the three arms of the state is
assured.1 Otherwise, there is no other guarantee that the executive – the “government”– will
respect the rule of law and act within established legal norms, processes, and institutions. The
constitution is thus not merely hortatory but the fundamental and supreme law of the land, the real
and living document that guides, defines, and permits all actions by the state. No individual or
official of the state is above the law or can act in defiance of constitutional prescriptions. This is
what separates democratic states from undemocratic ones. It is the difference between tyranny
1and freedom.
Since its creation by the British in 1895, the Kenyan state has largely been a predatory and illiberal
instrumentality, an ogre defined by its proclivity for the commission of gross and massive human
rights violations. Little need be said of the colonial state, which was specifically organized for the
purposes of political repression to facilitate economic exploitation. In 1963 Kenya formally became
an independent, sovereign state, ending decades of direct British colonial rule.2 Kenya’s postindependence history, however, has been marked by sharp contradictions between the state and
the civil society in spite of the image, cultivated in the West during the Cold War, that the east
African state was the beacon of hope for Africa. The post-colonial state has engaged in the most
abominable human rights violations and economic crimes known to humanity. Not even the reintroduction of multi-partyism in 1991, and the two general elections in 1992 and 1997, the first of
their kind in decades, brought relief from state-directed human rights violations and the wanton and
shameless theft of public coffers and property, evils that became the trademark of the Kenya
government.
Kenya’s 1963 independence constitution provided for a multiparty democracy, a freely elected bicameral
parliament, and guaranteed judicial independence.3 In spite of the liberal constitution, the post-colonial
state was autocratic at its inception because it inherited wholesale the laws, culture, and practices of the
1See

Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 711-12
(1996).

2Africa

Watch, KENYA: TAKING LIBERTIES 5 (1991).

3See

H. W. O. Okoth-Ogendo, “Law and Government,” in KENYA: AN OFFICIAL HANDBOOK 27-35 (Republic of Kenya:
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1988).
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colonial state. In 1964 the opposition Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), under the
leadership of Daniel Toroitich arap Moi, President of Kenya since 1978, voluntarily dissolved and
joined the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU), headed by the nation’s first African head of
state, the late Mzee Jomo Kenyatta. The merger made Kenya a de facto one-party state and paved
the way for a despotic executive.4
2

In the absence of a legalized and official opposition, although the constitution allowed
parliamentary democracy, President Kenyatta quickly created a highly centralized, authoritarian
republic, reminiscent of the colonial state. Although Oginga Odinga, then Vice President, broke
ranks to form the opposition Kenya Peoples’ Union (KPU), President Kenyatta outlawed it in 1969
and detained all its principal leaders.5 Upon President Kenyatta’s death, Vice President Moi
succeeded to the presidency in 1978. President Moi then took a number of important measures to
consolidate personal rule. The net effect of these measures was to heighten repression and
dramatically curtail all freedoms. Significantly, mismanagement, official corruption, and graft
skyrocketed. The national economy spiraled into a precipitous decline.
In June 1982, after popular calls for an open political system, President Moi pushed through the
single party parliament a constitutional amendment making Kenya a de jure one-party state.6
Several months later, an aborted coup by a section of the Kenya Air Force produced in President
Moi a determination to crush all dissent and concentrate all power in his hands. From then on,
President Moi worked to perfect the repressive state crafted by President Kenyatta. Thereafter, the
Party and the state became one. Through the government and KANU, he exercised extensive and
deep control over civic groups, trade unions, the press, the parliament, and most critically the
judiciary. Political murder, politically-instigated ethnic clashes, detention without trial, arbitrary
arrests and detentions, false and politically motivated charges of opponents, both real and
imagined, became the business of the state. The State, KANU officials and their agents committed
crimes with impunity. Laws and constitutional amendments, which abrogated due process
protections and the independence of the judiciary, were passed with little or no parliamentary
debate.
Even after the authorization of open political competition in 1991, President Moi and KANU
continued to resist the installation of democracy. The government used all its resources to
frustrate a genuine transition to democracy. Starting in 1992, the state periodically engineered and
orchestrated inter-ethnic violence, particularly against communities that supported opposition
political parties. The police and security forces constantly invoked colonial-era legislation to restrict
the activities of the press and civic and human rights groups. The judiciary, which lacked
independence, and was viewed by Kenyans as subservient to the executive, continued to be a
captive instrument of repression. Even as the opposition united against KANU in 2002, Mr. Moi
4See Makau wa Mutua, Human Rights and State Despotism in Kenya: Institutional Problems , 41 AFRICA TODAY 50 (1994). See
also Jennifer Widener, THE RISE OF A PARTY STATE IN KENYA: FROM HARAMBEE TO NYAYO! (1992).
5International Commission of Jurists, DEMOCRATISATION AND THE RULE OF LAW IN KENYA 11 (1997).
6In 1982, President Moi forced a constitutional amendment, making Kenya officially a one-party state. It provided that “There shall
be in Kenya only one political party, the African National National Union.” See Section 2A, CONSTITUTION OF KENYA
(AMENDMENT) ACT NO. 7 OF 1982.
* To be revisited later
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was still engaged in repressive tactics and the unlawful use of state machinery to stifle the
opposition. But the writing was clearly on the wall.

3

On December 27, 2002, Mr. Mwai Kibaki, a former Vice President under former President Moi, and
leader of the largely united opposition, was overwhelmingly elected President of Kenya, ushering in
regime change in an historic election that decisively ended the 24-year reign of President Moi.
Those elections offered Kenyans a genuine opportunity to construct a democratic state and to
confront the abuses of the past.
Human Rights Deficit
Over its forty-year rule of Kenya, KANU failed to foster a culture of the rule of law and respect for
human rights. The list of human rights violations and economic crimes is too long to tabulate. But
the most severe have included political assassinations, torture and detention without trial, police
brutality, massacres of communities, sexual abuse and violence against women and girls,
politically instigated ethnic clashes, and a host of economic crimes such as the looting of the public
purse and land grabbing. All these violations were perpetrated in spite of the fact that the Kenyan
constitution guarantees on its face fundamental rights. Over time, the government substantially
eroded and weakened many of the safeguards since independence. The Bill of Rights7 gives
individuals basic rights but then restricts them with qualifying limitations, otherwise known as claw
back clauses.8 Derogations from the Bill of Rights are also permitted during an emergency.9 The
first major blow to the rule of law came in 1966 when the nascent state passed the Preservation of
Public Security Act (PPSA),10 in essence re-enacting colonial detention laws. Under the PPSA, the
government detained scores of its outspoken critics, tortured and harassed their spouses, children,
and relatives, and in the process stifled calls for democratic change and an open society. Although
on its face constitutional – and even formally a democracy since 1992, the Kenyan state was in
reality until 2002 highly repressive and authoritarian, trapped in the culture of the one-party state.
In a revealing admission of lawlessness, Attorney General Amos Wako, stated in 1991 that “a
characteristic of the rule of law is that no man, save for the president, is above the law.”11 As noted
in 1997 by the respected Geneva-based International Commission of Jurists, the “Executive is still
an overarching and predatory institution shadowing and preying upon the other two constitutionally
co-equal branches of government – the Legislature and the Judiciary.”12 Indeed, the last decade of
7Sections

70-83, CONSTITUTION OF KENYA.
instance, Section 76(1), CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, protects individuals against arbitrary search and entry but then Section
76 (2) qualifies such protection, in part, in the following language:
3

8For

Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in
contravention with of this section to the extent that the law in question makes provision (a) that is reasonably
required in the interests of defense, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and country
planning, the development and utilization of mineral resources, or the development and utilization of any other
property in such a manner as to promote the public benefit.
9Section
10CAP.

83, CONSTITUTION OF KENYA.

57, LAWS OF KENYA.

11The Rule of Law Will Prevail , WEEKLY REVIEW, July 12, 1991, at 26 [reprint of the Attorney General’s first speech to
parliament].
12International

Commission of Jurists, DEMOCRATISATION AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 5, at 19.
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multi-partyism witnessed the increased fragmentation of Kenya and the escalation of the divideand rule tactics of the Moi government. State despotism sapped the energy of virtually all sectors
of society – the parliament, the political opposition, trade unions, non-governmental organizations,
the press, and opposition political parties – through political killings, intimidation, harassment and
sexual abuse of women, girls, and children, religious discrimination, official corruption, arbitrary
arrests and the persecution of political opponents. Additionally, the state pursued deliberate
policies of marginalisation and exclusion and perpetrated injustices with particular reference to land
distribution and access to economic resources.
Kenya is in a transition to democracy. But that transition will be stillborn unless Kenya creates
institutions to cultivate the rule of law and a culture that promotes and protects human rights. In its
transition to democracy – and the next five years will be pivotal – Kenya must unequivocally and
with uncompromising determination first reverse the corrupted soul created by KANU and then
reconstruct the state from the ground up. Kenya’s political, legal, economic, social, and cultural
renaissance must recreate both the state and the society in their entirety. Human rights are the
device for the realization of human dignity. The corpus of human rights norms stands between the
tyranny of power and the indignity of powerlessness.
The responsibility for the realization of multi-partyism and human dignity has been borne by the
Kenyan people. Examples include the struggles waged by the civil society, religious organizations,
individual politicians, and other Kenyans. It is at this delicate intersection that human rights
standards must be deployed to reform and de-fang the state. But human rights norms must do
more. They must contain the demonic proclivities of the state and turn it into a living nursery for
the growth and development of every one of its citizens and residents. But the state will not
accomplish these tasks unless it understands human rights in their robust, full, and liberating
potential and scope. That is why human rights must be understood in their totality. These include
not only the vaunted civil and political rights, which are essential for the rudiments of political
democracy, but also the much-maligned economic, social, and cultural rights, which are the critical
building blocks for social democracy.
Kenya and Transitional Justice
In the last two decades, the concept of transitional justice has come to represent the midwife for a
democratic, rule of law state. The script for the construction of such a phase is now regarded as an
indispensable building block for constitution-making, peace-building, and national reconciliation in
states emerging out of dictatorship. In fact, policy-makers and statesmen now increasingly realize
that a human rights state – a political society that internalizes human rights norms – cannot be
created unless the society concretely addresses the grievances of the past. The truth commission
has become the effective tool for addressing the abominations of the past.
The term transitional justice captures two critical notions. First, it acknowledges the temporary
measures that must be implemented to build confidence for the construction of a state ravaged by
human rights violations and the plunder of public resources. Secondly, by its own definition, it
rejects the application of any rigid set of norms or criteria as a beachhead to the future. In other
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words, transitional justice calls for deep concessions on either side of the divide, between victims
and perpetrators. No single party or faction can be fully satisfied. Non-concessionary demands or
non-conciliatory denials can only foil the truce that is essential for national reconstruction. But
equally important is the realization that transitional justice does not mean impunity for the most
hideous offenders, for to do so would be to encourage a culture of unaccountability for past
abuses. Hence a balance must be struck between, on the one hand, justice for the victims and
some form of retribution against some of the offenders, and on the other hand, a measure of
magnanimity and forgiveness on the part of victims. This is the plausible path if reconciliation is to
become a reality.
The world now lives in extraordinary times during which most societies are in a state of transition.
For most states in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and East/Central Europe, the transition is from
controlled, single party, or military regimes into more open societies based on constitutionalism and
respect for human rights. In the more established political democracies in the West, the challenges
include transitions to more diverse societies and the role of the state in a variety of social guises.
In either case, every country is today faced with the challenge of some form of transition or other.
But how will these transitions be managed, and what or who will assist in these monumental
changes?
The vast majority of states do not have adequate human and material resources to effect
meaningful transitions. Yet there are not enough or appropriate international institutions that can
effectively respond to these needs. This means that most states will have to look inward for
resources and personnel to effect their transitions to more humane societies. Thus new
governments must craft well thought out transitional agendas and programs to recreate the state.
Laws, policies, and public institutions have to undergo radical and substantive transformation. New
institutions may have to be created, while some old ones may need to be abolished or reformed.
The culture of the public service and the citizenry in general has to undergo deep transformation if
the new state is to be realized. In short, a society cannot fundamentally change if the transition
from autocracy and the plunder of public resources to democracy does not become a reality. For
Kenya, the truth commission could be the central vehicle for implementing the project of transitional
justice.
The truth commission is a relatively new institution in the universe of law and justice; it is about two
decades old as a vehicle for transitional justice. Each country where it has been established –
starting in Argentina and later in Uganda, South Africa, El Salvador, Chile, Argentina, Peru, Ghana,
Sierra Leone, among others – has had to improvise and craft an institution that was determined by
the particular country’s traumatic history and the balance of the political forces. That is why there
is no model truth commission anywhere that Kenya can simply mimic. Kenyans should learn from
the experiences of all these countries, and decide the type of a truth commission they desire to
establish mindful of the complexities of Kenya’s particular history.
The truth commission is now an internationally familiar conception and institution for a state
emerging from a period of gross human rights abuses and abominable economic crimes and
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debating how to address them. The term truth commission serves as the generic designation of a
type of governmental organ that is intended to construct a record of this tragic and barbaric history.
Thus truth commissions offer countries ways of responding to years of bare-knuckled barbarism, of
horrific human rights violations that took place for political, ethnic, religious, tribal, economic class,
ideological, gender, and other conflicts over justice, power, and the control of economic resources.
Truth commissions may be an alternative to other national responses to these abuses. At one
extreme, these responses could include criminal prosecutions, and on the other, the granting of
blanket amnesties to the perpetrators. Key actors to addressing past abuses include traditional,
religious, and civic organizations. Truth commissions are established for gross human rights
violations that normal courts cannot, are unwilling, or are unable, to address. Each country must
decide where a truth commission fits between each of these two poles, those of amnesty and
prosecution. Truth commissions are created principally at the time of a state’s transition toward a
more democratic and participatory government, a government that espouses the ideals of
democracy, of power bounded by law, of formal legal equality, and social justice. It matters not
how the moment of political change occurred; it could have been violent or non-violent, such as
Kenya’s. What matters is that there is a normative and substantive departure by the successor
government or state from its predecessor. Thus it could be change from autocracy to democracy,
from opacity to transparency, from open shameless graft to fiscal and economic accountability. But
that change must be structural, ideological, and fundamental; it cannot be a continuation of the
same. The change must signal real and genuine regime change.
Truth commissions seek multiple objectives, which are all interrelated. They can act as a sort of a
national catharsis in which the country goes through a deep and penetrating process of cleansing
the past. This function is akin to therapy. It can perform the function of moral reconstruction, in
which a country takes stock of its morality in politics, governance, cultural values, and its view of
humanity. Moral reconstruction implies learning lessons from the past and revising the nation’s
moral code. It could be a vehicle for reconciliation after truth and justice have been told and done.
Here, society must pass judgment on what it has heard; it must, in effect, establish a moral account
of the historical record.
Another function, which is probably the most important one, is that of truth telling, where the
perpetrators bare all, and the victims recount the horrors visited upon them by the sadism of the
state. From this truth, several options are available: a society may choose to forget or ignore the
truth, gloss over it, or use it to sanction the perpetrators and deploy it for the moral and political
reconstruction of the state. Some commissions seek the truth, others justice or reconciliation, and
some all three. Most truth commissions are victim-centred; victims must be allowed to express
themselves in the language of their choice.
Many Kenyans seek redress and justice for past violations, yet others are committed to a journey
of forgiveness and reconciliation. Some victims of past abuses have asserted that they may only
contemplate forgiveness after a full public accounting and justice have been done. The majority of
Kenyans have stated that as a rule of law regime, the Kibaki-led NARC government cannot be
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business-as-usual, and allow criminals to get away without facing the law and due process. The
2002 elections gave Kenya an opportunity to recreate the state, build democratic institutions, and
inculcate a democratic culture. That is why a competent and effective truth commission,
established by a new government, would go a long way in restoring confidence in Kenya and lifting
it from the ranks of the most undesirable countries.
In the Kenyan context, a truth commission would have to be faithful to several variables. Firstly, it is
important that the proceedings of the Truth Commission be carried live on radio and television
countrywide. The commission should have the power to require any person to appear before it and
completely submit to its instructions or be held in contempt and jailed. It ought to be empowered to
facilitate, and, where necessary, initiate or coordinate inquiries into: gross violations of human
rights and economic crimes, including violations which were part of a systematic nature; the nature,
causes, and extent of gross violations of human rights and economic crimes, including the
antecedents, circumstances, factors, context, motives and perspectives that led to the violations;
the identity of all persons, authorities, institutions, and organizations involved in such violations;
and establish whether the violations were the result of deliberate planning on the part of the state
or any of its organs, or any political organization, official, or individual.
The truth commission should establish accountability - both political, moral, and legal - for the
violations; facilitate, initiate, gather, and coordinate the collection of information and evidence from
any person, including victims, which establish the identity of the victims of such violations, and their
perpetrators; establish the fate and status of victims, and the extent of harm, suffering, or loss
incurred by them; determine what compensation, reparations, and restitution should be awarded to
victims, their families, and survivors; recommend the dismissal and barring from public service or
politics of particular perpetrators; recommend the seizure, forfeiture, and surrender of illegally
acquired property and other material goods, including money and other fiscal instruments; and
make referrals to the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs or the Attorney General on the
perpetrators to be prosecuted and sanctioned.
The commission’s final report should be made public in its entirety. Additionally, the Commission
should be given authority to recommend if a limited number of amnesties with qualified immunity
ought to be granted to further the ends of its mandate. Ideally, the truth commission should last a
maximum of two years.
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CHAPTER 3: FINDINGS
Section 6. HOW AND WHEN TO ESTABLISH THE TRUTH COMMISSION
How Should a Truth Commission be Established?
The Task Force received varied views on how the truth commission should be established.
Citizens offered three options by which the government could establish a truth commission. A truth
commission could be established by a presidential order, through an Act of parliament, or by
entrenching it in the Constitution. The Task Force admits there are merits and demerits for
whichever method is adopted. But there are four elements or variables that are key to the choice
that must be made. These are: the speed with which a truth commission ought to be set up, the
powers that would be vested in it, the support that it would garner from various constituencies, and
the ability or political will to set up the commission. After taking into account all these variables,
and the views of Kenyans, the Task Force recommends that a truth commission be set up by a
presidential order.
Many Kenyans felt that the truth commission ought to be established through an Act of Parliament.
They felt that legislating a truth commission would give it adequate powers and insulate it from the
whims of the executive, a fate that has all too often met past presidential commissions under
KANU governments. But they also wanted a truth commission established immediately. The Task
Force then had to reconcile these two positions. The Task Force rejected the legislative route
because it is of the view that the Kenyan parliament has too many competing, vested, and selfprotective interests that would delay, scuttle, or give the country a truth commission that would be
devoid of any meaningful powers. Many members of parliament and some political parties are
either ambivalent or hostile to a truth commission. The recent debate in parliament regarding the
resettlement of clash victims is instructive in this respect. Taking the matter to parliament is certain
to kill it or produce an anemic truth commission.
The Presidential approach, however, has the advantage of speed. The Judicial Commission of
Inquiry into the Goldenberg Affair is the best example of the advisability of the presidential route.
Besides, the executive’s commitment to transitional justice, the fight against corruption, and the
reform agenda is a strong indication that President Kibaki would set up an effective and
independent truth commission. A strong presidential commission is a mitigating factor against the
limitation on powers to prosecute, for example, but is still a far more preferable option. The Task
Force is impressed by the Kibaki Presidency, and in particular its setting up and expansion of the
Goldenberg Commission. This is a radical departure from the Moi Presidency and its treatment of
presidential commissions, and hence the faith of the Task Force in recommending the
establishment of a presidential truth commission.
The Task Force considered, and rejected, the suggestion that a truth commission be established
by entrenching it in the constitution. First, the wisdom of the constitutional method is scant; a truth
commission is a temporary institution that ought not to concern the constitution. Secondly, it is not
certain when the new constitution would come into force. Third, the particular truth commission
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institution contemplated in the draft constitution is a strange and unfocused vehicle for addressing
past abuses. For all these reasons, and its unpopularity with Kenyans, the constitutional approach
fails, and is not an acceptable method.
The Task Force therefore recommends that the truth commission be established by a presidential
order under the Commission of Inquiry Act. The Task Force was also persuaded by the
experiences of other countries in arriving at this conclusion.
When Should a Truth Commission be Established?
The views of Kenyans are unequivocal on the need for a truth commission to address past abuses.
The Task Force has determined that there are high hopes and expectations among the people that
the grievances of the past will be addressed. Kenyans also overwhelmingly told the Task Force
that the government must make a clean break with the past. Citizens expect this break to be made
urgently and soon so that the people can adjust and plan their lives in a new dispensation. It was
clear from the views of Kenyans that human and economic rights violations are part of the horrible
past, which must be urgently brought to a close. Thus the Task Force recommends that the truth
commission be established no later than June 2004. This recommendation is informed by the fact
that truth commissions are most effective when established within the first two years of political
transitions or regime change, otherwise governments consolidate their power and retrogress to
past practices.
The Duration of the Truth Commission
A truth commission is an intense, laborious, and expensive undertaking. It taxes the energies and
resources of all concerned, be they victims, perpetrators, and the nation at large. A commission
that takes a long time is not in the best interest of the country. The Commission must however
have adequate time – neither too long nor too short – to discharge its mandate. Bearing in mind
the experiences of other countries, the Task Force recommends that a truth commission for Kenya
should last for 18 months, with the option by the president to extend its life for a terminal six
months.

Section 7. THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE TRUTH COMMISSION
Since the December 2002 elections, Kenyans have sought more accountability from the state,
particularly in appointments to public office. Kenyans now demand fair representation,
consultation, and participation in official decision-making. That is why appointments to the truth
commission must be beyond reproach. The Task Force is acutely aware of this matter, and has
been faithful to the views of Kenyans in recommending the criteria for appointment to the truth
commission. Thus the Task Force makes the following recommendations that pay attention to
expertise, competence, gender, and the diversity of Kenya.
• The Commission should consist of 11 commissioners appointed by the President after
consultations with all stakeholders by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs;
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• The President, in appointing the members of the Commission, shall have regard to the
integrity, sense of fairness, and ability of the appointees;
• The President, in appointing members of the Commission, shall ensure that more than one
third of members shall be women; that no fewer than three members shall be religious
leaders; that one third of the members shall be lawyers; and that at least one person with
disability is appointed commissioner;
• The President shall make the appointment of the commissioners known by proclamation in
the Kenya Gazette;
• The President shall designate one of the commissioners as the Chairperson, and another as
the Vice-chairperson, of the Commission;
• The members shall be appointed as full-time officers for the duration of the Commission and
shall enjoy the status of the judge of the High Court, except the Chairperson who shall be in
the rank of a judge of the Court of Appeal;
• A member of the Commission may resign membership by written notice to the President and
may be removed from office by the President for inability to perform the functions assigned;
• The President may remove a commissioner from office on the grounds of misbehavior,
incapacity or incompetence, as determined by the vote of at least two-thirds of the
Commissioners;
• Where a vacancy occurs in the membership of the Commission because of dismissal,
resignation, disability or death of a member, the President shall appoint another person to
replace the member
It is important to note that the size and composition of the truth commission are critical to its
effectiveness. The Task Force realized during its public hearings that an effective truth commission
should be broad enough to accommodate sufficient public representation and participation in its
deliberations. That is why it has recommended that the truth commission be composed of 11
members to achieve these goals. The diversity of the country in terms of geography, ethnicity,
race, creed and religion, age, gender, disability, profession, and social status should be key
considerations in appointing members. The Task Force recommends that lawyers constitute one
third of the commissioners because of the legal nature of the work of truth commissions. Expertise,
integrity, and competence must be paramount factors in the appointment of commissioners.

Section 8. THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR A TRUTH COMMISSION
One of the least contested questions in the quest for a truth commission for Kenya relates to its
terms of reference or the matters that it must address, that is, the types of violations that it must
investigate. Although different communities, groups, and individuals around the country expressed
particular preferences to the Task Force, there is no doubt about the functions that Kenyans want a
truth commission to perform. Kenyans want a truth commission to perform four interrelated
functions. These are establishing the truth about past atrocities by identifying the perpetrators and
the reasons behind their actions; recognizing victims and providing justice or some form of redress
for the harm and suffering inflicted on them by the previous governments; auditing the state and
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suggesting corrective measures to avoid a recurrence of abuses; and creating an enabling
environment for national reconciliation and healing.
But Kenyans are clear that these functions cannot be successfully performed unless established
categories of human rights violations and economic crimes are fully investigated and addressed.
While it is true that many horrible and unimaginable violations have been perpetrated by the state
over the last forty years, the Task Force believes that a truth commission cannot investigate every
human rights violation. The Task Force therefore recommends that a truth commission address
certain categories of violations. The violations that ought to form the terms of reference of a truth
commission must be those that indicate a systemic pattern or state policies, actions that were
carried out as policies of the state to abrogate the rights of Kenyans. Thus a truth commission
must have the discretion to decide which violations qualify for scrutiny. In any case, it is
practically impossible for a truth commission to address more than several thousand cases. That
is why the Task Force has identified individual cases and groups of violations that it believes
ought to be the subject of inquiry. The Task Force has made this choice consistent with the views
of Kenyans and with due regard to the purposes of an effective, timely, and the least burdensome
truth commission. The Task Force recommends that a truth commission investigates six
categories of human rights violations and economic crimes.

Political Assassinations and Killings
It is an undeniable fact that the Kenyan state has over the last forty years of the reign of KANU
employed political murder as an instrument of silencing political dissent, stifling democratic
opposition, and creating a despotic, authoritarian, and murderous state. The Task Force heard,
over and over again, harrowing accounts of how prominent and ordinary Kenyans, whom the state
deemed political dissidents, have been assassinated and murdered by the state over the years. It
is a telling testimony of the state’s planning and execution of dozens of assassinations and
murders of political leaders and government critics that virtually no one has been held accountable
for these killings.
The purpose of the killings, without doubt, was to eliminate political opponents and all those who
would oppose the monopoly of power enjoyed by KANU from 1963 to 2002. Kenyans are united in
their demand that political murder must never again be an instrument of state policy to silence
political dissent or government critics. Kenyans want the perpetrators of political killings
investigated and called to account, their victims recognized, and justice done. Impunity for these
killings must be ended, and the only sure way of doing so is by holding those responsible
accountable.
Political killings and assassinations are divided into two categories, those of prominent Kenyans,
and those of ordinary wananchi who were deemed to be critical of, or opposed to, KANU over
the last forty years. The Task Force recommends that a truth commission should investigate a
number of these killings, including those of Pio Gama Pinto, J.M. Kariuki, Dr. Robert Ouko, and
Father Anthony Kaiser. Among the most significant political assassination was that of the late J.
M. Kariuki in 1975. The Task Force also recommends that the truth commission select a number
of killings of ordinary wananchi for investigation.
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Massacres and Possible Genocides
The use of political violence by the state to quash opposition to it was directed not only at
individuals, but also at groups and communities. By far the most brutal massacres of Kenyans
have been carried out in Northern Kenya, and in particular North Eastern Province, which has
since the colonial time been the epicenter of human rights violations in Kenya. Since
independence, KANU governments have treated Northern Kenya as enemy territory and its
residents as second-class citizens. The region is an abject lesson in marginalisation and official
neglect. It has been rendered so remote and inhospitable that its residents do not – and cannot –
feel Kenyan. Frequent military expeditions, the brutality of the provincial and district
administrations, massacres, the castration of males, the rape of women and girls, the dumping of
toxic waste, and the complete lack of development have turned the area into a vast wasteland.
A truth commission must investigate all the massacres in the region, particularly the Wagalla
Massacre in which thousands were brutally and callously exterminated by state security forces.
The Wagalla Massacre may meet the criteria for genocide since it was directed at one community,
the Degodia. Other massacres include the Bagalla Massacre, the Malka-Mari Massacre, and many
others in the region. The truth commission must also investigate the Kisumu Massacre of 1969 in
which scores were brutally murdered when President Kenyatta visited the area. That massacre
came to symbolize the proclivity of KANU governments to repress citizens of the Luo community in
Kenya.
Political Violence and Killings of Democracy Advocates
In the late 1980s until 2002, the Moi government pursued an open policy of using naked state
violence to suppress and vanquish the political opposition and pro-democracy campaigners,
among them civil society, opposition political parties, journalists, students, the clergy, and any
and every real or imagined political dissident. Opposition political rallies and meetings of
government critics were frequently broken up, and violently so. Police and security forces have
killed scores of reformers throughout the last two decades. But perhaps the most memorable use
of state violence against pro-democracy advocates was the Saba Saba incident of July 7, 1997 in
which government agents killed more than a dozen Kenyans. A truth commission must
investigate Saba Saba and other similar incidents.

Torture, Detention, Exile, Disappearances, Rape, and Persecution of Opponents
Over the last forty years, the state used its enormous power and resources to vanquish all those
deemed its opponents. The torture of government critics became state policy. Hundreds, if not
thousands, have been tortured and mistreated by the previous governments. Many were killed in
the process, while others were maimed for life. Some were castrated. Women and girls were
raped. The Nyayo House Torture Chambers, which the Task Force visited, and which the Minister
for Justice and Constitutional Affairs has termed a national monument of shame, stands as the
living testimony of the brutality of the state.
It was a dungeon where political opponents were stripped of their humanity and subjected to the
cruelest of torture tactics. Many other state opponents were detained without trial or jailed on
trumped up politically motivated charges. Some, like Mr. Kenneth Matiba, were ruined beyond
repair by detention. Some were disappeared, while others, like the celebrated writer Professor

31

Ngugi wa Thiong’o, were forced into exile. The list goes on. A truth commission must investigate
these abuses.
Politically Instigated Ethnic Clashes
Throughout the 1990s, the Moi government instigated and at times directed the ignition and
execution of ethnic clashes against communities that were deemed to be in opposition to it.
Directed at so-called opposition communities and zones, these clashes exploited the volatile
question of land as their pretext. Communities that had lived peaceably together for decades were
suddenly turned against each other as the KANU state sought to stamp out opposition to its rule.
Various investigations and reports by the Law Society of Kenya, the churches, the Kiliku Report,
the Akiwumi Report, and many others established beyond the shadow of a doubt that KANU, its
senior officials, their allies, many of its members of parliament and local politicians, the police and
security forces, and the provincial and district administrations either instigated or carried out
attacks against individuals and communities deemed opponents of the regimes.
In both the Rift Valley and Coast Provinces, in particular, Kenyans from certain communities were
termed “foreigners” and either killed outright, their lands forcibly taken, their property and livestock
confiscated or destroyed, women and girls from their communities raped and beaten, and their
lives irreparably ruined. Many of these “foreigners” were forcibly exiled from the provinces and
dared to return. Thousands were killed and hundreds of thousands internally displaced in the socalled land clashes. Deep wounds have been left on the Kenyan psyche by these clashes. The
epicenters of the clashes, such as Molo, Enoosopukia, Likoni, and many other places must form a
central component of the terms of reference of a truth commission, and must be fully investigated.
The truth commission ought to establish culpability and make recommendations for redressing
these most abominable of violations.
The truth commission, in its investigation of land and ethnic clashes, shall pay particular attention
to historical claims and distortions brought about by colonialism. These historical problems were
not addressed, and have in fact been compounded by post-colonial governments. Further, the
Task Force recommends that the government expand the mandate of the recently appointed land
commission to fully investigate and settle historical land problems with finality.
Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Economic crimes are a difficult matter to investigate and establish culpability. Quite often, whitecollar criminals are adept at covering their tracks and concealing the chain of evidence. Human
rights violations or bodily integrity violations, on the other hand, are easier to verify and establish
because human bodies are the primary evidence. That is why most truth commissions have found
it difficult to address economic crimes. Even so, economic crimes are so intertwined with human
rights violations that it is impossible to establish watertight compartments between the two types of
violations. This is more so in the Kenyan case where economic crimes were committed as part and
parcel of human rights violations.
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Land, for example, is an economic asset, and the killing or forcible eviction of the lawful owners
from their lands constitutes both economic crimes and human rights violations. Similarly, the
looting of the public purse and the stealing of public monies in bank accounts at home or abroad
has translated into a collapsed infrastructure and economic decomposition. Deaths on Kenya’s
horrible roads, the absence of medicines and hospital equipment, the pathetic state of Kenyan
schools, and a host of other ills are directly attributable to the theft of public funds and property by
previous governments over the last forty years.
Economic crimes lead to the violations of the entire gamut of human rights, and in particular of
economic, social and cultural rights. It is a well-established fact in human rights law that all human
rights – including economic, social and cultural rights – are indivisible, interdependent, and
interrelated. Thus human rights law does not only refer to civil and political rights. The Republic of
Kenya has an internationally binding obligation to protect all human rights, that is, civil and political
rights, and economic, social and cultural rights because it is a signatory to both the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. That is why a truth commission should investigate the violations of civil and
political rights as well as those of economic, social and cultural rights. It is important to note that
violations of economic, social and cultural rights disproportionately affect both women and children.
These include the rights to shelter, education, water, work, health, and a host of others. Kenya is a
patriarchal society in which women and children are the most vulnerable individuals, and on whom
the violations of economic, social and cultural rights have the greatest impact. This is a matter to
which the truth commission ought to pay special attention.
The Task Force realizes that a truth commission should not investigate the bulk of economic
crimes because the Goldenberg Commission and other state offices are looking into them. In
addition, economic crimes, due to their complexity, are very difficult to investigate. Yet, the Task
Force believes that a truth commission should investigate a selected set of economic crimes that
directly lead to the violations of economic, social and cultural rights. A few examples will suffice.
The failure by a contractor for the production and provision of clean and safe drinking water
because of fraud or theft of public funds resulting in ill health or deaths ought to be the subject of
an investigation by a truth commission. The same should be true for the grabbing of public land to
displace a school, a community cultural center, or other public amenities. A fraudulent contract for
providing medical supplies could also be the subject of scrutiny. In other words, a truth
commission should address a selected set of economic crimes that have a direct bearing on the
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.
It is the view of the Task Force that the truth commission ought to be given powers to negotiate
with perpetrators of economic crimes for the return of public property, wealth, and monies in
exchange for recommendations for a limited amnesty or immunity from prosecution. The truth
commission should be empowered to establish a Victim’s Compensation and Rehabilitation Fund
from such property and funds.
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Section 9. THE POWERS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE TRUTH COMMISSION

The Powers of the Truth Commission
Kenyans are clear that they want an independent and effective truth commission. Kenyans
repeatedly reminded the Task Force in both their oral and written submissions that they are
skeptical of government commissions. It is common knowledge that government commissions
were established by previous regimes to hoodwink the people, to equivocate, and deceive the
public that investigations would be undertaken and the rule of law upheld. Yet, in reality, many
government commissions were either disbanded before completing their work or their reports were
never made public or implemented. Most of the commissions were undermined through financial
starvation, intimidation, or interference from the Executive and other high-ranking officials. In
effect, Kenyans told the Task Force that government commissions have in the past been a charade
and a waste of public resources. But Kenyans have faith that the Kibaki government will depart
from the tradition of former regimes by respecting the intelligence of Kenyans.
It is in this context that Kenyans told the Task Force that a truth commission should not be a
whitewash or an instrument for deceiving Kenyans and allowing past offenders to escape scot-free.
Kenyans want a truth commission to be fully empowered, independent, and to conduct its affairs in
daylight. They believe that only such a commission can bring out the whole truth, provide justice,
and lead to national reconciliation and healing. The Task Force concurs with Kenyans on this
critical question. It therefore recommends the following powers and privileges for a truth
commission.
The Independence of the Truth Commission
The independence of a truth commission is key to its success and effectiveness. Although the
Task Force has recommended that a truth commission be established by a presidential order, and
not through an Act of parliament, a fact that may formally make it less independent, the Task Force
believes this approach does not necessarily compromise its independence if there is political will
and good faith on the part of the executive. In this respect, the President must, when establishing
the truth commission, publicly commit to Kenyans that he will give the truth commission ample
powers, that he will fully support it morally and with resources, and that he will not interfere with its
work. Thus the executive must publicly commit to the financial and functional independence of the
truth commission.
The commission must have the power to raise and receive funds, resources, and other forms of
support from any source, both local and foreign. The President must declare that there are no
sacred cows for the truth commission whether in his government or in previous regimes, and that
he will allow the commission’s investigations to lead wherever they might. In this connection,
therefore, the truth commission must have the authority to run its own affairs, hire and constitute its
own secretariat, write its own regulations, and conceptualize and execute its mandate pursuant to
its terms of reference.
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The Powers to Investigate Past Violations and Offenders
A central purpose of a truth commission is to establish a correct and truthful historical account of
past abuses, identify the perpetrators, and the reasons for their actions. This purpose cannot be
accomplished unless the truth commission is given adequate investigative powers, and receives
proper cooperation from the executive, law enforcement agencies, and the judiciary. Thus the truth
commission must have the powers to call witnesses and compel them to appear on pain of
contempt; it must have access to all official records and documents that are relevant to its work; it
must have the power to inquire, enter both official and private premises in search of evidence; and
it must receive the full and complete cooperation of all government officials, departments, and
institutions. In other words, the truth commission must expect that the state will facilitate its
investigations and inquiries.
The Power to Make Recommendations
The truth commission is not a judicial body, although it enjoys a quasi-judicial status. Although a
truth commission cannot issue judicial orders, it must have the power to make a wide range of
recommendations. These include the power to recommend the prosecution of offenders; the
power to recommend reparations, restitution, and compensation; the power to recommend that
particular individuals be barred from public office, otherwise known as lustration; the power to
negotiate with perpetrators for the return of stolen property and public funds in exchange for a
limited amnesty and immunity from prosecution; the power to recommend that anyone who acts in
contempt of the truth commission, commits perjury, or obstructs in any way the work of the truth
commission, be subjected to severe judicial sanctions; the power to recommend that stolen
property or public funds be returned either to their rightful owners or to the state to form part of the
Victim’s Compensation and Rehabilitation Fund (VCRF); the power to set up the VCRF; and the
power to recommend corrective measures to prevent a recurrence of past abuses.
The Power of Transparency
Past presidential commissions have failed to act transparently. The truth commission must break
this tradition. It must have the power to hold its hearings in public, and to determine when it should
sit in camera; it must have the power to broadcast its sessions live on radio and television, and to
be covered live by all media; it must have the power to make its report and findings public within a
short time of its submission to the head of state; and it must have the power to name names and
release any other information to the public that it deems fit. In this connection, the truth
commission should have the power to freely carry out civic education and engage in any other
public campaigns that would advance its work.
The Power to Recommend the Grant of Conditional Amnesty
The truth commission, in its wisdom, and in furtherance of its work, may recommend the grant of
conditional amnesty to past offenders in exchange for full disclosure to particular questions.
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The Power to Negotiate and to Receive Stolen Wealth, Property, or Funds
The truth commission should be empowered to negotiate with offenders for the return of stolen
funds, wealth, or property in exchange for immunity or a conditional amnesty.
The Power to Promote Reconciliation, National Healing and Unity
The truth commission should be empowered to promote reconciliation, national healing, and
unity through mediation, civic education, and other public campaigns.

The Privileges of the Truth Commission
The truth commission and its commissioners should be shielded from both criminal and civil liability
in the execution of their duties. In particular, the truth commission and its commissioners, as well
as the staff, should enjoy immunity from defamation and libel suits with respect to their work. Such
immunity shall extend to all the witnesses and all those who appear before the truth commission.

Section 10. HISTORICAL PERIOD TO BE COVERED BY THE TRUTH COMMISSION
The historical period to be covered by a truth commission is usually a matter of great national
debate. Kenya has not been an exception. This is particularly the case because since the
founding of Kenya as a state in 1895 by the British, the country has been defined by gross
atrocities and its lack of basic freedoms. Theoretically, it can be argued that Kenya’s abominations
are directly linked to its creation and the distortions that were effected in the colonial period. The
land problems in many parts of the country owe their origins to colonial policies. Some of the
ethnic problems are traceable to that period. Some Kenyans in the Rift Valley, North Eastern,
Coast, and even Central provinces voiced this view. But the choice of the historical period to be
addressed by a truth commission must be informed by many factors. Colonial atrocities and the
distortions of the era should not therefore be the determinant factor, important though that era is.
But the Task Force is cognizant of the importance of the pain and anguish that Kenyans still suffer
because of the legacy of colonialism. Colonial land alienation and the dispossession of some
citizens in the Rift Valley and in areas historically occupied by the Maasai, for example, are vivid
examples. The Task Force heard first hand the wrongs committed against peoples in the region by
the British. The same is true of Central Province and parts of Eastern province. The Mau Mau war
of liberation was a quest for both liberty and the repossession of lands from which Africans were
alienated in these provinces. The atrocities by the British in Northern Kenya, and North Eastern
Province in particular, left indelible marks in the region and consigned it to the backwaters of
Kenya. The colonial atrocities in the Coast Province through multiple invasions by atrocious
powers can never be forgotten. But the Task Force believes that serious as the human rights
violations of the colonial era were, they ought not to be addressed by a truth commission. The
reasons are simple and straight- forward.
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First, that period is too remote in time, and the questions that it raises are too complex for a
transitional justice instrument like a truth commission. Evidence would be scant; many of the
perpetrators are long dead or in the United Kingdom. Secondly, the answerable power is not
Kenya but the United Kingdom, and truth commissions are not generally established to investigate
a remote, departed power. Finally, extending the truth commission to the colonial period would be
an impossibly expensive, laboriously prohibitive, and practically unmanageable exercise. For
these reasons, the Task Force rejects 1895 as an impracticable time-line, and instead
recommends that the Kenya government sets up a less ambitious vehicle, such as a committee of
eminent Kenyans to examine a limited set of issues relating to the colonial period.
The Task Force suggests that such a committee could address the atrocities committed against
freedom fighters in different parts of the country. The purpose here would be to seek redress from
the British and recognize those who fell in the struggle to defend and liberate Kenya.
The Task Force therefore is of the view that a truth commission ought to cover the period from
1963 to 2002, the post colonial era and the period KANU ruled the country. But the Task Force
heard and rejected some minority views that the truth commission only addresses either the
politically instigated so-called ethnic clashes of the 1990s or the Moi Presidency from 1978 to
2002. The majority of Kenyans want a truth commission to address the post-colonial period from
1963 to 2002.
The reasons for this choice, which the Task Force endorses, are rational, compelling, and
unassailable. First, the period combines the first and the second regimes under KANU, and as
such cannot be said to be selective or directed at any particular community. This is important
because a truth commission cannot be legitimate if it appears to be an instrument to settle scores
against a particular former regime, community or individuals. Secondly, the post-colonial period is
very present, and not remote. Many of those who served in the independence government are still
alive. Thirdly, it stands to reason that Kenyans ought to rightly audit their own state, not the
colonial British state. Fourth, the human rights violations and gross economic crimes that the
majority of Kenyans want investigated were committed over the last forty years. Lastly, the
investigation span of the last forty years is financially feasible and defensible, practical, and could
be carried out within a two-year period. It is for these reasons that the Task Force recommends
that a truth commission cover the period from December 12, 1963 to December 31, 2002.
CONCLUSIONS
The Task Force therefore concludes that the government should establish an independent and
effective truth commission. It should be established by the President through the Commission of
Inquiry Act, Chapter 102 of the Laws of Kenya, and enjoy all the powers appertaining thereto. It
should have the power to investigate human rights violations such as political assassinations and
killings, so-called ethnic clashes, political violence by the state against opponents, detention,
torture, and harassment, massacres, the violations of the rights of women, including rape and
sexual abuse, and economic crimes that directly lead to the violations of economic, social and
cultural rights, among others. The Task Force should have the power to make recommendations
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on lustration, redress, and other victim-centered measures. It should also promote national healing
and reconciliation. Finally, the truth commission should investigate abuses committed between
1963 and 2002.
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CHAPTER 4. RECOMMENDATION
Section 11. THE TRUTH, JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
The Task Force was mandated to recommend to the Government the following institutional
architecture of a truth commission. The Task Force has therefore drafted, in the form of a
presidential commission, this comprehensive institutional framework. It provides the powers,
structures, composition, terms of reference, mandate, and the historical period to be covered by a
truth commission.
A commission to be known as the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission to inquire into
human rights violations in Kenya between 12th December 1963 and 31st December, 2002 by the
State, its organs and public officers with a view to seeking and promoting justice, national unity,
and reconciliation among the people of Kenya by recommending appropriate redress for persons
who have suffered any injury, hurt, damage, grievance or those who have in any other manner
been adversely affected through such acts and omissions as further specified in this commission.
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred upon the President by Section 3 of the
Commission of inquiry Act, I, Mwai Kibaki, President and Commander-in Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Republic of Kenya, do direct the commissioners to hold an inquiry at Nairobi and such other
places within the Republic of Kenya with effect from 1st June, 2004 and conclude the inquiry on or
before 30th June, 2006.
The objectives of this Commission shall be:
1) To seek and promote justice, national unity, healing, and reconciliation among the people of
Kenya –
a) By establishing accurate, complete and historical record of violations and abuses of human
rights and economic rights inflicted on persons by public institutions and holders of public
office between 12th December 1963 and 31st December 2002;
b) Establishing as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the
gross violations of human rights and economic rights which were committed during the
period from 12th December 1963 and 31st December 2002, including the antecedents,
circumstances, factors and context of such violations, as well as the perspectives of the
victims and the motives and perspectives of the persons responsible for the commission of
the violations, by conducting investigations and holding hearings;
c) Facilitating the prosecution of perpetrators of gross human rights violations that were
committed between 12th December 1963 and 31st December 2002;
d) Determining ways, means of redress for victims of gross human rights violations;
e) Facilitating the granting of conditional amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of all
the relevant facts relating to acts associated with gross human rights violations and
economic crimes and comply with the requirements of this Act;
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f) Providing victims, perpetrators, and the general public with a platform for non-retributive
truth telling that charts a new moral vision and seeks to create for all Kenyans a valuebased society;
g) Establishing and making known the fate or whereabouts of victims and by restoring the
human and civil dignity of such victims by granting them an opportunity to relate their own
accounts of the violations of which they are the victims, and by recommending reparation
measures in respect of them;
i)

Compiling a report providing as comprehensive an account as possible of the activities and
findings of the Commission contemplated in paragraphs a), b) and f), and which contains
recommendations of measures to prevent the future violations of human rights and
economic rights;

h) Providing victims of human rights abuses and corruption with a forum to be heard and
restore their dignity;
j)

Providing repentant perpetrators or participants in atrocities with a forum to come clean on
their actions as a way of bringing reconciliation.

2) The provisions of clause (1) above shall not be interpreted as limiting the power of the
commission to investigate or make recommendations concerning any matter with a view to
promoting or achieving justice, national unity and reconciliation within the context of this
Commission and the said Act.
3) In order to achieve the objectives of the Commission the commissioners shall constitute:
a) The Committee on Justice and Human Rights Violations, to deal, among other things, with
matters pertaining to investigations of gross violations of human rights;
b) The Committee on Amnesty, Reparations and Rehabilitation, to deal with matters referred
to it relating to reparations and amnesties;
c) An investigating unit to perform the investigations required under this Commission;
d) Subcommittees to exercise, perform and carry out the powers, functions and duties
conferred upon, assigned to or imposed upon them by the Commission.
The terms of reference for the Commission shall be:
a) Investigate violations abuses and of human rights relating to killings, abductions,
disappearances, detentions, torture, ill-treatment and seizure of properties suffered by any
person within the specified periods;
b) Investigate the context in which and the causes and circumstances under which the
violations and abuses occurred and identify the individuals, public institutions, bodies,
organizations, public office holders or persons purporting to have acted on behalf of any
public body responsible for or involved in the violations and abuses;
c) Identify and specify the victims of the violations and abuses and make appropriate
recommendations for redress;
d) Investigate and determine whether or not the violations and abuses were deliberately
planned and executed by the state or any person referred to in paragraph (b);
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e) Conduct investigations relevant to its work and or seek the assistance of the police and any
public or private institution, body or person for the purpose of an investigation;
f)

Investigate any other matters that it considers requires investigation in order to promote
and achieve national reconciliation;

g) Identify and specify persons who should be prosecuted for being responsible for or
involved in human rights and economic rights violations and abuses;
h) Investigate violations of economic rights;
i)

Investigate and provide redress in respect of crimes of a sexual nature against female
victims that were committed with political ends;

j)

Educate the public and give sufficient publicity to its work so as to encourage the public to
contribute positively to the achievement of the object of the Commission.

k) Make recommendations to the President with regard to –

l)

i)

The policy that should be followed or measures that should be taken with regard to
the granting of reparation to victims or the taking of other measures aimed at
rehabilitating and restoring the human and civil dignity of victims;

ii)

Measures that should be taken to grant urgent interim reparation to victims.

Make recommendations to the Attorney General with regard to prosecution of persons
responsible for or involved in human rights and economic rights violations and abuses.

m) Make recommendations to the President with regard to the creation of institutions
conducive to a stable and fair society and the institutional, administrative and legislative
measures that should be taken or introduced in order to prevent the commission of
violations of human rights.
And in accordance with Section 7(1) of the said Act, to report thereon as soon as reasonably
practicable but not later than 30th September 2006.
And I do direct that the said Commission shall consist of 11 commissioners appointed from
amongst Kenyans of integrity, sense of fairness and ability to achieve the objectives specified in
this commission and provided that:
a) One third of commissioners shall be women;
b) No more than three commissioners shall be religious leaders;
c) No more than three commissioners shall be lawyers;
d) At least one person of disability is appointed as commissioner;
e) The commissioners shall reflect the geographical and other diversity of Kenyan Society.
And I do direct the commissioners to appoint in their service a person as the chief executive
officer of the Commission who shall be in charge of administrative staff required to carry out such
duties and perform such functions as they may from time to time impose upon him or her in order
to achieve the objectives of the Commission.
And I do direct that in order to achieve the objectives of the commission and to perform its task the
Commission shall exercise such powers as provided for and incidental to this Act and without
prejudice to the generality of the foregoing the Commission shall have the power to:
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a) Determine the seat, if any, of every committee;
b) Establish such offices as it may deem necessary for the performance of its functions;
c) Establish subcommittees to exercise, carry out or perform any of the powers, duties and
functions assigned to them by the Commission;
d) Conduct any investigation or hold any hearing it may deem necessary and establish an
investigating unit;
e) Refer specific or general matters to, give guidance and instructions to, or review the
decisions of, any committee or subcommittee or the investigating unit with regard to the
exercise of its powers, the performance of its functions and the carrying out of its duties,
the working procedures which should be followed and the divisions which should be set up
by any committee in order to deal effectively with the work of the committee;
f)

Direct any committee to make information that it has in its possession available to any
other committee of subcommittee;

g) Direct the submission of and receive reports or interim reports from any committee or
subcommittee;
h) Have the administrative and incidental work connected with the exercise of its powers, the
execution of its duties or the performance of its functions carried out by persons –
i)

Employed or appointed by it;

ii)

Seconded to its service by any department of State at the request of the Commission
and after consultation with the Public Service Commission;

iii) Appointed by it for the performance of specified tasks.
i)

Receive grants and donations from any other source;

j)

In consultation with the Minister and through diplomatic channels, obtain permission from
the relevant authority of a foreign country to receive evidence or gather information in that
country;

k) Enter into an agreement with any person, including any department of State, in terms of
which the Commission will be authorized to make use of any of the facilities, equipment or
personnel belonging to or under the control or in the employment of such person or
department;
l)

Recommend to the President that steps be taken to obtain an order declaring a person to
be dead;

m) Hold meetings at any place within or outside the Republic;
n) On its own initiative or at the request of any interested person inquire or investigate into
any matter, including the disappearance of any person or group of persons.
And I do direct that, in the performance of its task, the Commission shall receive views from
members of the public and receive oral and/or written statements from any person with relevant
information, and may:
a) Make use of official reports of any investigations into abuses and violations of human and
economic rights;
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b) Use any investigation report by any institution, organization or individuals into abuses and
violations of human and economic rights;
c) Commission reports from experts in any relevant areas.
And I do direct that the Commission may co-opt not more than seven (7) persons who in view of
the Commission, could facilitate effective execution of its functions on a specific issue spelt out in
the terms of reference.
And I do direct that in accordance with the provisions of section 10(1) of the said Act, the
commissioners shall summon any person or persons concerned to testify on oath and to produce
any books, plans and documents that the commissioners may require. And without prejudice to
the generality of the foregoing the commission for purpose of the conduct of its proceedings, shall
have power:
a) To require any person to disclose truthfully, any information within the knowledge of that
person and which is relevant to the proceedings;
b) To examine any witness on oath or affirmation and to administer the oath or affirmation;
c) To issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of a person before the Commission and
require the production of any article, documents or other record relevant to the
proceedings;
d) To cause any person who refuses to comply with an order or directives of the Commission
or acts in any manner contemptuous of the Commission to be charged with contempt of
court and for that person to be tried at the High Court; and
e) To require a person to fill a form providing such information and within such period as shall
be specified in the form.
And I do direct that after its commencement, the said inquiry may be held at such times and in
such places as the commissioners may, from time to time, determine and shall be held in public or
in private as the said commissioners may, from time to time, determine.
And I do direct that the said commissioners shall execute the said inquiry with all diligence and
speed and make their report which shall comprise the findings and recommendations of the
Commission and shall among other things:
a) Provide proper documentation and establish the nature and causes of the serious
violations and abuses of the human and economic rights of persons;
b) Provide accurate records of matters investigated by the Commission;
c) Name individuals responsible for or involved in human and economic rights violations:
Provided that no person shall be so named unless he has
i)

been informed without delay of the allegations against him or her and of the
intention to name them in a public report, and

ii)

been given the opportunity to respond to the evidence against him or her and offer
a defence either in writing or through oral hearing;
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d) Recommend the appropriate response to the specific needs of each victim or group of
victims;
e) Suggest measures to prevent and avoid the repetition of such violations and abuses;
f)

Recommend reforms and other measures whether legal, political, administrative or
otherwise needed to achieve the objectives of the Commission;

g) How to promote healing and reconciliation; and
h)

The setting up of a reparation and rehabilitation fund.

And I direct the said commissioners to make its report public within 30 days after submitting it as
provided for by this Commission.
And I do direct that in accordance with the provisions of Section 19 of the said Act, the Minister for
Justice and Constitutional Affairs shall make regulations:
a) Prescribing anything required to be prescribed for the proper application of the said Act;
and in particular, this commission;
b) Prescribing the remuneration and allowances and other benefits, if any, of Commissioners:
Provided that such remuneration shall not be less than that of a Judge of the High Court of
Kenya;
c) Determining the persons who shall for the purposes of this Act be regarded as the
dependants or relatives of victims;
d) Providing, in the case of interim measures for urgent reparation payable over a period of
time, for the revision, and, in appropriate cases, for the discontinuance or reduction of any
reparation so paid;
e) Prohibiting the cession, attachment or assignment of any such reparation so granted;
determining that any such reparation received in terms of a recommendation shall not form
part of the estate of the recipient, should such estate be sequestrated;
f)

Providing for the payment or reimbursement of expenses incurred in respect of travel and
accommodation by persons attending any hearing of the Commission in compliance with a
summon issued in terms of this Act;

g) With regard to any matter that the President deems necessary or expedient to prescribe in
order to achieve the objects of this Act.
And I further do direct that:
1. a) The funds of the Commission shall be derived from such sums as may, from time to time,
be appropriated by Parliament for that purpose;
b)

The Commission may receive grants and donations from any other source: Provided that
such grants and donations shall not be made or received for purposes of influencing the
decision or ability of the Commission in any way and shall be disclosed in the annual
report of the Commission;

c) There shall be paid out of the funds of the Commission, all expenditure incurred by the
Commission in the exercise of its powers or the performance of its functions under this Act.
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2. The Commission shall open and maintain such bank accounts as are necessary for the
performance of its functions.
3. The Commission may:
4. a) Invest any of its surplus funds in Government securities;
b) Place on deposit with such banks as it may determine, any moneys not immediately
required for the purposes of the Commission.
4. The financial year of the Commission shall be the period of twelve months ending on the
thirtieth June in each year.
5. a) At least three months before the commencement of each financial year, the Commission
shall cause to be prepared estimates of the revenue and expenditure of the Commission
for that year;
b) The annual estimates shall make provision for all the estimated expenditure of the
Commission for the financial year and in particular, the estimates shall provide for –
i)

The payment of salaries, allowances and other charges in respect of the staff of the
Commission;

ii) The proper maintenance of the buildings and grounds of the Commission;
iii) The maintenance, repair and replacement of the equipment and other property of the
Commission.
c) The annual estimates shall be approved by the Commission before the commencement of
the financial year to which they relate and shall be submitted to the Minister for approval
and after the Minister’s approval, the Commission shall not increase the annual estimates
without the consent of the Minster.
6. a) The Commission shall cause to be kept proper books and records of account of the
income, expenditure and assets of the Commission.
b) Within a period of four months from the end of each financial year, the Commission shall
submit to the Controller and Auditor-General, the accounts of the Commission together
with –
i) A statement of the income and expenditure of the commission during that year; and
ii) A statement of the assets and liabilities of the Commission on the last day of the year.
c) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other written law for the time being in force, the
accounts of the Commission shall be audited by the Controller and Auditor-General.
And I do command all other persons whom it may concern to take due notice hereof and to give
their obedience accordingly.
Dated and signed by the President of the Republic of Kenya.
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ANNEX 1. WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS, INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP CONSULTATIONS
The Task Force received 38 written submissions. These submissions were as a result of individual
and group consultations, the substance of which is summarised below.
To set up or not to set up a commission
Out of 38 submissions received, 25 addressed the terms of reference of the task force of which
only one was against the establishment of a commission.
Two submissions opposed the reconciliation aspect of the proposed commission. One person said
that it should be a “National Reconciliation Commission” since the truth “is known”. The submission
considered justice to be a problematic area and that the commission may not accomplish much.
Other views expressed optimism that the commission will be important in ending the culture of
impunity and lack of accountability; that the commission should not be used to waste time; it must
not be used as a witch-hunt or to settle political scores; it should fairly and expeditiously dispense
justice to victims of past abuses.
How and when the commission should be established
How
The commission should be independent in law, in fact and in practice.
Three people out of the 25 who addressed the terms of reference expressly stated how they would
like the commission set up. One person said that the commission should be anchored in the new
constitution and therefore the enactment of the new constitution is crucial to the establishment of
this commission. One person said we should borrow from the South Africans. One person said that
the commission should be set up by an Act of parliament.
When
The commission should be set up soon after the task force submits its report. Most speakers
expressly stated when they would want the commision be set uip.
Life of the commission
Four people expressly stated how long they would like the commission to work. One person said
that the commission should not take a lot of time as an already enormous amount of evidence
exists. To save the country time and money, the commission should make use of this information.
Two people said that the commission should work for one or two years. Another said the
commission should work for one year and three months.
Terms of reference
Various submissions proposed that the commission should look into the following:
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-

Slavery and slave trade
The dispossession of land going back to the Sultan of Zanzibar, the British and postindependence governments
Detention without trial
Torture
Land clashes
The 1982 attempted coup
Economic crimes like Goldenberg
Institutional responsibility and complicity in the violation of human rights
Economic sabotage e.g. of coffee farmers and private companies by the KANU elite like
Uchumi Insurance Brokers
Political assassinations
Land grabbing
Corruption
Mwakenya
Insecurity and banditry in Pokot, Turkana and North Eastern Province
Massacres (Wagalla, the Kisumu Killings etc)

The commission should also investigate:
-

Inheritance and property rights violations particularly those of women, widows and children
The root causes and reasons for past abuses and recommend steps to prevent their
recurrence
Reproductive health rights
Aids and rape of young girls and boys
Retrenchment and plight of street families
Expulsion of students from public universities

The commission should, in addition to investigations, do the following:
- Rewrite the history of Kenya. The commission should be truthful to this history and correct
the distortion of historical facts that has happened over the years.
- Recommend ways and means of promoting reconciliation over major issues dividing
Kenya including ethnicity.
- Promote dialogue which is the basis of genuine peace making
- Initiate the healing of the nation by talking, compensating victims, forgiving. Perpetrators
should apologize to victims of past abuses.
- Provide victims with a forum to be heard in a dignified manner
- Provide perpetrators with a forum to come clean
One person urged that the scope of the commission be limited because an all-too-comprehensive
commission would be expensive, time consuming and delay justice. The Truth Commission should
address psychological as well as spiritual needs rather than promise material benefits such as
compensation.
Powers and Privileges
The commission should have the power to:
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-

prosecute and convict perpetrators
recommend reparations, reward, compensate or restitute, and provide support to families
of victims
restore property to its original owners and order the reinstatement of stolen public property
recommend the sacking of corrupt public officials and bar perpetrators from holding public
office
recommend ways of reforming existing institutions to prevent recurrence of past atrocities
grant amnesty to remorseful perpetrators who disclose their roles in past abuses or who
return stolen property

The commission should have the following privileges:

-

access to all information it needs and to protect sources of such information
act on its own recommendations
recommend who should implement what recommendations

Specific recommendations were made on reparations as key to the work of the commission.
Reparations are not only monetary; they should take other forms such as holidays, medical care for
victims and free education for the children of victims. It was submitted that reparations are an
obligation of the state and it should establish a Reparations Fund to which even perpetrators can
contribute.
Victim support and empowerment was also proposed as well as psychological support for victims,
commissioners, the media and others who would for long periods be exposed to victim testimonies.
Membership of the commission
The main criteria for selecting members should be high moral integrity, qualification and experience
with proven track record. Members should be politically non-partisan. The commission should also
be broad-based and represent the face of Kenya. Members should be religious leaders,
representatives of human rights groups, civil society, the LSK, the judiciary and Kenyans in the
diaspora.
It was proposed that lawyers should not dominate the commission because the issues to be
addressed are broad, which should be reflected in its composition. It was proposed that the
commission comprise 11 members five of whom must be distinguished lawyers with experience in
human rights law and practice while another person proposed 80 eminent Kenyans i.e. ten
commissioners per province.
A strong secretariat with an experienced secretary backed by others with skills in leadership,
management and knowledge of the issues of transitional justice was also proposed.
Historical period to be investigated
Various suggestions were made ranging from 1950 to date. It was proposed that the work be done
in four phases: 1952-1963, 1963-1978 and 1978-2002.
It was also suggested that the historical period be determined by the crime in question. Hence, the
cut off date for political assassinations should be 1963; Corruption and misappropriation of public
funds should be Moi’s era – i.e. 1978; land clashes 1990.
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List of written submissions:
1. Dr. Frank Njenga
2. Anonymous
3. Chemi Chemi ya Ukweli
4. Samuel Gitonga Muchemi
5. Fr. Eddie Karhof, Religious Superiors Conference of Kenya (RSCK)
6. Abel Mainda e-mail:taratibu2002@yahoo.com)
7. Agina Israel (agina@kenyaweb.com)
8. B. K. Mathenge, Uchumi Insurance Brokers Ltd.
9. Hassan Bashir Hassan Gele
10. Peter Maingi (fitacts@freight-in-time.com)
11. Wambui Otieno
12. Daniel Ishmael Ayieko Olilo
13. Samuel M. Magua
14. Kathendu Masya
15. Community Peace Museums Heritage
16. Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims
17. Citizens for Justice
18. Widows and Orphans Welfare Society of Kenya
19. Hon Oloo Aringo
20. Mr. Lucas Mboya
21. Centre for Non-Violent Change
22. A.H. Mchela Mbalaka
23. Mwatikho National Rehabilitation Centre for Victims of Torture
24. Paul Mwaura Mungai
25. The Shauri Moyo Ex-Pangani Residents Society
26. Joash Ogweno Amuom
27. Dr. Walter Edward Osewe Omocho
28. Maina Kiai
29. Juma Wycliffe OKodi Alakala Agencies
30. Pamellah Amadi
31. Ndiu-ini Murathimi’s Clan
32. Paul Mwaura Mungai
33. Ndeuri Ng’ang’a
34. F.J. Kamande
35. Rashmin P. Chitnis, Hindu Council of Kenya
36. Nicholas Ondiro Midiwo
37. Family Advancement in Development Affairs
38.Towett Kamaiyo Joseph, Ogiek Welfare Council
39.Shiraz Durrani (shiraz.durrani@blueyonder.co.uk)
40. Humphrey Muthoga
41. National Council of Churches of Kenya
42. The Ecumenical Centre for Justice and Peace
43. Presbyterian Church of East Africa
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44. The Consortium of Former Expelled and Suspended Students (COFESS- Kenya)
45. Wednesday Morning Prayer Group
46. Archer’s Post Wamba and Isiolo Women (Petition to British Government)
47.Dol Dol Women British (Petition to British Government)
48. Archer’s Post Women (Petition to British Government)
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ANNEX 2. PROVINCIAL PUBLIC HEARINGS
2.1 NAIROBI PROVINCE

The Task Force conducted a public hearing in Nairobi Province on 10 June, 2003..
Task Force members attending:
Prof. Makau Mutua – Chairperson
Dr. (Rev.) Timothy Njoya – Vice-chairperson
Rev. Patrick Rukenya - Member
Ms. Jane Kiragu – Member
Mr. Julius ole Sunkuli
Dr. Josephine Ojiambo
Ms. Zarina Patel
Ms.Mumina Konso
Sheikh Ali Shee
Dr. Amukowa Anangwe
Rev. Mutava Musyimi
Ms. Rachel Omamo
Mr. Johh Githongo
Mr. Tirop Kitur
Prof. Zablon Nthamburi
Mr. Kibe Mungai
Ms. Roselyne Lagat-Korir
Secretariat:
Mr. Johnson Weru
Mr. Wanza Kioko
Mr. Albert Tulie

OVERVIEW
Apart from the public hearings at KICC, the task force also visited the former Nyayo House detention cells,
Mathare 4A and Kamiti Maximum Security Prison on 11 June to appraise itself of the gravity of past human
rights abuses (see reports of visits below).
The Task Force received submissions from 39 members of the public at KICC, Kamiti Maximum Security
Prison and Mathare 4A.
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FINDINGS
To set up or not to set up a commission
The majority of those who made submissions wanted the government to establish a Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation Commission to look into past injustices. Concern was expressed that the government was
keener on dealing with economic crimes than violations of human rights. Some speakers said the
government should have set up the commission straight away like it did with the commission of inquiry into
the Goldenberg affair instead of establishing a task force.
Thirty-one people out of 39 wanted a commission set up. Thirteen out of the 31 wanted a commission set
up but did not support the idea of reconciliation. They argued that the government has no business asking
people to reconcile. The victims should be able to decide whether to reconcile with their abusers or not.
They said that reconciliation should be an outcome of a truth and justice process just as would be
compensation and reconciliation.
Five out of the 39 people who appeared before the task force were vehemently opposed to the formation of
such a commission.
Three people voiced conditional support for the establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation
Commission. One wanted the government to hold a referendum on the matter to determine if Kenyans
support the establishment of such a commission. Another felt that the political environment was not
conducive for the establishment of such a commission. The government should make the environment
conducive by, first, ridding itself of key functionaries of the former regime and, secondly, implementing
thoroughgoing institutional reform. The third person urged the government to first explore the possibility of
using other state organs like the courts to achieve the intended results of the commission before setting up
the commission.
Two people wanted special genocide courts established to deal with past injustices if the ordinary courts
cannot cope. If the government cannot use domestic courts, then attempts should be made to take these
cases before international fora.
One person says that the commission should not address economic crimes. These should be left to other
organs of the state.
One person out of the 39 was opposed to the justice component of the commission’s work because, in his
view, it is impossible to achieve justice for the many people wronged by the previous governments because
everybody will want justice and the country will be overwhelmed.
Those against the establishment of the commission see the commission as intended to hoodwink Kenyans
into believing that the government is taking action against those that have taken the nation down the path of
destruction when indeed the government is doing nothing. They demanded that the government should act
on existing intelligence on past injustices. The government should prosecute those that broke the law.
Others felt that it would be an instrument to witch-hunt and persecute certain communities.
How and when the commission should be constituted
How
The commission should be anchored in the constitution and its mandate, powers and privileges should be
set out in an Act of Parliament. The constitutive law of the commission should ensure its independence and
effectiveness.
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Seven people expressly stated how they would like the commission established. Six of them said that it
should be set up by an Act of Parliament while one person suggested that it should be a presidential
commission that will eventually report to the president.

When

The commission should be set up as soon as it is practically possible after the task force has submitted its
report. Most people who made submissions in support of its establishment consider the proposed
commission’s work as an urgent national assignment that cannot be delayed any further.
Seven people submitted on when the commission should be set up. One person said that it should be set
up “as a matter of urgency.” Two persons said in six months. Two persons said that the commission should
be set up by January next year. One person said the commission should be set up not later than three
months after the task force submits its report. All these sentiments have one ring to them: urgency.
Terms of reference for the commission
The commission should address:
-

Gross human rights violations - Torture, political killings (assassinations) police brutality and
killings, massacres, detention without trial
Economic crimes like corruption
Grave injustices related to land such as land clashes and grabbing
Institutional Culpability/responsibility of institutions and organs of state central to repressing them,
e.g. judiciary, the police and the intelligence service.
Activities of private militia like Jeshi la Mzee and connected political violence
The repression, expulsion or murder of student political activists from Kenya’s public universities.

In addition to the above, specific recommendations were made on the following:
-

Freedom fighters: the government should establish a heroes’ corner/acre.
Exiles: The government should also facilitate the return of all exiles.
Scope: The investigation should not be limited to state actors only. It should also be extended to
non-state actors who might have acted in their private capacities and ordinary Kenyans who
violated others.

Historical period to be investigated
The commission should investigate and address atrocities from 1963. Although the commission would be
effective if it limited its work to the post-independence period, it must be informed by the experiences of the
Kenyan people during the colonial period stretching back to 1895.
Eight out of the Nairobi 39 people expressly stated 1963 as the cut off date for investigating past injustices.
Five persons wanted the commission to investigate from 1895 and one person wanted the commission to
start investigating from 1939.
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The period of investigation can also be deduced from the terms of reference that the public gave the
commission. One has to therefore look at the acts or injustices that most Kenyans want investigated. They
fall within a certain period of Kenya’s history and it is therefore reasonable to say that those Kenyans who
say that the deaths of Tom Mboya and J.M Kariuki be investigated, implying that the whole independence
era be investigated.
Powers and privileges of the commission
The commission should have the power to access information held by the government. It should be able to
summon anyone, including the head of state, to testify or release required information; to compel persons to
appear before it; to protect witnesses that appear before it and, allow for naming of persons implicated in
any wrongdoing.
The commission should also have power to take action where appropriate. It should be able to recommend
to government organs appropriate remedial action to right past injustices; power to recommend to the
judicial system matters that require criminal prosecution.
The commission should have immunity against libel action against itself, its members, and persons who
testify before it.
The commission should therefore have powers to:
- hear testimony from victims
- to receive and examine public records
- recommend rehabilitation measures for victims
- to compel people to appear before it
- To name names
- to protect witnesses and sources of information
- recommend compensation, restitution and reparations
- to prosecute
- to recommend prosecution to the judiciary
- to act on the reports of previous commissions
- reconcile and heal communities

Membership of the commission
High moral integrity and inclusiveness are the two major criteria for membership of the commission.
The commissioners should be men and women of high moral integrity, patriots, competent, people of good
faith and representative of the face of Kenya. The commission should be lean but broad-based.
The commission should be gender balanced, reflect regional balance and the face of Kenya. It should
comprise men and women, religious leaders, trade unionists, academics, lawyers, political scientists and
youth. Representatives of international human rights defenders like Amnesty International should be exofficial members of the commission.
One person said that lawyers should not be members of the commission. Another person said that the
commissioners should not have served in any of Kenya’s governments – colonial or post-colonial
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governments, while another said that they should not have served in any other commission. One person
recommended that the number of commissioners should not exceed 19.
One person suggested that the public, and not the minister, choose the commissioners. It was also
submitted that the judiciary (Bench), military and the police should not have representation in the
commission since they bear institutional responsibility for violating the rights of Kenyans.
The life of the commission
The life of the commission should be long enough to carry out its mandate effectively. The time set must
take care of the public concerns about its cost to the government and the history of past commissions that
did not deliver. Most submissions wanted the commission given the shortest possible period to carry out the
work to save the public money, time for other critical projects and avoid further delay in ensuring justice for
the victims of past injustices. Many speakers wanted the commission to start work soon (expressed as
“now”) so that the commission would finish its work in good time.
One person in Nairobi said immediately after the task force submits its report on 31 August. Another
wanted the commission set up in January 2004. Two people said that instead of setting up the task force,
the ministry should have set up the commission because it was eating into precious time.
Those who were outrightly opposed to the establishment of the commission mainly argued that the
commission would be used to deny justice to long-suffering victims. It could also delay justice in cases
where urgent action is necessary and possible. It means that if the commission is to have legitimacy, it
must be set up soon and wind up its work expeditiously.
Others said that commissions are expensive and therefore unnecessary. If the commission is set up,
Kenyans want the life of the commission to be determined by the need to save the country much needed
resources for national reconstruction.
One person suggested that the commission, if it is formed, should sit for less than six months while two
people said that it should take six to eight months. Two people proposed that it should sit for one year while
one person said it should sit for five years.

SPECIAL SITE VISITS
Nyayo House “Torture Chambers”
Task force members visited the Nyayo House torture chambers as a site symbolic of gross violations of
human rights by the state. The visit was to establish whether Nyayo House ”torture chambers” were
designed as part of an official state policy on the use of torture as an instrument of political repression.
Guides provided by the PC, who had prepared the rooms for the visit, showed the task force members
around the basement. Some victims of torture at the Nyayo House torture chambers were also present.
Nyayo House was built in 1983 and has 12 torture chambers, six each on the right and left side. The cells
were designed as “strong rooms” with very poor ventilation. Some of the rooms are painted red.
The victims described their ordeal in the cells and asked the task force members to seek explanation from
the government and the architects as to the purpose for which the underground chambers were intended.
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The task force members heard from former detainees present that people died in the cells of pneumonia
and torture while some would be thrown out to the street and reported as having committed suicide. Former
victims wanted the country to remember the alarming number of persons who committed suicide from the
higher floors of the Nyayo house in the 80s, especially in 1986, and others who just “disappeared”.
Kamiti Maximum Security Prison
The task force members visited Kamiti because it is symbolic of the role the criminal justice system played
in repressing citizens. Task force members were able to visit cells that held former political detainees.
The task force members also wanted to see the hangman’s noose but it was not possible. There has been
no hangman since 1987. It was also not possible to see Kimathi’s grave. Prison authorities were not sure if
Kimathi was buried in Kamiti.
Silas Gacharia, the director of inspections, gave task force members a history of Kamiti before they were
given a tour of the prison and to listen to two groups of prisoners. The prisoners mainly complained about
corruption and delay in hearing their cases, which had caused them to spend more time in remand. The
task force heard that prisoners often waited for as long as ten years for their appeals to be heard.
Statistics
No. of submission
- 39
In support of a commission - 31
Opposed to a commission - 5
Conditional support
-3
Overall response to TJRC in Nairobi Province
40
35
Number

30
25
20

Series1

15
10
5
0

For TRC

Against TRC
Votes

Series1

34

5
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Male and Female Contributors in
Nairobi Province
35
30
Number

25
20

Series1

15
10
5
0

Female

Male
Speakers

Series1

7

32

List of contributors:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Ng’ang’a Thiongo [Chair, RPP]
Hon. Njeru Kathangu
Mr. and Mrs. Patel
Kenneth Kituma Murichia
Rosemary Gadiha karuiki
Cyprian Nyamwamu
James Watenge (Special branch inspector
Otieno
Wafula Buke
Otieno MakOnyango
Mr. Paul Amina
Kuno,S. Abdi
Fatuma Ibrahim Ali
Amanya Wafula
Mr. Kisemei wa Mutisya
Mr. Stephen Mutuku
Mr. Hassan Shah Ali
Rev.James Kimanthi kibunja
Peter Wambua
Wachira wahiri
Mrs. Jennifer Miano
Mr. Henry wa Ngure
Evans Gor
Mr. Ndimba
Mr. Kaleve Rodgers
Mr. Obure
Mr. Odhimbo
Dr. Lucas Munya
Tim Gitau
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30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Mr Peter Njenga
Mr. Peter Ochieng
Leson Njiru
Noah Olumbe
Joseph Maina
Wanjiku Muhia
John Kabaka
Stella Juma
Head Teacher
Annastacia Njeri

Written Submissions
The task force received five written submissions:
1. Shailesh Patel
2. Citizens for Justice
3. Release Political Prisoners Group (RPP)
4. The Truth Be Told Network
5. The Children’s Cabinet.
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2.2 WESTERN PROVINCE
The Task Force conducted Public Hearings in Western Province from 24 - 26 June, 2003, in
Kakamega and Kapsokwony.
Task Force members attending:
Ms Jane Kiragu – chairing
Ms. Zarina Patel
Rev. Patrick Rukenya
Sheikh Ali Shee
Dr. Amukowa Anangwe
Rev. Mutava Musyimi
Secretariat:
Mr. Ronoh Tumuising
Ms. Wanza Kioko
OVERVIEW
The Kakemega meeting got off to a slow start on 24 June 2003 due to poor communication between the
task force and the provincial administration, which created the wrong impression that the hearings would
start on 25 June.
Part s of Kakamega district bordering Nandi had experienced ethnic clashes in the past as had Mt Elgon
between the Sbaot and the Luhya, communities.
FINDINGS
To set up or not to set up the commission
Majority of the people who appeared before the task force supported the establishment of a Truth, Justice
and Reconciliation Commission.
Twenty-five persons out of the 34 who made submissions to the task force supported the establishment of
a Truth Commission. Eight people out of the 34 were opposed to the idea of reconciliation being part of the
commission’s mandate. One person recommended that instead of reconciliation, the commission be called
Truth, Justice and Compensation commission.
Nine out of the 34 people opposed the establishment of a truth commission
Those against the commission or the reconciliation aspect of the commission wanted justice. They
demanded that the law be allowed to take its course. They equated justice with trials and punishment.
Those opposed to the commission said they had seen many commissions before that had accomplished
nothing. They felt that it would be another expensive exercise that would yield nothing and preferred rather
that the government used the money to alleviate poverty and let bygones be bygones.
They proposed that instead of setting up another expensive commission to establish past injustices, the
government should act on existing reports of previous commissions such the Akiwuumi report, the Njonjo
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report and many others. Some pointed out that the government knows who did what from the intelligence it
has and should just act on the information unless. They saw the setting up of a commission as a
diversionary tactic because it (government) has no intention of acting on the perpetrators of past injustices.
Others feared that the commission will open a Pandora’s box and the country may not cope with all the
issues that have to be dealt with if we begin digging into the past. They urged that the country draws the line
and moves on. They also cautioned the task force against drawing any conclusions without deep reflection.
They urged task force members to consider the possibility that most people who are supporting the
establishment of such a commission are motivated by the perception that at the end of it all they will get
money as compensation. The country cannot afford the money to compensate all those people who
consider themselves victims of the previous regimes. One person expressly opposed the idea of
compensating victims.
Three people called for the establishment of special courts.
In Mt. Elgon, only 16 spoke out of the 120 people who attended the pubic hearing due to time constraint.
Because of the time limit, the task force opted to resort to a vote at some point. Fifty-five people supported
the establishment of the commission while 31 were opposed. Thirty-four persons abstained.
Those against the establishment of the commission saw it as a ploy to derail the constitutional review
process. They also felt it would exacerbate conflict and open old wounds instead of bringing harmony and
healing.
In western province, therefore, 79 persons out of 119 people supported the establishment of the
commission while 40 were opposed.
How and when the commission should be established
How
The commission should be set up by an Act of Parliament with constitutional protection. Only three people
commented on the question “how”. One person said that the commission should be constitutionally
entrenched. Two persons said that it should be set up by an Act of parliament.
When
The commission should be set up as soon as is practically possible. Eight people made express
contributions on when they think the commission should be set up. Three people said “now.” One person
said immediately. One other person said immediately after the submission of the report. Four people said
as soon as possible. One person said before December 2003.

Membership of the commission
The general sentiment is that commissioners should be persons of high moral integrity. The commission
should reflect the cultural mix of the nation as well as regional balance. It should comprise religious leaders,
women, youth, elders, political leaders, lawyers, professionals, victims, perpetrators and civil society
representatives. One person demanded that suspected violators must not sit in the commission. Two
people demanded that victims should not sit in the commission. One person said that lawyers should not sit
in the commission.
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Terms of reference for the commission
The commission should investigate:
- Torture and detention without trial
- Political assassinations
- Land clashes
- Corruption
- Private militia and connected political violence
- Land grabbing
- Existing reports on human rights such as the Akiwumi report
- Various “mafia” allegedly associated with the three presidents: the Kiambu mafia under Kenyatta,
the Rift Valley Mafia under Moi and now, the Mt. Kenya mafia under Kibaki.
Powers and privileges of the commission
Most contributors said that the commission should have adequate powers and privileges to carry out its
mandate. The commission should be able to implement its own recommendations and not just recommend
to government because from previous experience the government is known not to act on recommendations
by commissions. The following powers were however specifically mentioned as befitting a commission:
Power to
- compel people to appear before it
- prosecute, order restitution and compensation
- investigate and reconcile people
- name culprits
Privileges
- Security of tenure and immunity for itself and members against legal action
Historical period to be investigated
Majority of the people who addressed this question wanted the period investigated to start from 1963.
Twenty-eight people expressly made contributions on the historical period to be investigated. Fourteen
persons expressly wanted the commission to start investigating from 1963. Eight people wanted it to start in
1895. Two people were for 1920. One person recommended 1954 when colonial rule turned atrocious and
many freedom fighters were killed while yet another proposed 1969 when Tom Mboya was killed. One
person proposed 1978 and another 1990 as ideal because it is when the political environment led Kenyans
to increasingly demand more political space and respect for their freedoms, and every government official
was on notice that certain actions were abusive and a breach of law and Kenya’s public morality.
Life of the commission
The general sentiment was that the life of the commission should be adequate for it to effectively carry out
its mandate. Many also did not want the commission to sit for too long and become expensive exercise for
the country in terms of money and time.
Nineteen people expressly stated how long they would like the commission to take to accomplish its
mandate. Six people said three years while five people said one year and three people said five years. Two
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people wanted a permanent commission; one person said six months; one person said 1-2 years and
another suggested 3-5 years.
The cost should be factored in when deciding the life of the commission. Most people who rejected the
commission cited the possibility of the commission being used to delay justice, so that the government can
buy into national amnesia and therefore cheat Kenyans into inaction about past injustices.
Statistics
No. of submissions
- 34
Supporting a commission - 25
Opposed to a commission - 9

Overall response to TJRC in Western Province
100

Number

80
60

Series1

40
20
0

For TRC

Against TRC
Votes
79

Series1

40

Female and Male Contributors in
Western Province

Number

150
100
Series1
50
0

Female

Male
Speakers

Series1

4

115

List of contributors:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Nelson Aukwa Miega
Councilor Lawrence Oyando
Antony Muneria
Mposobowa Shikuku
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5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Jenson Miti
Councilor Joseph Museno
Sammy Aswan Amuga
Kipkorir Kigai
Joseph Simiyu
Pius nye
Titus arap Mayek
CLLR John Adanti Musungu
Fr. Gabriel Dolan [Kitale Catholic Diocese]
Councilor James Chapati
Abdulaziz Mutange
Benson Osur
Rose Kiboi
Moses Keiyo
Hon. Joshua Angatia
John marcus
Wilberforce Koisero
Reuben Sanoi Mdara
Jethro kisanyi Oriedo
Leornard Njuguna
Bernadette mbwale
Vincent Sambulil
Musa Odondi
Munuvi Katwii
Fred Kavundi
Dr. Polycarp Kundembule
Richard Ikana
E.j Garu Wasaidia
Julius shikanga Nabuongu
Moses buwoya
Ojenga Okwe
Alfred Khamisi
Fred Sanende
William M. Kagwamba
Dr. Tubei Daniel
Gabriel Masinga
Dickson Kakarukha
Ibrahim Kweyu Sagana
Carol Mbugua
Cllr. Joshua Kusimba Ndubai
Isaac Sande
Abdullah Aleka
Tiger Machenja
Oscar Uhombo
Graham .K. Obima
Cllr. Palapala Mutesi

Written Submissions
1. Alfred H. Mchela – Mbalaka
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Musa D.Odondi
Dr. Polycarp Kundembele
Fr. Gabriel Dolan
Jared Oteba Imai
Mwatikho - National Rehabilitation Centre for Victims of Tortures
Professionals from Mt. Elgon
Jethro K Oriedo
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2.3 COAST PROVINCE
The Task Force conducted public hearings in the Coast Province from 16 -18 June, 2003, in Mombasa,
Garsen in Tana River District.
Task Force members attending:
Mr. Davinder Lamba
Dr. Amukowa Anangwe
Ms. Jane Kiragu
Rev. Patrick Rukenya
Sheikh Ali Shee
Ms. Zarina Patel
Rev. Mutava Musyimi
Secretariat:
Ms. Wanza Kioko
Mr. Albert Tuli

OVERVIEW
Coast province has suffered tremendous violations of human rights. The key issues in the province gravitate
around landlessness of the indigenous communities, insecurity, banditry, discrimination and inter-ethnic
skirmishes that rocked the region preceding the 1997 elections.
FINDINGS
To set up or not to set up a commission
Majority of the contributors supported the establishment of a commission. Sixty-eight out of the 75 persons
made submissions in support of a Truth Commission while seven were against it.
Five out of the 68 that support the establishment of a commission opposed the reconciliation aspect of the
proposed commission. One person out of the 5 opposed to reconciliation recommended that the
commission be termed Truth, Justice and Compensation instead.
Twelve of the 68 who supported the establishment of a commission wanted it to be a permanent feature of
the country’s justice system. One out of the seven against the establishment of the commission suggested
instead that the government establishes the office of the ombudsperson.
How the commission should be set up
The commission should be established by an Act of Parliament.
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Out of the 18 people who expressed themselves on the matter, 15 said that the commission should be set
up by an Act of parliament while three people felt that it should be provided for in the new constitution.
When the commission should be set up
The commission should be set up as soon as practically possible.
Only 19 out of those that made submissions expressly stated when they would want the commission to start
its work. Two people wanted it “now”. One person wanted it to start work “tomorrow.” One person wanted it
immediately.
Nine people want it as soon as possible while four people wanted it set up quickly. One person wanted it
set up next month (July) while another wanted it set up between July and September whereas another
wanted it set up in September. Three persons wanted it established after the enactment of the new
constitution, which would protect it from negative interference from powerful people in society.
Membership of the commission
Speakers were unanimous that the commission should be broad-based in membership.
Thirty-nine people out of the 75 people stated their preferred calibre of commissioners which included
religious leaders, political leaders, women, youth, the disabled, professionals, scholars, lawyers, political
scientists, farmers, teachers, historians, elders, wise people and judges. In addition, the commission should
have regional balance i.e. reflect the face of Kenya.
Seven people out of the 39 said that politicians should not sit on the commission while three did not want
lawyers in the commission. One did not want KANU in the commission while another wanted a commission
of women only. One person also wanted a commission of ordinary people only; one wanted only ordinary
people and religious leaders, while three people wanted international human rights defenders e.g. Amnesty
International or Human Rights Watch represented on the Commission.
Terms of reference for the commission
The commission should be empowered to investigate:
-

-

Land Clashes
Torture
Land problems
Political assassinations
Corruption
Citizenship and marginalisation
Insecurity (especially banditry)

Existing reports of previous commissions
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Powers and privileges of the commission
The commission should have powers to:
-

prosecute
order compensation
investigate
convict perpetrators
Name names
summon people to appear before it

The commission should have security of tenure
Period to be investigated
A majority of the people felt that the commission should investigate beginning from 1963.
Fifty-four out of the 75 people made submissions on the question of the historical period to be investigated.
Thirty-one people said that the commission should cut off from 1963 while four people wanted it to start
from 1895. Six others wanted it to start from the time of the coming of the Portuguese while seven people
wanted the commission to be forward-looking and start investigations with the coming of the NARC
administration. Two people wanted it to start in 1900 whereas another two chose 1990; one person 1993;
and another 1997.
The life of the commission
The commission should have adequate time to do its work effectively.
Out of 75 people only 11 submitted on the life of the commission. Two people said that the commission
should be given adequate time while two others said three months were enough. Another said not more
than eight months while yet another said that the commissions should work as fast as possible. Two people
said that the commission should be given a year to complete its work; one said less than three years; one
person said it should report before the next general elections; while one gave the commission 5 years to
complete its work.
Statistics
No of contributors
Supporting a commission
Opposed to a commission

- 75
- 68
-7
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Overall response to TJRC in Coast Province
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Number
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40
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20
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For TRC

Against TRC
Votes
68

Series1

7

Femal and Male contributors in Coast Province
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List of Contributors:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Mokaya Arani
Martin Ndiga
Pastor James
SheikhElijah Mate Nthiga
Leslie K. Mwambura
Mzee Musa
Milicent Ouma
Stambuli
James Njoronge
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11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Joseph Kimumu
Sheikh Khalifa
Dedan
Serah nzoka
Sheikh Omar
Susan
Francis Muigai
Adam Salim
Francis Oduor
Pastor Aggrey
Odonge
Matolo
John
Evans
Asha Hussein
Rukia Hassan
Esha Abdulamani
Githuki Mwangi
Micheal
Philip Oremo
Khalif Salim
Joseph Kimani
Seif Slim
Nuru Said
Stephen
Louis Ogutu
Grace Mwea
Speaker
Mwanzamba Mwaboza
Salim Alibashir
Athman
Fatuma
Musula
Abdi Omar
Juma Rajab Haji
Miriam
Tameem Hassan Ali
MP. Danson .B. Mungatana
Issa Umuru Kofa
Adde Dadacha
Abdullah Komorah
Khadija Ali
M. K. Diwayu
Abdikadir Sharif
Lysania K. Kigogo
Mathew Solomon
Said Shongolo
Justin Haribae
Jeremiah Igwo
Said Gor
Christian Mbatu
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62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Bacha Korondo
Abdi Robule Gobu
Mohammed HAssan
Jilo Shung
Peter Aro Gwiyo

Written Submissions
The Task Force received nine written submissions from the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Dr. Edwin Mwinga
Mohamed H. Ngoto
The Kenya Long Distance Truck Drivers’ Union
Mrs. Katharina
Postel Pensioners
Lt. Leslie Mwambura
John Omgany
Evans Changalawa
George Jilloh Kase
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2.4 RIFT VALLEY PROVINCE
The Task Force conducted public hearings in Rift Valley Province from 16 to 19 June, 2003, in Nakuru,
Molo, Narok and Eldoret .
Task Force members attending:
Prof. Makau Mutua -Chair
Dr. Josephine Ojiambo
Ms Mumina Konzo
Mr. Tirop Kitur
Mr. Julius Sunkuli
Mr. Kibe Mungai
Secretariat:
Ms. Wanjiku Miano
Mr. David Gathii
OVERVIEW
These areas were close to or scenes of the ethic/land clashes between 1991 and 1997. Majority of the
speakers in Nakuru and Molo were clash victims who gave testimonies of the suffering they had undergone
since the clashes in 1992. While speakers enumerated various forms of injustices and human rights
violations justifying the formation of a truth, justice and reconciliation commission, it was clear that land was
the central issue in the Rift Valley.
Although the majority of those who presented their views favoured the establishment of a truth, justice and
reconciliation commission, it also emerged clearly that victims not only wanted the government to recognise
that violations had been committed, perpetrators punished and victims compensated for violations while
those forcibly evicted from their lands reinstated or resettled.
In Narok, majority of the speakers did not support the establishment of a truth, justice and reconciliation
commission. Land dispossession through successive regimes was a recurrent theme in many submissions.
Speakers in Narok maintained that a truth telling process would be hollow in the absence of a preliminary
process that would address land injustices meted against certain communities.
In Eldoret, one detected hostility that was directed at a certain ethnic community alleged to have
dispossessed original inhabitants of the area of their land with the support of the Executive at the time.
Inevitably, prevailing hostilities would persist if the government did not reconsider current land distribution
policies.
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FINDINGS
To set up or not to set up a Commission
Majority of those who presented their views favored the establishment of a truth, justice and reconciliation
commission. Many speakers who supported a commission narrated their experiences of injustices suffered
either during the colonial regime, Kenyatta and Moi administrations.
Most supporters were unanimous that the country was emerging from a dark past and needed truth to begin
the healing process. They asserted that human rights violations had become the norm during past regimes,
and because Kenya is in transition, a truth commission was necessary to avoid a repeat and restore the rule
of law. Some speakers submitted that setting up of a truth, justice and reconciliation commission would
assist Kenya become a united nation in diversity and not disintegrate into ethnic divisions.
Opponents
There were a few speakers who opposed the establishment of a truth commission, the most compelling
reason being that those appointed in the past neither made their findings public nor implemented their
recommendations. To start with, it was suggested that relevant reports of previously commissions be
published and their recommendations implemented. Some opponents of a commission felt that there were
more pressing national concerns to which resources for such a commission should be directed. They
argued that commissions were expensive to the public and time-consuming. Speakers also expressed fear
that such a commission was likely to be a witch hunt of members of the last regime, in which event the
country would emerge perilously divided and unstable. Instead of expending resources on a truth telling
process, opponents suggested that the government considers other priority areas of national reconstruction
such as the resettlement of clash victims, compensation for violations committed and poverty alleviation.
Other speakers felt that existing structures and mechanisms were adequate for the purpose of truth and
justice and ought to be utilised. They argued that courts of law should be used to address human rights
violations and other injustices.
The need for another protracted process for seeking solutions and remedies was questioned. Some
speakers noted that in certain instances, perpetrators were known and victims too, especially those
displaced from their land through ethnic violence. It does not require a truth commission to prosecute
perpetrators who are known or resettle clashes victims who have evidence of ownership of land from which
they were forcibly and violently evicted.
Few were against the establishment of a truth commission for fear that it would reopen old wounds and
cause pain and anguish to victims.
How and when the commission should be established
How
Supporters of the establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission asserted that it was only
through an Act of Parliament that the proposed Commission would be insulated against manipulation. Those
who proposed this mode, expressed confidence in their elected representatives who would vote for the
Commission when it came up for debate in parliament.
Some speakers opposed a Presidential Commission because past experience had shown that such
commissions never lived up to public expectation owing to executive interference.
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Some suggested that the Commission be established by the president, but suggested that the bill on the
Commission be referred to the National Assembly for voting.
It was also suggested that the Commission be entrenched in the constitution to guarantee its protection,
with some proposing that the commission be made a permanent structure.
When
The Commission should be established immediately.
Supporters of a truth, justice and reconciliation commission said it was long overdue. Others proposed that
about one year from the date of submission of the report to government by the Task Force was reasonable.
Others felt that the commission should await the outcome of the National Constitutional Conference so as to
determine whether the National Commission on Human Rights and Administration of Justice would be the
Commission, or it would address aspects of the work of a truth commission.
It was also proposed that the Commission be established after the draft constitution has been enacted and
become operational. Some felt that it was only within a solid constitutional framework that the Commission
would effectively function and execute its mandate.
Membership of the commission
The commission should be broad based and all-encompassing.
Most speakers seemed to agree on the need to;
appoint competent persons from diverse disciplines
consider women, the youth and persons with disability
nominate persons from all regions of Kenya to ensure the Commission reflects national
diversity
A proposal for victims to sit on the commission was rejected on grounds that they would not objective and
therefore, unlikely to ensure fairness and justice. On the whole, there was no contest on the need for an
independent, and impartial commission.
Terms of Reference/Powers and privileges of the commission
Speakers recommended that the commission be empowered to deal with a wide range of issues, including:
- Plunder of the economy
- Political assassinations and murders
- Massacres (Lari, Wagalla, Kisumu, etc.)
- Ethnic clashes
- Torture by law enforcement agents
- Environmental degradation
- Land grabbing and dispossession
- Exploitation of workers
- Denial of basic rights
It was also proposed that the commission be empowered to summon persons before it to give evidence and
recommend prosecution, compensation, resettlement, restitution, or other suitable relief. It was proposed
that the commission and commissioners be made immune from legal action and granted security of tenure.
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Speakers also suggested that the more complex matters be referred to the judiciary while few speakers
proposed that the commission be empowered with unfettered jurisdiction over all matters before it.
Period to be investigated
The following periods were proposed by those who supported the establishment of a commission;
-

From 12 December 1963 to date: Majority of the speakers favoured the post independence
period when Kenya attained self rule. This, they argued, made it easy to hold accountable
those who were responsible for wrongdoing.

-

From 1952: There are those who strongly felt that the violations committed by the colonial
regime must be probed and chose to focus from when the state of emergency was declared
in Kenya.

-

From 1920: Two speakers proposed this period because it is when Kenya was formally
declared a colony by the British, precipitating many violations against Kenyans which have
had profound ramifications on the social, political and economic character of Kenya.

-

From 1895: Others proposed that the commission commences investigations from the period
when the Imperial British East Africa (IBEA) took over the colonial administration of Kenya.

-

From 1897: Few speakers recalled that during this period there had been a marked influx of
settlers who had began alienating land in Kenya, and for this reason it was a suitable period
from which to begin investigations.

-

From 1885: Some speakers said some problems, particularly relating to land, could only be
traced back to colonialism. Therefore, to diagnose existing problems accurately and proffer
appropriate solutions, it is necessary to go back in time to the Berlin Conference.

Statistics
Total number of submissions
Supporting a commission
Opposed to a commission

- 101
- 74
- 27
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Overall response to TJRC in
Rift Valley Province
40

Number

30
For TRC
Against TRC

20
10
0

Nakuru

Nolo

Narok

Eldoret

For TRC

36

18

6

14

Against TRC

4

0

8

15

Districts

Number

Female and Male Contributors in
Rift Valley Province
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
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0

Male
Female

Nakuru

Molo

Narok
Districts

78

Eldoret

List of contributors:
Nakuru
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Joepl Chirchir Kpkurui
Geoffrey Kiplagat Kenduiywo
Martha Nyaga
Bright Oyela Amayame
Richard Lagat sigilai
Haggai Kagiri
David Kimani
Kimunya Kamana
Harriet Macharia
Peter Cheruiyot
Kings Maina
Ngali Valai
John Muchiri Gikunga
P.C Kinuthia
Sammy arap Seroney
Roselyne Lai
Job Seng’eng’e
John Njenga Wainaina
Odhiambo Swar Mc Oduor
Mark Mwithaga
John Kiprotich Basi
Cyrus Waweru
Francis Shinali
Wycliffe Agega
Paul Muraya
William ole Kisaun
John Kahato
John Karanja
Aaron Mbugua
Karanja Quindos
Peter Wanyeti
Simon Ruga
Nicholas Ochodho
Kipsiele L.A Ng’eno
V. Ondedo
Michael Mahugu
Francis Chege
Reuben Irungu
Arthur T
Linus Mokoro

MOLO
41.
42.
43.

GG. Njuguna
Anthony Njogu
Manasse Njuguna
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44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Vernonica Gathoni Mwai
David Karumba Maina
James Waweru
Ezekiel Rono
Mary Njoki chege
Speaker X
John Obati
Joseph Mungai
Ngere Ngatia
Muhinda
Magdalenme Wamboi
Monica Njeri
Councilor Paul K
Stephen Kamau
Chair, Molo Town Council

NAROK
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Segeyo Ole Ntaiya
Shadrack Korutei
Patricia Saniriaki
Moses Ole Mari
John Maitai
Agnes Kureiyo
Pauline Tuya
William Ole Supeyo
Ole Yaile William
Salam Kapapa
Hon. William Ole Ntimama
Eunice Marima
Kelena ole N’toye
Joseph Ngadado

ELDORET
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Salaam Joshua
Arap Joel
John Nderitu
Farouk Kibet
Kiprokiri Menjo
Geoffrey Sang
Rev. Nyoro
Wilson Mutai
Nelson Ngethe
Emmy Busoe
Barasa
Raphael Wambua
Tecla Otuodi
PaulKibe
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87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Counc. Keter
Martin Githongo
Simon Kibor
Carolyne Chemusoi
Josephat Maiyo
Nelson Wambugu
James Tamu
Njoroge
Hassan
Prof. Tirop
Counc. Julius Kuchedi
David Martin
Counc. Haida Kosgei
Zachary Mwangi
Councillor Bii
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2.5 NYANZA PROVINCE
The Task Force conducted public hearing in Nyanza Province from 23 – 25 June, 2003, in Kisumu, Kisii,
Gucha and Kuria.
Task Force Members present:
Prof. Makau Mutua - Chair
Dr. Josephine Ojiambo
Mr. Julius Sunkuli
Mr. Kibe Mungai
Secretariat:
Ms. Wanjiku Miano
Mr. David Gathii
OVERVIEW
Speakers at the public hearings in Nanza voiced urgent need for the establishment of a truth, justice and
reconciliation commission.
In Kisumu, a recurrent theme among many speakers was political assassinations and murders that had
allegedly deprived the Luo community of visionary leaders. Speakers also decried the plunder of national
resources, economic destruction, collapse of the sugar and cotton industries, ethnic violence in Muhoroni
and other parts of the country, land grabbing, environmental degradation, non-recognition of liberation
heroes, torture and political repression.
In Kisii, speakers urged for efforts to reinforce on-going community level initiatives in laying to rest border,
inter-tribal conflicts and involvement of women in peace initiatives.
Marginalisation, discrimination against women and the girl child due to oppressive traditional practices also
featured prominently in Kuria.
Skepticism was expressed about another commission because of past experience with multiple
commissions and task forces that had been established but findings had not been made public or acted
upon.
FINDINGS
To set up or not to set up a Commission
Majority of those who appeared before the Task Force supported the establishment of a truth, justice and
reconciliation commission in view of the improved obtaining environment, which encourages openness and
free expression.
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Proponents submitted that such a commission was necessary because existing mechanisms of dispute
resolution such as courts of law had been compromised by past regimes. Speakers argued that in order to
solve prevailing problems, full disclosure of truth was a prerequisite for national healing.
Some speakers cautioned that the process could shortchange Kenyans and victims if compensation,
restitution, reparation and prosecution were not pursued where circumstances so dictated.
While majority spoke in favour of a truth commission (see figures below), they also advised against seeing
such a commission as a compensation processing and prosecution structure. Hence, some speakers saw
more added value in forgiveness and reconciliation as the ultimate outcomes at the discretion of victims and
perpetrators.
Proponents of a truth commission considered it as a panacea for ethnic tensions and a vehicle to lasting
harmony and national integration.
Some speakers said that in order to avoid unreasonable expectations and disillusionment with the proposed
truth commission, the public will need to be sensitised on the role and objectives of the commission.
Unreasonably high expectations would put the commission into disrepute.
The primary objective of such a commission would be to restore confidence among Kenyans as a nation
and begin anew.
Opponents
A few speakers opposed the establishment of a truth commission because of the high number of
commissions that have been established in the past to no avail. Their confidence in such mechanisms had
considerably been eroded and the government should on perpetrators of human rights violations who were
known. They instead recommended expeditious restructuring and strengthening of the capacity of the
judiciary to try perpetrators and handle complexities that might attend certain cases. In instances where
victims of torture and ethnic clashes had documented evidence of loss, it was suggested that a program be
commenced of scrutinising claims that have been forwarded with a view to awarding compensation.
Speakers also suggested that resources intended for the commission be used in economic revival efforts,
compensation, and strengthening strategic institutions in facilitating transitional justice, such as the judiciary.
It was also contended that the process of excavating truth could easily plunge the nation into more
antagonism. Hence, there was no need to rekindle painful memories about the past and disrupt nascent
communal peace and stability.
How and when such a Commission should be established
How
Most presenters supported the establishment of a commission through an Act of Parliament.
Speakers suggested that legislators were accountable to the people, and had a responsibility to the nation
to endorse a popular bill on the establishment of a truth commission. Parliament was considered a safe
route for the reason that a body created by statute would be protected against frivolous suits and
manipulations, and its independence from the executive guaranteed. Presidential commissions were too
fragile to be trusted as they could easily be disbanded at the whims of the president, it was pointed out.
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Presidential Commission
Proponents of a Presidential Commission expressed fear that routing the commission through parliament
might be protracted. Speakers in favour of a presidential body also cautioned that perpetrators in previous
regimes were in the current parliament, and were still politically and economically influential to frustrate a
bill. With the instruments of power at their disposal, such legislators could scuttle the process, and ensure
the bill is never debated in parliament. On these grounds, they deemed a presidential commission to be the
certain and safe avenue provided that there was assurance that the commission would be accountable to
the public, free from interference by the executive and independent in its operations.
When
Speakers in all the areas visited proposed the expeditious formation of the truth commission.
Some felt that it was long overdue and quipped that the Task Force ought to have been the commission.
They proposed that the truth commission be established between six months to one year from the date of
submission of the report by members of the Task Force. Speakers reasoned that the enthusiasm by both
the government and the people provided the necessary impetus for the formation of a truth commission and
warned that the euphoria could wane if it takes longer that the next two years of the new government’s
existence.
Membership of the commission
There was unanimous need for persons of integrity and competence in their respective fields of expertise to
be appointed commissioners.
Submissions were also made for the commission to reflect national diversity by ensuring that persons from
all regions were considered.
Various professionals such as lawyers, doctors, social workers, economists, psychologists, and
anthropologists were proposed. It was also proposed that clergy, women, the youth, the disabled, and
minority groups be considered for appointment.
Terms of Reference/Powers and privileges of the commission
Victims who spoke identified strongly with the nature of violations that they had suffered but were not
opposed to the truth commission investigating a broad spectrum of human rights violations and other
injustices. The following were proposed as matters for the commission to address;
-

Political murders and assassinations
Corruption
Collapse of the economy
Ethnic clashes,
Environmental degradation
Land grabbing
Cattle Rustling
Border conflicts
Rape of women and girls
Marginalisation of women and girls
Widow dispossession (property)
Torture and arbitrary killings by law enforcement agents
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-

Inhuman treatment of prisoners
Harassment of farmers
Harassment of hawkers and slum dwellers
Inhuman treatment of prisoners

Speakers contended that it was necessary to establish what happened and why. In meting out justice, it was
recommended that the commission be empowered to issue summons, to order prosecution, compensation,
restitution, reparation or resettlement on the basis of the merits of each case. They contended that this
would distinguish the truth commission from past commissions, which lacked authority, and were therefore
ineffective. But speakers wanted judicial powers to remain with the courts.
Period to be investigated
Those who spoke in support of the formation of a truth commission proposed varied periods.
-

12 December 1963 to Dec. 2002: this was the period most preferred because it defines the
period when Kenyans became responsible for their governance. This makes the case for
holding accountable those in whom trust and power to lead the nation reposed.

-

From October 1952: It was argued that most of the human rights violations and bad
governance witnessed during the 40 years of Kenya’s independent history was a direct result
of colonialism. The misrule was perpetuated by successive regimes. Therefore investigations
ought to pre-date 12 December 1963 to cover the declaration of emergency in Kenya.

-

From 1980: A speaker was of the view that it was during this period that human rights
violations became pronounced and therefore should be the beginning point for the truth
commission.

-

From 1978: Few speakers proposed that the truth commission investigates injustices
committed during the Moi regime since cogent evidence would be available in a number of
cases.

-

From 1969: One speaker cited this year as the beginning of the deterioration of the rule of law
and intense political repression.

-

From 1885: Two speakers suggested that the truth commission revisits events from the
partition of Africa by major imperial powers at the Berlin Conference.

Other periods for which no concrete reasons were advanced are 1950, 1965, 1966, and 1970.

Statistics
Number of submissions

- 55
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Number

Overal repsonse to TJRC in Nyanza Province
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

For TRC
Against TRC

Kisumu

Kisii

Guha

Kuria

Districts

Female and Male Contributors in Nyanza Province
20
18
16
Number

14
12

Speakers Female
Speakers Male

10
8
6
4
2
0
Kisumu

Kisii

Gucha

Districts
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Kuria

List of contributors
KISUMU
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

John Oloo, B
Fredn Omondi Oyoo
Adira Osawa
Onyango Lazaro
Agwanda
Charles Atyang Atyang
John Bruno Oloo
Nicholas Atieno Omolo
William Ochiegn
Stephen Otieno
Cyrus Yuji
John Ongele
Mohammed Aslam Khan
Adhiambo Lomo
Bernard Omondo Otieno
Ben Outa Onyango
Owuor Jacob Mark

KISII
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Bishop Omesa Omango
Jackson Maboro
DC Abdulahi Leloon
Abdullahi Irisora Ongaga
Moses Maranga
Anonymous speaker
Richard Otundo
Michael Nyabuto
James Omariba
James Oloro
Nyaberi Arane
Joseph Otieno mwai
Charles Ayieny
D.O Maranga
Nyansera Thomas
Silvanus Onymabu, O
Ogeto Odori
George Bitange Ng’weno
Norah Mutema
Samwel Mirima Bunde

GUCHA
38.
39.
40.
41.

Peter Nyandulia
Innocent Nyandiro
Evans Nyambaso Zedekiah
Bernard ole Maki
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42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

James Oyaro Kangare
Tom Okworo
Nahashon Orenge
Priscilla Ombonja
Jackson Amia Ogeto
James Osiero
Francis Marangi

KURIA
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Charles Wambura
Benedict Mwita
James Muochi
Peter Nyanyaga
Minyiri Jackton Otieno
Beatrice Robi Mwita
Rose Marwa
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2.6 CENTRAL PROVINCE
The Task Force conducted public hearings in Central Province from 16 - 18 Jul,y 2003, in Nyeri, Murang’a
and Kiambu.
Task Force Members attending:
Prof. Makau Mutua –Chair
Rev. Timothy Njoya – Vice Chair
Rev. Patrick Rukenya
Ms Mumina Konzo
Zarina Patel
Sheikh Ali Shee
Bishop Prof. Zablon Nthamburi
Mr. Tirop Kitur
Dr. Amukowa Anangwe
Mr. Kibe Mungai
Mr. Davinder Lamba
Rev. Mutava Musyimi
Dr Josephine Ojiambo (attended Kiambu only)

Ms Roselyne Lagat-Korir (attended Kiambu only)
Mr.Kairichi Marimba, OP, Ethics and Integrity Dept. (attended the Kiambu meeting only).
Secretariat:
Ms. Wanjiku Miano
Mr. Rono Tumuising

Mr. James Waititu
Mr. David Gathii

OVERVIEW
The public hearings in Central Province were generally poorly attended. Nevertheless, most speakers were
unanimous on the need to establish a truth, justice and reconciliation commission in Kenya. Support for the
commission was justified on the basis that Kenya is a fragile nation because of the festering wounds of
violations meted on citizens by successive regimes. The overwhelming feeling was that the country needs to
make a clean break with an imperfect past through a national healing process.
A two-tier commission was proposed to address injustices during the colonial and post independence
periods. Land grabbing and the collapse of the tea, coffee, and diary industry, and emerging cartels that
have frustrated the local farmer, were recurrent themes in submissions. Others were the non-recognition of
liberation heroes, and consequent betrayal by the ruling elite (the case of Jimmy Beauttah, and Bildad
Kaggia), inequitable distribution of national resources, the plight of ethnic clash victims, rape of women, the
violation of property and inheritance rights of women, atrocities committed against the Mau Mau by the
colonial regime, torture and killings by law enforcement agents. The confiscation of Asian businesses by
elite Kenyan entrepreneurs in the 1960s was also raised as an injustice that needs attention.
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Several speakers proposed that reconciliation should be excluded as it is a voluntary action that ought to be
left to concerned parties and determined by different circumstances.

FINDINGS
To set up or not to set up a Commission
All those who presented their views supported the establishment of a truth, justice and reconciliation
commission.
Some presenters submitted that a commission would provide an ideal forum for Kenyans to ventilate their
bottled up pain and anguish from years of suffering.
Others contended that the reason why violations occurred on a massive scale was because the judiciary
had degenerated like all other institutions of governance. The fact that it was no longer accountable to the
people made it a tool in the hands of the rich and mighty. The judiciary was considered inept and lacking the
capacity to handle complex transitional justice issues.
Speakers argued that there was need to know the truth about what happened as a first step towards
healing. Such a commission would record evidence from the past that would help retrace the steps and
rewrite history from a perspective of knowledge and experience.
Speakers cautioned against the narrow perspective of punishing perpetrators and compensating victims.
Those subscribing to this view saw forgiveness and reconciliation as overriding, and advised that greater
emphasis be laid on the two elements, otherwise they feared that Kenya would emerge a bitter and bruised
nation in need of further healing after the commission.
Even though most contributors supported the commission, some were skeptical of the eventual outcome
because of past experience.
How and when such a Commission should be established
How
The Commission should be established through an Act of Parliament.
Majority were of the opinion that a commission established by statute was more certain in terms of its tenure
than one appointed by a president. It was also safeguarded against manipulation, executive whims and
usurpation of its role.
Some speakers, however, argued that while they would not mind a commission created by statute, the
process of legislation meant delaying the urgent commission. Support for a presidential commission was
based on the fear of the intricacies of parliamentary and the disparate interests of legislators some of whom
were suspected perpetrators of atrocities.
A few proposed that the commission be entrenched in the new constitution for its protection, but also
wondered how such a structure would interface with similar proposed structures in the draft constitution.
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When
There were varied views by the presenters on when the commission was to be formed. Some argued it
should be within a year from the date of the submission of the report by the Task Force. Others thought that
the commission was a significant national process that should not be dwarfed, hence the moment of its
creation should be opportune. Proponents of this view, recommended the formation of the commission after
the constitution review process and the Goldenberg commission.
Membership of the commission
Most submissions proposed qualities that would serve as criteria for appointing members of the
commission. It should:
- Reflect national diversity - ethnic, youth, women, the disabled, among other representatives of
marginalized and vulnerable groups.
- Comprise persons of integrity and who were beyond reproach
- Comprise persons with relevant competence and experience in their respective fields
- Include professionals. It was proposed that few be lawyers while the majority be drawn from
peacemakers, and experts in conflict resolution, trauma counselors, doctors, economists, social
workers, clergy and anthropologists
- Comprise perpetrators and victims were considered undesirable for membership
Terms of Reference/Powers and Authority of the commission
Speakers recommended that the commission be empowered to deal with a wide range of issues including;
-

Plunder of the economy, and collapse of industries in the agricultural sector
Atrocities committed by home guards and the colonialists against freedom fighters
Political assassinations and murders
Massacres (Lari, Wagalla, Kisumu and others)
Ethnic clashes
Torture and killings by law enforcement agents
Saba Saba events
Land grabbing and dispossession
Denial of women’s property rights
Denial of basic rights
Social justice

Powers and privileges
It was proposed that the commission be empowered to summon persons before it to give evidence and
recommend the best cause of action, i.e. prosecution, compensation, resettlement, restitution, or other
suitable relief. It was also proposed that the commission could offer selective pardon depending on each
case but full disclosure ought to be a prerequisite, accompanied by restitution or other penalty. More
complex matters for prosecution were to be referred back to the judiciary. A few speakers proposed that the
commission be empowered with unfettered jurisdiction over all matters before it.
Speakers recommended that the commission be granted security of tenure to prevent its arbitrary
disbanding.
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Period of investigation
Several periods were proposed as follows;
12 December 1963 to Dec. 2002: Majority of the speakers seemed to favour the post independence
period when Kenya gained self-rule.
From 1952: Some speakers proposed that violations committed by the colonial regime be probed
from when the state of emergency was declared in Kenya because these violations set a selfperpetuating precedent
From 1885: A few speakers were of the opinion that the problems in Kenya today, particularly
relating to land could only be traced back to imperialism. Therefore to be able to diagnose existing
problems accurately and proffer appropriate solutions, it was necessary to go back in time to when
some territories were partitioned at the Berlin Conference by major European countries.
Statistics
Total No. of submissions - 52
Supporting commission
- 52
Opposed to a commission - 0

Overall response to TJRC in Central Province
25

Number

20
15

Vote For TRC
Vote Against TRC

10
5
0
Nyeri

Murang'a

Kiambu

Districts
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Female and Male contributors in Central Province
25

Number

20
15

Speakers Female
Speakers Male

10
5
0
Nyeri

Murang'a

Kiambu

Districts

List of participants:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

B.K Mathenge
Boniface Gichuki N.
Shadrack M. Gitonga
James Ndungu T.
James Gatama
Rev. Jamlick M. Miano
Julius Miriti Magambo
Richard Muahi
Hon. Peter G. Miriithi
Wilson Wanyeike
Munyi Wa Goro
James Mwangi G.
Baragn Mutahi
Francis Kiboi Wachira
James Wamburu
Julia Wambui
Jane Nyambura
Hawa Wangeci Ngatia
Meshack G.
Mwende M.
Michael Rambo
Stephen K. Wahinga
M. Gachara
Ephraim Karani
Cleopus W. Mathu
W.K. Kubai
S. Kuguru

Kabugwa
M.N. Musyimi
Patrick Waigwa
Eunice Nyaitaha
George Ndirangu K.
Velonica M. Mundia
Jackson Kiriaita
Francis N. Mwangi
Patrick Gitonga
Kabiru Richard
Ndiritu H. T.
Velonica N. Mundia
Richard K. M.
Maalim Abdullahi
James Mwongera
Joseph Kirimi
Daniel Kimaru
Joseph Mbugua
Peter Kamau Waithaka
Joseph Kiberia
Shadrack Muter
Julius M. Kiboi
Ndungu Makara

Murang’a
51. Sammy Kahura Muriuki
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52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Karuri Francis G.
Leornard Ndungu
David Karugo Mugo
Cyrus K.
Martin Telewa
Imam Abduillahi Ali
Halima Haji
Salim Karigita
Feisal
Ali Yusuf
Ndegwa
Thuo James Frank
Jimmy J. B.
Julius Macharia Kimani
Joseph G. Mbugua
Stephen Kariithi Mwaniki
Orungu Kang’ata

89. Gabriel M. K.
90. David Kibunja
91. Willam N. Kimani
92. John Njuguna
93. John Mwangi
94. Franics Njagi
95. Benard Njenga
96. Pius Mungai Njenga
97. Frank Nyagah
98. J.N. Ndegwa
99. Ndito Mwangi
100. Ndungu Wakirogo
101. Joseph Rutere
102. M.A. Charagu
103. Mathenge John
104. Kamau K.
105. Teresia
106. Esther Wanjiru
107. Alice Wanjiru
108. Ayub Makimei
109. Bernard N.
110. P.C Kuria Gathuru
111. Stephen Njuguna
112. David Mwathi
113. Mwangi Thuku
114. Joe Nyagah
115. S.K. Kamau
116. Ng’anga Waweru
117. Gitau Mwara
118. George Gachau
119. Clement Kamau
120. Michael Njenga
121. Titus Wainaina
122. Katee Mwanza
123. Mwangi Patrick
124. William Mwangi
125. Paton Kimathi

Kiambu

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Maina Kariuki Ngotho
Karori Karanja
Sarah Wanjiru Njoroge
Peter Muiruri
Mithamo Kariuki
Njoroge Wanguthi
Njoroge Waweru
Jane W.K.
Benson Maina
Kaniaru Njogu
D.K.Munuwe
David Njenga Ngugi
Njuguna Mwangi
Margret Wambui Mwangi
Daniel Mutie
Karanja Gikungu
James Gicheru Karanja
Peter Njenga
Paul Mwaura Mungai
Gitu Wa Kahengers
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2.7 EASTERN PROVINCE
The Task Force conducted public hearings in Eastern Province from 25-27 June, 2003, in Machakos, Meru
and Isiolo.
Members of the Task Force attending:
Rev. Timothy Njoya (Team Leader)
Mr. Davinder Lamba
Mr. Tirop Kitur
Ms. Mumina Konso
Ms. Raychelle Omamo (did not attend Meru and Isiolo sittings)

Secretariat:
Mr. George Gathi
Mr. Edwin Maloba
Mr. Ronoh Tuimising

OVERVIEW
The team was not able to visit the areas that were considered by the provincial administration to have been
prone to injustices and human rights violations in the past – i.e. Moyale, Maua and Nyambene. Moyale,
which lies on the border, has suffered from incursions by Ethiopian warriors while Maua and Nyambene
have experienced ethnic clashes.
The turn out in Meru was low. Only 18 and 15 people attended on the first and second respectively. Only 2
women turned up for the two days, but none of them made a submission. The team had to wait for over 3
hours on the second day for the members of the public to start arriving. The poor turn out was attributed to
poor mobilisation by the Provincial administration.
At Machakos, 52 people attended the public hearing, among them 6 women.
The turn out was impressive in Isiolo with over 200 attending and 40 persons testifying. In order to reflect
the ethnic diversity of the district, the participants divided themselves into groups and spoke through
selected spokespersons. Many others who wished to speak but had no opportunity for want of time handed
in written submissions. Generally, the submissions were based on the erroneous perception of the mission
of the Task Force and most did not strictly answer to the terms of reference.

One woman spoke about the injustices against women in Isiolo and throughout northern Kenya
districts which have suffered from banditry and cattle-rustling in the course of which women have
been raped, abducted, beaten, impoverishment, married or forcibly cohabited.

FINDINGS
To set up or not to set up a commission
On the whole, most submissions supported the establishment of a commission to investigate political,
social, economic, land-related and religious wrongs committed since the colonial period.
A commission is necessary to correct the wrong history about Kenya that is found in books as the ‘official’
history of Kenya. This is historical injustice, which needs to be corrected through the exposure of the truth
about Kenya.
A few were, however, opposed to the establishment of such a commission because there already exist
capable state machinery and systems to address those wrongs. What Kenya needs is therefore the
strengthening of those institutions, not the creation of new ones. Several submissions called for a clean
break with past commissions whose findings have not served any useful purpose because they were never
made public yet public funds had been expended.
Those who supported the commission especially in Isiolo, did so in the he hope that it will compensate and
correct wrongs and suffering caused to them since the colonial period. Some speakers stated that for them
independence is yet to come as they still live in hostile conditions, fighting among themselves and ravaged
by withering poverty. It was claimed that between 1947 and 1957, over 4000 people were massacred by
the colonial regime and others killed in concentration camps during the emergency period.
Reconciliation to them is a strange concept in the face of the atrocities they have suffered. A commission is
viewed as their vehicle to economic justice for lost livestock and property as well as compensation for their
suffering.
Those opposed to the commission said it would be a waste of scarce public resources and valuable national
time. They posed the questions – the commission will reconcile whom with whom? Forgive what? From
whom shall the truth be extracted – the government, or its one-time diehards? They submitted further that
what Kenya needs is justice and a remedy of wrongs arising from government’s failure to govern. They
further argued that Kenya should be futuristic in attitude and not be bogged down by the past because it
would be difficult to establish the truth about wrongs committed many years ago.
How and when it should be set up
How
Most of the speakers advised that it should be set up by an Act of Parliament while others recommended its
entrenchment in the Constitution. One speaker, however, advised that the parliamentary route might take a
while and proposed that it be set up like most other commissions, by presidential decree.
One speaker proposed that the Commission should employ its own independent investigators as the police
force is tainted with complicity in past injustices that shall be investigated by the commission.
When
Most participants felt it should be set up immediately the Task Force completes its work. A proposal was
made to link the commission with the office of ombudsman proposed in the ongoing constitutional review
process.

Membership of the commission
It should be made up of persons with good moral standing in society, drawn from all the key professions,
including lawyers, clergy, and grassroots representatives, women, youth, people with disabilities and human
rights activists.

Life of the commission
A few of the speakers suggested that it should be permanent in lifespan, while the others did not specifically
prescribe how long the commission should remain alive.
Terms of reference
The list of target subjects to be investigated include:
- The Emergency era in Northern Kenya
- Police brutality and excesses – trigger-happy officers, torture in police custody, rape while in
custody, corruption
- Judicial services – corruption, delay, cost, fairness, openness
- The prison service - brutality, inhuman treatment, congestion, unlawful sentences, unbecoming
jail sentences, homosexuality among inmates, nutrition, among other evils. Kodiaga and
King’ong’o prisons were singled out at the top of dreaded destinations in terms of detention
- Human rights abuses and economic crimes, including land grabbing and land rights in general
- Banditry and insecurity in northern Kenya and the role of the security forces
- Human and wildlife conflict
- Education rights and deprivation of livelihoods for marginalised communities like the Turkana
- Violation of women’s rights – domestic violence, rape, early marriage, HIV/AIDS, representation
in public offices among other issues of concern to women
- Atrocities committed by the provincial administration
- Slave trade and its impact on Kenya, and possibilities for reparations, as well as repatriation and
settlement of descendants of slaves shipped abroad
- Welfare of squatters in various settlement schemes – a relic of colonialism.
- Oppressive laws
- Land grabbing and illegal allocations
- Land dispossession by foreigners
- Government-sponsored atrocities such as ethnic clashes
- The plight of freedom fighters
- Oppression of university students and lecturers during the Mwakenya days
- Political assassinations – from 1963 to 2002
- Economic saboteurs from 1963 to 2002, particularly in relation to collapsed public institutions,
and the irregular allocations of municipal council lands to private individuals
- Detention without trial during both the Kenyatta and Moi eras
- Wrongful dismissal of public servants, and delays in handing over retrenchment benefits to
retrenched civil servants, as well as review of the measly ceilings of such benefits

Authority and powers of the commission
- Independence emanating from the act of parliament establishing it – powers similar to those
enjoyed by the South African Commission; and if a Presidential commission, functional privileges
and immunities accorded it under relevant laws;
- Power to summon anyone it deems necessary and useful for the investigations before it;
- Power to recommend prosecution, pardon, compensation and or restitution;
- Power to reconcile; pardon;
- Power to visit any place it may deem necessary in relation to proceedings before it;
- Power to access and peruse any document in whatever custody relevant to its investigations
- Authority to prosecute (opinion was divided)
- Authority to call back vital data stored outside the national borders in the national interest – for
the reconstruction of national history, and reference was made to the Vatican (in relation to Meru
generally) and to Westminster (in relation to the history of colonial rule in Kenya).
Historical period to be investigated
- From the colonial period (1895) to date, with a view to correcting wrongs committed against
Kenyans up to the present time;
- From 1952 to date – to ensure it gets to the genesis of the Mau Mau problems, the injustices of
the Kenyatta and Moi regimes, as well as the first year of the incumbent government;
- From 1963 – because it was then that governance changed hands, from the white colonialist to
the black Kenyan man, so that inquiries should focus on injustices perpetrated by Kenyans
against Kenyans.
- From 1978 – essentially in relation to the plunder of public institutions and the infamous
phenomenon of ethnic clashes and land grabbing.
- From 1939 – as a compromise to 1885 – to facilitate the re-writing of Kenya’s history.
- From 1945 – essentially for an audit of public lands within municipal councils in Meru, as well as
for looking into the cases of Kenyans who fought alongside the allied forces in Burma and other
battlegrounds during the second world war – as conscripts.
Statistics
Total no. of submissions - 74
Supporting commission - 74
Against commission
-0

Overall response to TJRC in Eastern Province

Number

40
30
Vote For TRC
Vote Against TRC

20
10
0
Machakos

Isiolo

Garba
Tullah

Vote For TRC

21

34

10

Vote Against
TRC

2

2

0

Female and Male contributors in Eastern Province
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Number

40
30

Speakers Female

20

Speakers Male

10
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2.8 NORTH EASTERN PROVINCE
The Task Force conducted three public hearings in North Eastern province and between 7-10 July, 2003, in
Garissa town, Wajir town and Wagalla airstrip.
Members of the Task Force attending:
Prof. Makau wa Mutua - Chairman
Rev. Tomothy Njoya
Sheikh Ali Shee
Mr. Kibe Mungai
Bishop (Dr/Prof) Zablon Nthamburi
Hon. Dr. Amukowa Anangwe
Rev. Patrick Rukenya
Mr. Davinder Lamba
Ms. Zarina Patel
Dr. Josephine Ojiambo
Mr. Tirop Kitur
Ms. Mumina Konso
Secretariat :
Ms. Jennifer Miano
Mr. Ronoh Tuimising
Mr. George Gathi
Mr. James Waititu
OVERVIEW
North Eastern Province is regarded as the epicentre of human rights violations in Kenya. The province has
experienced tremendous and continuous economic, political, social and religious upheaval that predates
independence.
The residents generally welcomed the prospect of a truth commission to investigate atrocities committed in
the region in the hope that it would get to the bottom of the issues faster than law courts ever would.
The residents of Garissa spoke more feelingly about the rest of Kenya, unlike in other parts of the Province,
which considered northern Kenya districts not to be part of mainstream Kenya. Speakers observed that they
are routinely subjected to discriminatory treatment but also demonstrated awareness of the afflictions of
other parts of the country such as tribal clashes in the Rift Valley and Likoni in Mombasa, economic crimes
and land distribution matters.
The Task Force, visited Wagalla airstrip, scene of the 1984 massacre, and visited several mass graves of
Wagalla victims. It received recommendations from residents and survivors of Wagalla massacre. About
200 members of the public attended the hearings, the majority of whom were women and children. [It is said
that arising from the 1984 massacre, the men folk have remained fewer than the women. Above the age of
40 years, there are distinctly more women than men, almost 7 to 1, and among the younger generation, the
oldest men are about 26 – 27 years].

The participants were delighted that since the new government came in, they are able to visit the scene
without being beaten up by the police. Before then, since 1984, they have not been allowed by the district
administration to visit the site.
Most speakers traced their problems to the colonial time and therefore proposed that investigations from
that time through the two post-independence governments headed by Kenyatta and Moi respectively.
FINDINGS
To set up or not to set up a truth Commission
The submissions returned an emphatic ‘yes’ for the establishment of a Truth commission. They suggested
that even if the rest of Kenya did not need such a commission, North Eastern Province alone would justify
its creation for the reasons set out under terms of reference below and because of the mass killings in the
province.
They cited grave and sustained violations of human rights, some of genocidal proportions like the Wagalla
Massacre, cruelty to animals, confiscation of private property without compensation, religious discrimination,
oppressive laws, economic and political marginalisation as some of the reasons justifying the creation of a
truth commission for Kenya.
Exposing and publicising these gross violations of human rights is important for posterity so that the
country’s shameful past may never be repeated against the people: massacres, colonial oppressions,
killings and confiscation of livestock, torture of men including castration, human rights abuses, oppressive
laws, and dumping of suspected radio-active material in the province.
Opposed
Two speakers held the view that Kenya does not need the proposed commission because it would be like
spraying perfume on one’s nose in order to avoid a bad smell. They went on to explain that Kenya needs
real courts to dispense real justice because the Bench has been compromised.
There can be no amnesty for the perpetrators because doing so will institutionalise impunity for criminal
conduct. Instead of amnesty, there should be reparations.
The truth is largely known and, for the most part, fairly well documented even if not currently in the public
domain. They called for the declassification of dossiers on all the massacres and other injustices so that
perpetrators can be prosecuted.
How and when the commission should be established
The majority of the residents favoured the commission being established by an Act of Parliament because of
the significance of its mandate. A few suggested that beyond legislation, it should be entrenched in the
constitution – to be included under a Schedule of Commissions.
Some expressed concern about a commission set up by an Act of Parliament, which several speakers did
so recommend, because of the fear that a bill on the subject might be shot down by perpetrators who are
now Members of Parliament. Such opponents proposed a Presidential commission. They also cautioned
against a commission being used to witch-hunt other or that would not deliver like past commissions of
inquiry.

Moreover, taking it to parliament would stretch and delay its establishment indefinitely due to the House
procedures political manipulation and competing considerations in the House. Third, because the President
has powers under the Constitution to create such a commission, the commission’s mandate and authority
would not be compromised in any way.
All were unanimous that the findings and work of the commission must be publicised and acted upon. They
also recommended unanimously that once set up, the commission ought to have a secretariat stationed at
Garissa to collect facts and evidence on injustices and violations of human rights. This, they explained, is
because the ills they have lived through are legion, and short sittings will not do.
It was proposed that the commission exploits indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms in its reconciliatory
role, and that it sets up conflict resolution centres all over the country.
Membership
The commission should have representatives from all provinces chaired by a Presidential appointee.
When it should to be set up

The majority of the speakers recommended that the commission be set up immediately. The Task
Force interpreted immediately to mean ‘as soon as possible’. A few others recommended that it be
set up after the conclusion of the on-going constitutional review process.
Terms of Reference

It was proposed that the commission conduct the following:
- State brutality through security agents – the Kenya Army and police – exemplified in
massacres (particularly the burning of Garissa in 1980, Bura Irgu in July 1967, Bura
Kartasi in 1980, Maalkam Ari, in Mandera, 1982, Bagala in 1998 - and other less
reported but equally brutal and devastating executions)
- Torture – including the dropping of tortured persons to their deaths from helicopters,
- Rape of women and girls – including the forced impregnation of women and girls (‘watoto
wa Moi’ phenomenon),
- Abduction of girls for immoral purposes
- Other killings/executions of persons, sponsorship of and prosecution of inter-clan warfare
and tribal clashes
- Confiscation of civil property – notably livestock – by security personnel, oppressive laws
(including the Closed Districts Act, Indemnity Act, and operation laws), the emergency
period of 1964 –1967, the shifta and bandit flushing operations;
- Marginalisation of the Province by the government since independence in allocation of
national resources for development: infrastructure, educational institutions, market
development among other issues;
- Violations of women’s rights other than those already referred to above;
- The October – November 1967 Peace Agreement between Kenya and Somalia: content,
context, operation, impact on policy and administrative methods since 1967 – 2003;
- Specific provincial administrators during the time of the most heinous violations of human
rights, and notably those in charge during the emergency years (1964 – 67), 1980 and
1998;
- Religious discrimination and victimization;
- Institutional and structural victimization;

- Open sale of sophisticated weapons and ammunition all over the province;
- Land grabbing;
- Cruelty to animals by security personnel and the Kenya Army: the mass shooting of
livestock deliberately to impoverish the communities;
- Strictures on the use of River Tana: which is administratively under Coast Province, not
North Eastern Province;
- Destruction of schools;
- Discrimination in the issuance of national identity cards and passports to Somalis
(including the Somali Verification Programme);
- Dumping of toxic wastes in the province (especially on the reported cases of rising
incidence of cancer of the oesophagus on residents of the suspect sites, and the
increasingly poisonous waters around the sites that have killed livestock, as well as the
increasingly visible environmental degradation around the suspect sites);
- Plight of original occupiers of land forcibly evacuated by the State’s security agents;
- Abuse of office and power;
- Discriminatory treatment at Mwingi, Meru District, where Somalis are frisked by the police
on suspicion of being ‘shifta’;
- Translocation of the Hirola, a wild animal traditionally resident in the Province, and an
endangered species, to a private farm in Laikipia, in defiance of a court order;
- Government policy on Northern Frontier Districts and today’s North Eastern Province and
parts of Eastern Province since 1963.
Authority and powers of the commission
The recommended powers for such a commission were:
- Investigative powers
- Prosecutorial powers
- Compensation mandate
- Power to make reparations
- Power to recover grabbed property and restore it to the rightful owners
- Powers to order restitution of property
Specific submissions were also made on the following:
Compensation: a poor country with huge developmental needs like Kenya cannot afford to compensate all
people for their loss. It might be possible to make token compensation to the countless victims if the
colossal sums of money looted by perpetrators of economic crimes are recovered, but that it might be
infinitely better to make compensation in other forms, such as enhancing access to basic services in the
form of access to education, health, clean water, user-friendly roads, restoration of respect and humanity to
the provincial administration, an end to all forms of discrimination, among many other humane deeds for the
benefit of the residents of the province.
Reconciliation: is a non-factor before retributive justice is administered. They recommended that justice be
done by way of prosecuting perpetrators of various atrocities and compensating them for property looted by
security agencies before healing can follow.
Historical period to be investigated by commission
The residents were quite agreed that the social, economic and political evils that have befallen them started
during the colonial days. However, they were divided on whether the commission should probe ills
perpetrated against them by the British colonial government, or whether the probe period should be from

1963 when Kenya became an independent state. The arguments for either period were strong and
passionate.
The general preference, however, leaned in favour of 1963 on the ground that to probe into the colonial past
would be to open a can of worms that may not be concluded satisfactorily. Further, that the wrongs
perpetrated by the independent Kenyan government, by Kenyan against Kenyan, is what causes much
distress, and an evil that must be investigated and punished.
SITE VISITS - WAJIR
The Task Force visited the Catholic Mission Graveyard and the Wagalla Airstrip in relation to the
Wagalla massacre of February 10 – 15 1984.
The purpose of the visits was to allow members of the Task Force to familiarise themselves with the
enormity of the atrocities of February 10 – 15 1984 at Wagalla. At the sites, the members witnessed the
legacy of a savage past, and Christian and Moslem prayers were said by the Reverend Timothy Njoya and
Sheikh Ali Shee.
The Task Force members, in the company of the District Commissioner, his senior officers and a contingent
of security personnel, visited Wagalla airstrip, the scene of the 1984 massacre of mainly members of the
Degodia clan of the Somali community. The team also visited the Catholic Mission Graveyard at Wajir, the
site of several mass graves of the victims of the massacre. Each grave holds approximately 75 bodies, the
team was told.
It is estimated that 5000 men were rounded up and taken to Wagalla. Among the civil servants who were
brought to Wagalla, only 2 survived the fire: a district officer and the then area chief. The residents of
Wagalla could not verify the exact number of the dead but the Team was informed that the Wagalla incident
has been documented before, and in that document statistics may be found.
At the baraza conducted after the site visit to Wagalla airstrip, it was striking that there were more women
than men. Several survivors undressed and prostrated themselves on the exact ground on which they lay
reliving their horror and watch the massacre unfold. Most of the men who survived or witnessed the
massacre are aged over 65 years on 9 July 2003 when the Task Force heard their testimonies.
It was the Task Force’s impression that knowledge of the real cause of the massacre must lie with the civil
servants in charge of the province at the material time led by the Provincial Commissioner, Mr. Benson
Kaaria. Others who would be of assitance are the Wajir District Commissioner of the time, the OCPD Wajir
and the Army Commander at the time.
Wagalla was a genocidal massacre. Survivors have the details of the unit commanders at the Wagalla
airstrip on the fateful days, as well as those who picked them from their houses who would assist with
investigate.
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ANNEX 3. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
SUMMARY OF DELIBERATIONS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE
ESTABLIHSMENT OF JUSTICE AND TRUTH COMMISSION
OVERVIEW
The Conference was held on 4-5July 2003 at the Intercontinental Hotel, Nairobi. Justice and
Constitutional Affairs minister, Hon. Kiraitu Murungi, opened the conference which was attended by
senior government officials including his assistant minister, Hon. Robinson Githae, and Permanent
Secretary, Jeremiah Matagaro. Assistant Minister of State in the Office of the President, Hon.
Kivutha Kibwana, also attended as did all members of the Task Force.
The conference was called to facilitate a national dialogue on the necessity of a truth, justice and
reconciliation commission for Kenya. At the end of the conference, delegates passed a declaration
to the effect that:
1. The Government of Kenya immediately establishes a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation
Commission to address both gross human rights violations and economic crimes
committed in Kenya between 1963 and 2002;
2. The Commission be empowered to recommend restitution, reparations, prosecutions and
conditional amnesties;
3. The commission should be independent, effective and broad-based in membership;
4. The Commission must not be a witchhunt or a white wash instrument; and
5. The commission should address grave injustices related to land.
The conference was unanimous that the country had been wounded by the atrocities of the past
and a mechanism to find out the truth, mete out justice to victims and bring about national healing
was necessary. Various concerns were raised with the governemnt:
1. Government commitment
Delegates were concerned about the government’s commitment to change and questioned the
belief that the NARC administration was actually ready to preside over change and therefore
committed to a truth, justice and reconciliation process. Some participants said that the
government had yet to prove that it is reformist and not engaged in business as usual. The real
test, it was pointed out, was the way the government held people accountable for the past and the
success of its war against corruption.
Both the minister and assistant minister for justice and constitutional affairs assured delegates that
the government was deeply committed to the exercise and would be faithful to the wishes of
Kenyans as will be expressed in the task force report. The minister assured the delegates and
Kenyans in general that the quest to address the past is not a pretext to witchhunt, hound or
persecute certain individuals and communities.

2. Clemency and Accountability
There was concern about pardoning gross human rights violations. Participants felt that cuprits
ought to be held to account by being prosecuted or punished. It was pointed out that it was
generally against international law, to which Kenya is obliged to comply, to forgive gross human
rights violations even when carried out under lawful immunity.
3. Duplication
There was further concern about the duplication of efforts in dealing with Kenya’s dark past. It was
noted that the government had already established the Goldenberg Inquiry as well the
Parliamentary Select Committee to pobe the death of the former foreign affairs minister, Dr. Robert
Ouko. It was pointed out that the government needed to be seen to have a coordinated approach
in dealing with the past.
FINDINGS
To set up or not to set up the commission

The conference supported the establishment of the commission to facilitate a process through
which the nation’s collective soul could be healed. The commission would capture the broader
picture than prosecuting human rights violators would. The genesis of such abusive acts would be
understood and dealt with for posterity. Such a process would inculcate a culture of human rights in
government and enhance respect for the rule of law. The commission will help the country come to
terms with its past and help build the future.
A commission process would take not only legal but also moral responsibility for remedying the
Kenyan society and preparing the public to accept responisbility for their acts while the State would
atone to its people for abusing the power and trust bestowed upon it by the constitution.
The commission was said to be necessary because Kenyans doubted the capacity of the Kenyan
judiciary to deal with the past. It was argued that the Judiciary was heavily implicated in the
repression of Kenyans and it still needs further refinement to be able to deal with such an
enormous assignment. It was further feared that now that some members of the judiciary must be
working to ensure their survival under the NARC administration, they might be tempted to convict
alleged perpetrators even without proper legal basis. This danger is as real and as dangerous as
the previous practice of letting known and notorious abusers of human rights and public office scot
free during the KANU reign.
Opposed
There were three very articulate submissions against the establishment of the commission. The
speakers felt that the country did not need to investigate the truth because it was already know.
Nor was there need to reconcile anybody. Kenyans needed justice. They were not opposed to

reconciliation being a by-product of justice but vehemently opposed forgiving perpetrators. They
wanted alleged perpetrators taken to court, tried and if convicted, duly punished.
Speakers expressed the need for the commission to be qualitatively different from other
commissions that have been established before, which were good at documentation but achieved
little. It was proposed that the commission should also use reports of previous commissions such
as the Akiwumi Report on Land Clashes.
It was noted that in the absence of a negotiated political settlement in Kenya like in other
jurisdictions which guarantee their success, the Kenyan commission would solely depend on the
government’s commitment and political will to support the work of the Commission.
It was stressed that Kenyans must get some form of justice for there to be true national healing and
reconciliation. For instance, it was said, those that stole public property should return it as a super
minimum precondition for forgiveness.
When the Commission should be set up
The government was urged to set up the commission immediately. Speakers warned against
delaying the establishment of the commission noting that the longer it took the government to set
the commission, the more time and space the government gave to perpetrators to strategically
reposition and reinvent themselves thus making it more difficult to hold them accountable for their
misdeeds. This strategic repositioning had to be stopped for the further reason that such persons
were able to subvert the new order.
Powers, Privileges and Limitations

The Commission should have power to summon witnesses, to restore stolen property, order
restitution and compensation, grant amnesty, recommend lustration and demand that perpetrators
apologize to victims.
Terms of Reference for the Commission

The conference recommended that the commission be focused in its work. Lack of focus might
lead to a situation where the commission investigates everything and nothing.
The commission should investigate gross human rights violations, economic crimes and grave injustices
related to land. The country has seen very dark days when citizens were tortured, detained without trial or
even killed because they did not politically agree with officialdom or wanted restoration of democracy, good
governance, respect for fundamental rights, freedoms and the rule of law, which officialdom regarded as
treason.
One presenter argued that the commission should only focus on gross human rights violations and leave out
economic crimes. The government should establish other mechanisms for addressing economic crimes like
it has already done under the Goldenberg Inquiry. Combining both economic crimes and gross human
rights violations would make the commission’s work endless, become a ploy to delay justice and defeat the
purpose of a truth commission. A truth commission should, ideally, finish its work in less than three years.

The majority, however, felt that the commission should address both gross human rights violations and
economic crimes because there is a very thin line between them. Other proposed duties of the commission
included:
- political assassinations, massacres and police killings, land clashes of 1991-1992 and 19971998, corruption, land grabbing and other historical claims relating to land.
- reports of previous inquiries to avoid duplication
- educating the public on matters of rights, remedies and the work of the commission so that those
that would choose to forgive should do so with a clear understanding of their rights
- mandate to order restitution and compensation for the victims. Victims will feel sacrificed if they
do not get some form of acknowledgement and recognition.
- establish personal and state responsibility for certain past crimes. The commission should
establish and document the policy object behind the crimes. It is important to go for the sponsors
and key pillars of the crimes since going after every small perpetrator would tie down the
commission in detail

- he task force was urged to clearly think through the question of amnesty and whether the
president could exercise the power of clemency for some people and for certain crimes.
The question of amnesties was seen as one of the incentives that would be given to the
“soldiers” who would be useful in producing evidence linking the crime to the
“commanders.” Those that refuse amnesty should be prosecuted.
- The commission should be able to offer counseling to victims who had been greatly hurt
and traumatized.
The commission must protect both victims and perpetrators.
Membership of the commission
The membership of the commission should be broad without compromising competence and
integrity which are core to legitimacy that is absolutely critical to the success of the commission.
Ther commission shouold comprise doctors because of questions of torture, lawyers,
psychologists, a representative of the Lands Office, police, judiciary and religious groups.
Historical period to be investigated
The commission should investigate all human rights violations from 1963.

A few people, and notably the keynote speaker, wanted these investigations to be done from 1895.
Colonial rule was seen as having sown the seeds of oppression and the culture of impunity. One
person said that the commission should investigate from 1990 to 2003 because the expansion of
the democratic space put every public official on notice that certain acts were illegal,
unconstitutional and outrageous to Kenya’s public morality. They should therefore be held to
account.

DECLARATION OF THE NAITONAL CONFERENCE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRUTH,
JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION HELD ON THE 4-5, JULY, 2003 IN NAIROBI
We, the participants at the National Conference on the establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation
Commission assembled in Nairobi on July 5, 2003,

Responding to the national and historical call of our people to justice,
Mindful of our national duty to foster peace and democracy,
Committed to the enormous task of national reconciliation and healing,
Driven by deep faith in a just society based on a culture of constitutionalism and the rule of law,
Affirming the need to confront our past that has a history of gross human rights violations and
economic crimes,
Acknowledging limitations and inadequacies of our legal system in addressing gross human rights
violations and economic crimes
Do now resolve:
1. That the Government of Kenya immediately sets up a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation
Commission to address gross human rights violations and economic crimes committed in
Kenya from 1963-2002.
2. That the Commission shall have the powers to address and recommend restitution,
reparations, prosecutions and, in special circumstances, conditional amnesties as well as
mechanisms and policies for preventing and addressing future violations.
3. That the Commission should be independent, broad-based and composed of persons of
high moral integrity.

4. That the Commission shall not be used as a witchhunt, white wash or as an instrument to
delay justice.
5. That the Commission shall have the mandate to address gross human rights violations,
gross economic crimes and grave injustices related to land.
6. That the Commission shall pay special attention to the atrocities committed in the Northern
Frontier Districts.
List of speakers
Mr. James Orengo
Hon. Kivutha Kibwana
Mr. Pheroze Nowrojee
Dr. Karuti Kanyinga
Mr. Nzamba Kitonga
Dr. Gibson Kamau Kuria
Ms. Betty Murungi
Ms. Nancy Baraza
Mr. Abdulmarni Wandati
Ms. Lynn Muthoni Wanyeki
Justice Torgbor
Bishop Horace Etemesi
Kisemei wa Mutistya
Prof. Gilbert Ogutu
Mr. PLO Lumumba
Mr. Ahmed Nassir
Mr. John Munuve

ANNEX 4. REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
Introduction
The international conference was held on 14-16 August 2003 at Safari Park Hotel. It was addressed by
Archbishop Desmond Tutu who chaired the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Justice
and Constitutional Affairs minister Hon. Kiraitu Murungi, Assistant Minister Hon. Robinson Githae and Office
of the President Assistant minister Hon. Kivutha Kibwana beside other political and academic luminaries.
The conference was attended by all members of the Task Force (some intermittently) except Dr Amukowa
Anangwe.
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS
The Importance of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Process
Participants noted the importance of societies emerging from repressive periods of their national history to
confront their past in a way that enables them to grieve and heal wounds and look into the future with
confidence. The options available to such nations include the Nuremberg route, whose core principle is trials
and administering due punishment; blanket amnesties where those who belong to the ancient regime are
forgiven for all their misdeeds without an inquiry; and truth commissions.
The Nuremberg route is fraught with many dangers. There are questions of a polarized judicial system that
embodies the polarisation of society at that time in history compunded by the capacity of the judicial system
to cope with an avalanche of new prosecutions targeting perpetrators and members of a former repressive
government. Politically, trials get complicated especially where, like in the case of Kenya, the former
government is defeated through an electoral process but not vanquished. Members of the former regime
that still hold on to their constituencies and could occupy key and strategic government positions in the short
and medium term, which poses a potential threat to political stability.
It was further observed that in the interest of breaking the vicious circle of hatred, vindictiveness and
violence so as to achieve national harmony, it is important to negotiate the way forward for a country
emerging from a traumatic past. Trying perpetrators is not always an easy option. Nuremberg was made
easy by the fact that the victors did not have to share a homeland with the vanquished. Even then, the
Germans carry a deep resentment and hurt to date as the after-effects of Nuremberg. Most countries are
often unlucky to have tormentors, oppressors and abusers co-exist.
The option of blanket amnesties is morally repugnant. It signals the sanctification the culture of impunity in a
dangerous form that leaves society insecure in the knowledge that what they experienced before could
recur.
Though it would be naive to say that the truth commission process is perfect, it gives a country the
opportunity to craft a vehicle for addressing its past that is best suited to its experiences. The delicate
political situation that countries undergoing transition from a dark past often find themselves in and the
complexities that attend such transitions demand that every truth commission process must take into
account local circumstances. The future of the nation must underscore all efforts to investigate the past.
Efforts that would jeopardize that future are best avoided.

Truth commissions and political transitions
The place of a truth commission in a political transition from a dark past is not hard to see. Dictatorships
leave behind highly fragmented societies in urgent need of national healing, harmony and unity. The
process of looking at the past must be one which helps debunk the myths that helped perpetuate the
dictatorship by establishing historical truth, restoring the dignity of the people through some measure of
justice availed to the victims and country in general and work towards national unity and reconciliation. This
process must of necessity not undermine the forward-looking direction of change by exacerbating national
divisions and conflicts or pursuing methods that signal a slip back to authoritarianism.
A troubling aspect of the Kenyan scenario is the fact that some senior officials in the current administration
were key actors in the former government. Some are suspected perpetrators. This scenario is not unique to
the Kenyan experience. The difficulty with this scenario is that government support and commitment to such
a process may not be forthcoming because actors in the government foresee themselves as casualties of
such a process. The question is one of securing government support, material and political, for the truth
commission. The answer to this difficulty can only be found in the unequivocal expression of the Kenyan
people of their need to have an effective truth commission. This must start with the leadership and great
contribution from organized civil society in a project that is necessarily political, putting the nation in a mode
that makes it difficult for anyone, no matter how powerful, to obstruct the process without adversely affecting
their standing in society.
Prerequisites for a commission
It is important that before a commission is set up that those charged with the responsibility of setting it up
think through the consequences and likely outcomes of such a process. Though it is not possible to foresee
all the outcomes and consequences of such a process, it is possible to foresee important outcomes and
possible scenarios that would be the consequences of the commission’s work. This is important since it
helps the country focus on wanted results. The kind of commission the country comes up with after
prospective thinking on outcomes and consequences has a higher probability of delivering the wanted
results.
It is equally important to engage in wide consultations with stakeholders after the task force submits its
report before the commission is set up. This presents an opportunity for people to respond to the task force
report. Such a process will generate a strong sense of ownership of the process among the Kenyan people.
This is very crucial for the success of the commission.
It is also important to prepare the country, victims and perpetrators for a truth commission process through
civic education, continuous consultations with civil society and other actors. It was noted in this regard that
civil society has proved invaluable in countries that have undertaken similar national exercises.
Commission operations and process
It is important that on the whole, the proceedings of the commission be in public. This is a necessary
departure from the culture of secrecy that characterized the years of oppressive rule. It is however
recognized that special categories like the testimony of women be held in closed doors, requests for which
may be granted.

In addition to holding public hearings, it is important to hold institutional hearings in which process
institutions that have been indicted for human rights violations like the police, the judiciary and intelligence
service can account for their past (mis)conduct.
It was pointed out that truth-finding involves ascribing responsibility and the commission must not shy away
from doing so. It also includes individualizing responsibility and exposing those that hide behind collectives
and institutions such as communities and government organs.
The task of report writing should start at the beginning of the commission’s work. The experience of other
commissions is that if report writing waits till the commission is in its winding up phase, it becomes very
difficult to write a report that does not lose a lot of significant information. It is important to capture a lot of
the process and procedure in the report because it is in itself a very strong educational and political tool.
Victims should receive V.I.P treatment during commission proceedings.
Composition of the commission
The membership of the commission goes to the core of its legitimacy. The process of choosing
commissioners also presents an opportunity to anchor post commission follow up processes that would
generally continue its work into the future. In this respect, key organizations such as the Kenya National
Commission on Human Rights should be ex–officio members of the commission. This would secure
continuity once the commission has wound up. The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights would
carry forward with the commission’s work especially with regard to issues of redress and work to guarantee
non-recurrence of human rights violations.
The commissioners should be appointed after wide consultations with civil society and other stakeholders.
Only persons of integrity and competence should be appointed.
Powers and structures of the commission
The commission should be given adequate powers to effect its mandate. The structures and powers should
match the job at hand. It is important for the commission to have the power of subpoena. Experience
elsewhere shows that if the commission does not have power to compel people to appear before it they will
subject it to ridicule and attempt to scuttle its work.
The power to recommend or offer amnesties should be exercised judiciously. Experience in other
jurisdictions shows that offering amnesties alone does not of itself guarantee full disclosure and honest
confessions about the role of certain actors in past abuses. For amnesty to be effective as an inducement
for full disclosure there must be a real and felt threat of prosecutions.
The Commission’s mandate
The mandate of the commission should be precise if it is deliver results. The conference did not
exhaustively discuss the question of economic crimes in a truth commission, which needs further
discussion. However, there was consensus that those that plundered the national economy must account.
The issue is one of route or vehicle as opposed to whether or not these should be investigated.

Though it is very important for the commission to do its best to promote national reconciliation and unity, it
must be careful not to be trapped into the role of mediators. If this happened, it would take a lot of the
commission’s time and resources away from its more critical job: truth finding. It is therefore important in this
respect for the commission to partner with civil society and religious bodies that would comfortably shoulder
this responsibility.
Who is a victim?
For certain violations and abuses of power the victim class is more diffuse. In this context, the term evokes
such acts as corruption, violations of press freedom, infringement of the twin freedoms of assembly and
association, restrictions on free movement and expression. Though the victim class is diffuse, these acts
are no less destructive of society. They involve collective hurt and therefore require national healing.
In other situations the victims are known individuals, their relatives and communities. Even when the hurt
can be individualized, the nation still hurts from the violations of individual citizens in the same manner that
the whole human body suffers when a part is sick or injured.
Access by women and children
It was observed that across the world it has been reported that it has been difficult for women and children
to access truth commission processes in a meaningful way. Where women do indeed participate, they
merely go through the motions and may not express their hurt. They will most probably talk about the
suffering of their loved ones but not themselves. Truth commissions work in cultures that muffle women’s
voices most of the time and may, if not conscious of this limitation, alienate women from their processes.
The truth commission should therefore go out of its way to design procedures and methods that make sure
that women are heard. A good example is the Sierra Leone Truth Commission, which decided to hold
thematic hearings. The suffering of women was one of these special themes and only women
commissioners participated in its sittings. As a result, it has been reported that women were more
forthcoming with their stories of hurt and pain than in processes where this was not done.
Post-commission follow-up processes
The truth commission process is never the end. It is important therefore for the commission to think about
post-commission processes that would complete what it started. This could be carried in the
recommendations that it makes in its report.
It is important in this regard for the commission to draw a comprehensive reparations policy for
implementation by government amongst other recommendations. Further, the commission should make
recommendations for the reform of the state to guarantee non-repetition of past abuses. Such reforms could
include legal reform and the establishment of such institutions as the office of the ombudsperson for future
protection of citizens.
The government should also be required to give full and meaningful consideration to the recommendations.
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sacrificing the search for justice at the altar of orderly transition and reconciliation in Serbia.
51. Lansink Annette, “Forget Revenge…What about Compensation?” Africa News Service, March
30, 2000
Lansink urges compensation for the victims of apartheid in order to conclude on the work of the
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55. National Catholic Reporter, “Discoveries Underline Need for Truth Commission,” 36(29), May 19,
2000
This article focuses on revelation of US involvement with the Salvadoran military which was found to
be involved in human rights atrocities and calls for a truth commission in the US to facilitate the full
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and Reconciliation Commission Accomplished?” 345, November 1, 1997
This article evaluates the South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, its purposes, its
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failure to improve the socio-economic conditions of most victims. He notes that the view of the South
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This book examines the most egregious war crimes and acts of genocide in the 20th Century as well
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Introduction
Following democratic elections on 30 December 2002 ushered in a new political era began in Kenya.
Suddenly, there was a new opportunity to make a clean and clear break with over a century of authoritarian
rule. The electoral loss of the then ruling political party, Kanu, to Narc by a sizeable margin in effect
renewed hope of a transition to democracy in the country.
A key aspect of that democratic transition is the issue of transitional justice and the mechanisms that should
be put in place to midwife the process. Hence, it is in this context that the issue of a truth commission is
being examined.5
Various approaches have been employed to redress past human rights violations. Professor Makau Mutua
defines their spectrum as: “at the one extreme these responses could include criminal prosecutions, on the
other, the granting of blanket amnesties to the perpetrators…Each country must decide where…(it) fits
between each of these two poles…of amnesty and prosecution.”6
He proceeds to argue that “Truth commissions are established for gross human rights violations that normal
courts cannot, are unwilling, or unable, to address. Each country must decide where a truth commission
fits...”7
The question of just where a truth commission would appropriately fit is “best understood when situated in
the actual political realities and in the transitional political context, which includes the features of the
predecessor regime as well as political, juridical, and social contingencies.”8 Amy Ansell, Associate
Professor of Sociology at Bard College recognizes that “truth commissions are not established in situations
of complete defeat of former powers, but rather in situations of political compromise.”9
Yet it is not in question that truth commissions “are created principally at the time of a state’s transition
toward a more democratic or participatory government, a government that espouses the ideals of
democracy, of power bounded by law, of formal legal equality, and social justice. It matters not how the
moment of political change occurred; it could have been violent or non-violent, such as Kenya’s. What
matters is that there is a normative and substantive departure by the successor government or state from its
predecessor. Thus it could be change from autocracy to democracy, from opacity to transparency, from
open shameless graft to fiscal and economic accountability. But that change must be structural, ideological,
and fundamental, it cannot be a continuation of the same, the change must signal real and genuine regime
change.”10
Molly Andrews, co-director of the Centre for Narrative Research and Senior Lecturer in Psychosocial
Studies at the University of East London, points out that, “when a society suffers an “administrative
massacre” its members will often seek to reconstruct its institutions on the basis of a shared understanding
of what went wrong…mostly, they tell stories. The “telling and retelling” of a people’s central stories
constitutes its collective identity.11
She adds that “truth Commissions are one way in which citizens of a country help to determine what shall
be included and what shall be left out in the story a nation tells itself about a traumatic past.”12
Characteristics of Truth Commissions
There have been at least 25 truth commissions established around the world since 1974.13 Although they
have gone by different names, and sometimes did not themselves during their operations even
acknowledge being truth commissions, they generally share the following characteristics:14

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Are temporary bodies, usually in operation for one or two years;
Are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the state;
Are non-judicial bodies that enjoy a measure of de jure independence;
Are usually created at a point of political transition, either from war to peace or from authoritarian
rule to democracy;
Focus on the past;
Investigate patterns of abuses and specific violations over a period of time, not just a single specific
event;
Complete their work with the submission of a final report that contains conclusions and
recommendations; and
Focus on violations of human rights and sometimes of humanitarian norms as well.

Their work offers extremely useful insights in the do’s and don’ts of how to establish and operate a truth
commission. Yet it is clear from the outset that there is no single universal model applicable to all nations,
societies and peoples.15 Indeed, Harvard University’s Professor Henry Steiner has observed, “The truth
commission has been a protean organ, not only in the many institutional forms it has assumed, but also in
its varying membership, in the diverse functions it serves, and its range of powers, methods, and processes.
Each country…has given its commission a distinctive architecture.”16
It would, however, be remiss not to study and imbibe the lessons offered by other truth commissions.
Steiner states: “…what rapidly becomes apparent is that concrete examples drawn from different countries
must inform abstract description. No architect of these institutions has proceeded by deduction from
general principles.”17 In failing to study other experiences, we would, to borrow Hayner’s words, “retrace the
errors and struggle with the same difficulties that others have in the past.”
What lessons?
Several clear questions, that Kenya will need to grapple with, suggest themselves when reviewing the
experiences of the truth commissions that have been established in different jurisdictions. These include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Why (not) form a Truth Commission?
When is a Truth Commission formed?
How is a Truth Commission formed?
What scope and mandate is ideal for a Truth Commission?
What powers should be vested in a Truth Commission?
For how long should a Truth Commission operate?
How are Commissioners appointed to a Truth Commission?
What are the staffing needs of a Truth Commission?
What period in history is to be investigated by a Truth Commission?
Should the Commission hearings be in public?
How will information be managed by the Truth Commission?
Will there be a witness protection program in place?
How adequately will abuses of women be handled?
How is the question of amnesty to be dealt with?
The danger for re-traumatisation
The issue of reconciliation
What standard of proof will be adequate for the Commission?
The question of reparations
Relations with concurrent judicial investigations
The resources for a Truth Commission

21. The naming of names in the final report
22. The question of follow-ups after a Truth Commission winds up
23. The principal activities of a Truth Commission (including networking with local and international
partners)
24. The issue of how serious economic crimes will be dealt with by a Truth Commission
Let us now examine each of the issues outlined above.
Why (not) form a Truth Commission?
Justice and constitutional Affairs minister Kiraitu Murungi has stated: “We cannot move forward without
referring to the past. Just as a tree grows upwards, its roots grow downwards...We need to uproot weeds in
the garden so that we can plant.”18 Speaking at the same conference, Professor Makau Mutua, Chair of the
Task Force on the Establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission observed that, “A state
that sees no evil, hears no evil and speaks no evil is an evil state.” Kenyan freedom fighter Bildad Kaggia is
also quoted as having said: “You cannot wish away history and history is not what you want to happen.
History is what happened and it will stay whether you like it or not.”19
In his book, The File: A Personal History,20 Timothy Garton Ash extols Jewish wisdom that “to remember is
the secret of redemption” and recalls George Santayana’s words that “those who forget the past are
condemned to repeat it.”
Alex Boraine, Vice-Chair of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, notes that “dealing with the
past is inescapable, if we are working towards a peaceful future…To ignore the past is to perpetuate
victimhood. We are aware that many countries continue to be haunted by their past. For the sake of
justice, for stability and the restoration of dignity to victims, there must be accountability for the past. And as
an added benefit, such accountability could be a deterrent to those who might be tempted in future to
engage in gross human rights violations.”21
Colin Bundy points out that “the establishment of the objective truth is part of the struggle for the control of
history. It plays a central role in society’s redefinition of itself.”22 In May 1985, Richard von Weizsacker,
then President of West Germany commented, “Whoever closes his eyes to the past becomes blind to the
present. Whoever does not wish to remember inhumanity becomes susceptible to the dangers of new
infection. And former US President Gerald Ford is recorded as having stated, “Learning from our mistakes
is not pleasant, but…we must do so if we need to avoid repeating them.” In Switzerland, the President is
quoted as having said, “I’ve spent ten years in the government. Until last year no one – I mean no one –
spoke of the fundamental necessity of reexamining Swiss history. Now I realize this must be done, because
a country that has not really faced its past cannot decide its history.”23
Albert Camus exhorts: “Truth is as mysterious as it is inaccessible and it must be fought for eternally.” On
the other hand, Poet Maya Angelou writes,
History, despite its wrenching pain,
Cannot be unlived, and if faced
With courage, need not be lived again24
Hence, there is clear consensus on the need to revisit the past, to learn from it and use the compass of
these lessons to navigate the future. “…there is an emerging sentiment in international advocacy circles
that official truth-seeking should always be recommended for countries emerging from authoritarian rule.
Policy statements of both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch…call for investigation into the

truth about gross violations of human rights whenever such violations take place. Many cite emerging
international law to back the “right to truth” and confer an obligation on the government to
investigate…Likewise, international “principles to combat impunity” proposed in 1997 by United Nations
Special Rapporteur Louis Joinet includes a recommendation for a commission of inquiry to establish the
truth about the past in a transitional country. “Full and effective exercise of the right to truth is essential to
avoid any recurrence…in the future,” these recommendations state.
The document continues: “A people’s knowledge of the history of their oppression is part of their heritage
and, as such, shall be preserved by appropriate measures in fulfillment of the State’s duty to remember.
Such measures shall be aimed at preserving the collective memory from extinction and, in particular, at
guarding against the development of revisionist and negationist arguments.”…Yet there may be cases in
which a “truth always” recommendation is not appropriate, or at least in which a recommendation for a
formal and official truth-telling project such as a truth commission might be inappropriate.”25
Perhaps the most compelling reason why the road of a Truth Commission should be trod is that the people
ask for or demand it. Hayner observes, “…ultimately, the decision whether or not to institute broad truthseeking should be made by the country itself.”26 She continues, “…neither the quantity nor the type of
human rights abuses, nor whether the abuses have already been documented by previous efforts, will
determine the suitability or prescribability of official truth-seeking. A relatively small number of cases does
not lessen the urgency of the issue…Instead, the primary measure to determine the importance of a truth
commission is found in the desire for a truth-seeking process from within the society under question. It is
hard to measure these sentiments in concrete terms… Opinion polls are unrealistic in most countries, and
fear of speaking publicly about government abuses may continue long after…the departure of a repressive
regime…although there may be no means of formal measurement…governments should be guided by
expressed national preferences, especially those of victims or groups that represent them. In those
countries where there is a generalized lack of interest in or resistance to digging up the past, this is likely to
be reflected at all political and societal levels: a preference for letting go, an uncomfortableness in talking of
the past…Elsewhere, the demand for truth and accountability is made clear through public demonstrations,
lobbying from victims or human rights organizations…”27
Other reasons why a Truth Commission should be established are that it can:28
•

Help establish the truth about the past: Professor Makau Mutua writes, “Another function, which
is probably the most important one, is that of truth telling, where the perpetrators bare all, and the
victims recount the horrors visited upon them by the sadism of the state.”29 “The ultimate goal of
the truth commission, in fact its raison d’etre, is the search for truth,” writes Charles Manga
Fombad, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Botswana. Alex Boraine observes that,
“one of the major advantages of a truth commission…is…inclusive truth telling.”30 He proceeds to
categorize these as the objective or factual or forensic truth; the personal or narrative truth; the
social or dialogical truth; and the healing and restorative truth.31

Writer Michael Ignatieff states: “The past is an argument and the function of truth commissions, like the
function of honest historians, is simply to purify the argument, to narrow the range of permissible lies.”32
The aim here is for the Truth Commission to establish an “accurate record of a country’s past, clarify
uncertain events, and lift the lid of silence and denial from a contentious and painful period of history.”33
It establishes “a record of the past that is accurate, detailed, impartial and official. This record can
serve to counter the fictitious or exaggerated accounts of the past that were propagated by the previous
regime…and bring the true scale and impact of a violent past to the public consciousness.”34

In this regard, it may not even be telling a new truth, rather it may be acknowledging or formally
recognizing a truth that may be generally well known that is critical, especially where official denial was
pervasive.
In Chile, survivors cite a public apology by the state during an emotional appeal for pardon and
forgiveness by the President when releasing the Chilean truth report to the public as a powerful
moment after having their claims brushed aside for so many years.35 Molly Andrews notes that, “the
power of truth commissions lies not so much in discovering the truth – in the form of new facts – as in
acknowledging it.”36
•

Promote the accountability of perpetrators of human rights violations: The evidence collected
by a Truth Commission could be used in subsequent prosecutions, or to recommend other
sanctions such as civil liability, removal from office, restitution or community service. An example
of a country where evidence gathered by a Truth Commission has been instrumental in this regard
is Argentina where it was used to quickly build cases against nine senior members of the previous
regime.37 It should also be noted that, “Baltasar Garzon, the Spanish judge who brought charges
against Augusto Pinochet, relied heavily on the Chilean truth commission report to build his case.
Likewise, international human rights groups started with the truth commission report in Chad in
their attempts to bring charges against fromer ruler of Chad, Hissein Habre.”38

•

Provide a public platform for victims: A truth commission can put victims at the epicentre of the
process, giving them a sense of personal vindication. It could also help educate the public about
the adverse effects of past crimes on individuals, thus creating support for such victim-centred
initiatives as reparations programs.

•

Inform and catalyse public debate: A truth commission can “help stimulate public deliberation on
the complex array of moral, political and legal issues that must be addressed during a transition
process. This can be achieved by engaging with the public through commission activities and
encouraging broad media coverage. In addition, truth commissions can themselves serve as a
model for the public, as the public begins to take up again the critical practice of discussing
controversial political subjects without fear of recrimination or resort to violence. Commissions can
also serve as independent, impartial and public arbiters if and when members of the previous
regime grossly misrepresent or distort events of the past.”39 In this regard, it has been noted that
in, for instance, South Africa media coverage of the Truth Commission “was intense: most
newspapers ran a number of stories on the commission every day, and radio and television news
often led with a story on the most recent revelations from the commission’s hearings. Four hours
of hearings were broadcast live over national radio each day, and a Truth Commission Special
Report television programme on Sunday evenings quickly became the most-watched news in the
country.40

•

Recommend victim reparation: Given past abuses and ongoing psychological and economic
injuries arising as a result, a Truth Commission can build cases for reparation as well as establish
fair and effective definitions and categories of “victims” in order to process compensation. A truth
commission could also suggest symbolic reparations such as memorials, reburials and
commemorative ceremonies. Different Truth Commissions have gone about this objective in
different fashions, 41 as we shall see later on this briefing.

•

Recommend necessary legal and judicial reforms: Professor Steiner argues that, “Realization
of (or at least toward) fundamental change appears to be an almost constant companion to the use
of truth commissions. A repressive regime succeeding as repressive a government that it has
ousted from power is unlikely to explore prior misdeeds that may be ideally suited to its own malign

purposes.”42 Part of the architecture of past repression has been the structures or institutions that
have failed to uphold the protection of human rights by condoning or even themselves perpetrating
human rights abuses. A truth commission can clearly and authoritatively identify these institutions
and recommend their reform by, for example, strengthening civilian oversight of intelligence
agencies and the military; new appointment, tenure and disciplinary rules for the judiciary, the
establishment of an independent and well-financed prosecutor’s office, re-design of the electoral
and political system, land reform, and new human rights training programs for the disciplined
forces.43 Examples are given: “While some of the earlier truth commission reports provided only
very brief and general recommendations, those in more recent years have been much more
extensive, usually including a full and detailed chapter outlining specific reforms across many
sectors of government and public life. The El Salvador report’s recommendation ran for fifteen
pages, South Africa’s forty-five pages, and Chile’s over fifty-five pages.44
•

Promote social reconciliation: The process of hearing out grievances and suffering can be
therapeutic and promote tolerance. In his book No Future Without Forgiveness, Archbishop
Desmond Tutu notes that, “it is crucial, when a relationship has been damaged or when a potential
relationship has been made impossible, that the perpetrator should acknowledge the truth and be
ready and willing to apologize. It helps the process of forgiveness and reconciliation immensely. It
is never easy…if the process of forgiveness and healing is to succeed, ultimate acknowledgement
by the culprit is indispensable – not completely so but nearly so…”45
Professor Makau Mutua further argues that a truth commission “can act as a sort of a national
catharsis in which the country goes through a deep and penetrating process of cleansing the past.
This function is akin to therapy. It can perform the function of moral reconstruction, in which a
country takes stock of its morality in politics, governance, cultural values, and its view of humanity.
Moral reconstruction implies learning lessons from the past and revising the nation’s moral code. It
could be a vehicle for reconciliation after truth and justice have been told and done. Here, society
must pass judgment on what it has heard; it must, in effect, establish a moral account of the
historical record.”46 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa had, at its public
hearings, “a huge sign behind the panel of commissioners that read, Truth: The Road to
Reconciliation. Posters promoting the commission coaxed, “Let’s speak out to each other. By
telling the truth. By telling our stories of the past, so that we can walk the road to reconciliation.””47
As we shall see later, however, achieving this aim remains contentious, and an issue that needs to
deep reflection upon.

•

Help consolidate democratic transition: A truth commission could “signal a formal break with a
dark and violent past, and the transition to a more open, peaceful and democratic future. If they
are successful, truth commissions can have the effect of weakening anti-democratic actors who
might otherwise continue to pursue their goals outside the democratic process.”48

In the introduction of the Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation,
Commission member Jose Zalaquett summarizes the importance of a truth commission, thus: “The truth is
considered as an absolute, unrenounceable value for many reasons. In order to provide for measures of
reparation and prevention, it must be clearly known what it is that ought to be repaired and prevented.
Further, society cannot simply black out a chapter of history, however differently the facts may be
interpreted. The void would be filled with lies or conflicting versions. The unity of a nation depends upon a
shared identity, which, in turn depends largely on a shared memory. The truth also brings a measure of
social catharsis and helps to prevent the past from recurring. In addition, bringing the facts to light is, to
some extent, a form of punishment, albeit mild, in that it provokes social censure against the perpetrators or
the institutions or groups they belonged to. But although the truth cannot really in itself dispense justice, it
does put an end to many a continued injustice – it does not bring the dead back to life, but it brings them out

of silence; for the families of the ‘disappeared’, the truth about their fate would mean, at last, the end of an
anguishing, endless, search…”49
Conversely, a Truth Commission should not be established if the people do not recommend it. Alex
Boraine, the vice-chair of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission notes: “On the other hand,
there are powerful voices that urge that the way to deal with the past is to forget and move on…for many of
them it is not a question of ignoring the atrocities that have been committed so much as a concern to
consolidate and protect our emerging democracy. Of course, there are some who simply wish to ignore the
past because of their involvement in it. But there is a defensible position which calls for moving into the
future and not allowing the past to destroy or inhibit the new democracy.”50
And Timothy Garton Ash observes: “There is profound insight of the historian Ernest Renan that every
nation is a community both of shared memory and shared forgetting. ‘Forgetting,’ writes Renan, ‘and I
would say even historical error, is an essential factor in the history of a nation.’ Historically, the advocates of
forgetting are many and impressive. They range from Cicero in 44 B.C., demanding just two days after
Caesar’s murder that the memory of past discord be consigned to ‘eternal oblivion,’ to Winston Churchill in
his Zurich speech 2000 years later, recalling Gladstone’s appeal for a ‘blessed act of oblivion between
former enemies.’”51
Yale University Professor Bruce Ackerman also says that “moral capital” is better spent in educating the
population of the limits of the law rather than in engaging in a “quixotic quest after the mirage of corrective
justice.” He cautions that any attempts at corrective justice will generate “the perpetuation of moral
arbitrariness and the creation of a new generation of victims because of the inevitable deviations from due
process that would attach to trials.”52
Hayner53 commits a whole chapter of her book discussing this issue (titled “Leaving the Past Alone) and
uses the cases of Mozambique and Cambodia as studies in this area. Freeman and Hayner54 note that “in
transitional contexts ranging from Spain in the 1970s and Cambodia in the 1980s to Mozambique in the
1990s, civil society and democratic political leaders have sometimes consciously opted against any attempt
at formally establishing the truth about the past.” They give the reasons as:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Fear of ongoing or renewed violence or war: A Truth Commission should not be formed where
there is a perception that violence would return, increase or fail to end if past abuses are revisited.
Ongoing conflict: Whenever there is armed conflict going on, the utility of a Truth Commission is
in serious doubt because it is near impossible to effect the perception of neutrality and also
guarantee the security of all involved.
Lack of political interest: Where there is no pressure from the political leadership or significant
non-governmental actors for its formation, this could be a reason to cast aside the idea of a Truth
Commission
Other urgent priorities: There may be a national desire to focus on national survival and
rebuilding following extensive destruction
Insufficient capacity: There may be a lack of resources or basic infrastructure to support a Truth
Commission
Alternative mechanisms or preferences: There may be a cultural preference to avoid confronting
past crimes (for example in Cambodia) or there may be existing community-based mechanisms
(for example in Mozambique) that can better respond to past abuses.

Perhaps a key reason not captured in the above discourse on why not to have a truth commission is where
its general purpose and design is general political expediency; to witch-hunt55 or, alternatively, whitewash.

While asserting that, “of course, we should have a Truth & Reconciliation Commission; one that will help us
put behind the dark years, and anchor us to a sense of national togetherness in the coming period,” Mr
Pheroze Nowrojee argues that, “we are not yet ready for a TRC,” because an “edifice of trust” has yet to be
built.56 He contends that, “A successful commission…does not just happen. It takes national honesty. It
takes hard work. To prepare ourselves for the genuine exchange of truth and reconciliation amongst
ourselves, we must build more and more trust among ourselves. Although a TRC does also raise levels of
trust, it cannot be the sole instrument of building trust…A TRC follows the generation of trust amongst a
people, it does not precede it…We must address the difficult problems of trust, and as we resolve them we
can simultaneously move to the TRC that must be held. Even then, the TRC will still have enormous
national tasks. It will have to bring about the healing of individuals in a nation riven by silent suffering. It will
aim at setting national history right. It will lay the foundation of the political practice of human
rights...Therefore, there is much work to do before a TRC is announced. It must not be simply the creation
of a newspaper campaign, which could stampede the country into a TRC before we are ready. It is a pretty
concept [and] we all want to feel good. But it is also a complex concept…We must not use a TRC to create
trust if there are no other processes ongoing to that end. That would reduce it to a convenient excuse for
not solving hard problems. The critical aims of catharsis and the return of dignity of the people who have
survived will be compromised. There are real dangers of such a process turning into a formulaic recitation
of wrongdoing and public apology, and turning testimony into routine…That will not ensure the recording of
history as it was painfully lived through…If we do not ensure this, the TRC will become only a selective and
partial exercise.
Four things will then happen. Firstly, the victims will be victimized a second time around. Secondly, we will
have another generation of forgotten survivors and freedom fighters. Thirdly, once again Kenya’s history
will have been left unrecorded and unacknowledged. Fourthly, undemocratic government will return
because the memory of the freedom struggle will again have been erased…Effective reconciliation is a hard
process. Cheap reconciliation is an easy process. It comes cheaply when the testing of conflicting views is
avoided, or the media block out dissenting voices. It comes cheaply when no true debate takes place on
it…We shall not cleanse Kenya by cheap reconciliation, by individual victims giving painful evidence in small
halls, while others are elsewhere, enhancing their economic prospects…Therefore, the TRC should not be
used as the political solution of the month. The TRC should not be another ‘piecemeal legislation’ by the
new government. Nor should it be the press campaign of the month. Deeper foundations must be laid,
when we can safely move forward to the establishment of a trusted TRC…”57
RECOMMENDATIONS
The task force has engaged in a timely and useful exercise of public hearings to gauge whether or not
Kenyans desire a Truth Commission. Based on its reading of the public mood, the task force is therefore
fairly able to recommend whether Kenyans are agreeable to a Truth Commission or not.
Notably, after evaluating the examples of Mozambique and Cambodia, it is clear that their history has been
characterized by internecine civil war; a phenomenon that, thankfully, did not happen in Kenya, which has a
history of successive authoritarian regimes. In this regard, one would agree with the following excerpt from
Unspeakable Truths:58
Indeed, there are some examples around the world that seem to confirm the danger of allowing a
country or its government the option of simply ignoring the legacy of past state crimes. African
rights expert Richard Carver argues persuasively that several countries in Africa have suffered
from such a policy, and that there have been clear negative long-term consequences from failing to
come to terms with the past. For example, in Malawi, some of the repressive patterns of the past,
such as laws allowing censorship, have received support from those who used to oppose them

under the old regime. If these laws and the effects that they have “were properly exposed to public
view, the repressive tendencies would still be there, but there would be greater public will to resist
them,” says Carver.
Let us now turn to the specific questions regarding the formation of truth commissions.
1. How is a truth commission formed?
Of the 21 truth commissions documented in Unspeakable Truths,59 12 were created through executive
decree (President, Prime Minister or Ministry of Government and Police), four were created through the
legislature (although in Sierra Leone there had been an earlier agreement to form it in the peace accord),
three were arrived at through the avenue of the United Nations, and two were formed by an independent
political entity (the African National Congress – ANC – in South Africa).
There are two visibly contending avenues through which a truth commission can be formed in Kenya. As
Professor Makau Mutua has observed, “there are two possible routes for the establishment of a truth
commission. The commission could to be established either as an independent organ by an act of
parliament or through a presidential order under the powers granted him by the Constitution.”60
But the use of either of these methods will have different effects, which the Task Force needs to consider.
As Mark Freeman and Priscilla Hayner observe, “in many countries, the way in which a truth commission is
created will have a direct effect on what its powers can be. For example, in democratic countries with
presidential or semi-presidential forms of governance, the executive branch of government usually cannot,
on its own, confer search and seizure or even subpoena powers, that tends to be the exclusive preserve of
the legislative branch. The same may also be true in respect of powers of reporting, including the question
of whether the commission can make binding recommendations. Similarly, who establishes the commission
can affect the allocation of funding, since one branch of government may have greater access to resources
and a greater commitment to the commission’s work.”61
Appointment by the President would be through the Commissions of Inquiry Act, Chapter 102 of the Laws of
Kenya. The purpose of this Act is “to provide for the appointment of commissioners to inquire into and
report on matters of a public nature referred to them by the President, to prescribe their powers, privileges
and duties, and to provide for other matters relating thereto.” To achieve this objective, the President is
vested with powers to issue a commission to a commissioner or commissioners to inquire “into any matter
into which an inquiry would, in the opinion of the President, be in the public interest.”62 It is also provided
that “every commission shall direct how the commission shall be executed.”63
The greatest strength of establishing a Truth Commission in this manner is that it fulfils the need for
timeliness, which arises under the question of when a truth commission should be formed (tackled below).
As we shall see when considering this question, the recommended and appropriate time to form a truth
commission is immediately.
A Truth Commission that is established under the Commissions of Inquiry Act “shall have the powers of the
High Court to summon witnesses, and to call for the production of books, plans and documents, to examine
witnesses on oath.”64 The Act is silent as to what powers of search and seizure such a Commission would
have. There are also explicit evidentiary limitations placed on such a Commission in order to protect the
reputation of individuals.65
It should be noted that Truth Commission established in this manner can have its mandate revoked or
amended arbitrarily by the President, who can similarly dismiss a Commissioner; which could clearly impact
on the independence of the Truth Commission. The need for independence of the Truth Commission

cannot be gainsaid. Makau Mutua observes: “…the truth commission must not be subject direction or
dictation from any official or arm of government.”66 Section 4(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act states,
“The President may at any time, if he considers it advisable to do so, revoke, or issue a commission
amending a commission previously issued, and, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power,
may by any such amending commission appoint an additional commissioner or commissioners, vary the
designation of the chairman or deputy chairman of the commissioners, or appoint a new commissioner in
the place of any commissioner who is or becomes unable or unwilling to act or dies or is, in the opinion of
the President, or any reason unsuitable to continue to serve as a commissioner.”
In addition, it is also notable that forming a Truth Commission under the Commissions of Inquiry Act has the
potential of being carried out without due consultation and inclusiveness. However, this potential weakness
can be easily cured if due attention is taken towards including the public in general and crucial stakeholders
in particular in the drafting of its terms of reference and the appointment of commissioners. Boraine notes
the importance of this when he records: “Very early on it was decided to involve as many individuals and
organizations as possible in the framing of the Bill that would give the substance to the idea of a truth and
reconciliation commission. This decision to democratize the process paid rich dividends.”67
A Truth Commission could also be established through an independent Act of Parliament. Whereas the
method of forming a Truth Commission through Parliament under an independent Act will potentially take
care of the weaknesses of a Truth Commission under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, it is noteworthy that
this process through the legislature is likely fraught with political intrigue, brinkmanship, grandstanding and,
ultimately, delay. The task force needs to be alive to the hostility from a large section of Parliament to the
idea of a Truth Commission. In the run-up to the general elections in 2002, a large section of members of
the now-ruling party Narc clearly refused to countenance the idea of the formation of a Truth Commission
when it was suggested to them by officials of the Kenya Human Rights Commission; electing instead to
loudly boo, heckle and jeer the movers of the idea. Kanu, as the former ruling party, will hardly be expected
to support this idea when it is clear that it has the most to lose from such an interrogation of Kenya’s political
history.
A lesson from the withdrawal earlier in the year of anti-corruption bills, not on their substantive demerits, but
because of political bickering within the ruling political coalition should serve as a loud warning that the
establishment of a Truth Commission through an independent Act of Parliament could suffer the same fate,
thus losing critical time and momentum. Moreover, in the existing political climate, there is a real danger of
its powers being severely curtailed by Parliament as there is a considerable constituency within Parliament
that is clearly threatened by the formation of a truth commission. It should not escape the mind of the task
force that when their interests have previously been similarly threatened, some Parliamentarians have been
as bold as to state that they would disable progressive legislation, as happened at the National
Constitutional Conference when delegates’ support of a provision to recall members of parliament in the
draft constitution was met with a threat to withdraw legislative support. It is perhaps this weakness that
Justice and Constitutional Affairs Minister Kiraitu Murungi was referring to when he lamented that “there are
inherent structural limitations to radical reform in Kenya” as he opened the workshop organized by the task
force on, “A Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission For Kenya: Prospects and Obstacles on 4 July
2003.
Recommendation: Exercising Presidential Power under the Commissions of Inquiry Act is the way to go.
There does not seem to be an intention in the current Presidency to interfere with the working of
independent institutions and there is clear goodwill emanating from this office. In relation to independence
of the commission, it should be provided in its establishment that the Truth Commission shall not be subject
to direction from any individual, institution or group.

2. When should a Truth Commission be formed?
It is clear that this should be undertaken immediately. Makau Mutua notes that “Kenya must establish a
truth commission this year.”68 He continues: “Truth commissions are created principally at the time of a
state’s transition toward a more democratic or participatory government, a government that espouses the
ideals of democracy, of power bounded by law, of formal legal equality, and social justice. It matters not
how the moment of political change occurred; it could have been violent or non-violent, such as Kenya’s.
What matters is that there is a normative and substantive departure by the successor government or state
from its predecessor. Thus it could be change from autocracy to democracy, from opacity to transparency,
from open shameless graft to fiscal and economic accountability. But that change must be structural,
ideological, and fundamental, it cannot be a continuation of the same, the change must signal real and
genuine regime change.”69 Indeed, it should be noted that a defining characteristic that serves to define a
truth commission is that it is, “usually created at a point of political transition, either from war to peace or
from authoritarian rule to democracy.”70
Moreover, at the point of political transition, there is oft-times great support for change and this can be used
to create an environment that helps uncover and unlock secrets that have been hidden in the caves of
history. It is instructive to look at, for example, the circumstances surrounding the declassification of top
state secret files regarding Goldenberg by Attorney-General Amos Wako as widely reported by the media
on June 18, 2003. Clearly, there is a need to take advantage of such cusps of public goodwill before they
are eroded by political evolution. In this regard, Hayner observes: “Most countries are well served by a
quick start to a truth commission. The political momentum and popular support for such an initiative are
generally highest at the point of transition, as a new government takes power…and there is a narrow
window to transform this momentum into serious reforms, purges of human rights abuses, or reparations for
victims. A quick start to a truth commission can also have the secondary effect of holding off pressure for
immediate reforms and other measures of accountability, giving the government time to take stock, plan and
strengthen institutions as necessary to further its other transitional justice initiatives.”71
However, Hayner also points out an important exception to the “the quicker the better” rule. “South Africa
spent eighteen months designing its Truth and Reconciliation Commission following democratic elections in
1994. This preparatory time was crucial to developing the commission’s complex empowering legislation, to
gain the backing from almost all political parties, and to seek input from many outside observers through
which the proposed commission gained legitimacy. The Committee on Justice of the South African
Parliament held over 150 hours of public hearings on the legislation, taking input from human rights
organizations, victims, an association of former police officers, churches, and others. International human
rights groups made submissions critiquing the draft legislation. And finally, after the legislation was in place,
the very public process of selecting commissioners…added many months, but these steps greatly improved
and strengthened the commission.”72
Recommendation: In order to expedite the formation of a truth commission as well as address the question
of consultation and inclusiveness, it is recommended that:
1. The Task Force submits to the Minister in its report, a draft of the precise terms of reference of the
suggested Truth Commission based on the domestic and international consultations it will have
done.
2. The task force also suggests names of the people who in its view are eminently qualified to serve
as commissioners in the Truth Commission, guided by the principle of affirmative action
3. Prior to submitting these terms of reference and names, the task force allows for their wide critique
by principal national and international actors with a view to critiquing and refining them.

3. How are Commissioners appointed?
This is a critical question. Freeman and Hayner observe that “perhaps more than any other single factor,
the persons selected to manage a truth commission will determine its ultimate success or failure. In fact,
several commissions have run into serious problems that were clearly rooted in weak management by
commissioners…As the public face of the commission, the commissioners’ personal and political authority
can also be critical in dealing with recalcitrant authorities…The key lesson from past truth commissions is
that a commission will generally garner greater public and international support where its members are
selected through a consultative process and where an honest attempt is made to ensure a fair balance in
the representation of political views, ethnic or religious groups and gender.”73 (emphasis added)
Recommendation: In addition to submitting the names of those people it recommends to serve in the truth
commission, the task force should also set out clear criteria that the suggested people meet to merit the
appointment.
4. How many Commissioners?
This is really a resource question as well as one of manageability. Professor Makau Mutua suggests that, “it
should consist of no more than 15 members chosen for their probity, expertise, and outstanding morality.
Effective commissions are not large...The commission may include no more than three foreigners of known
competence and expertise. This acts to check the partiality of nationals and bring in comparative
experiences.”74
Recommendation: In line with keeping the numbers down, the Truth Commission should have a maximum
of 11 members.
5. The scope and mandate of a truth commission
Two critical issues to look into with regard to the scope and mandate of truth commission are:
1. How is that scope and mandate developed
2. What is the actual scope and mandate vested in a truth commission?
Freeman and Hayner note that “truth commissions enjoy greater legitimacy where the process of defining
their powers and mandate includes active involvement from many different sectors of society. Although
there is often a need to move quickly at a point of transition, it is important to attempt to build a broad base
of support for the commission among several important constituencies. In some countries where the
government established a truth commission with virtually no consultation with civil society, the commissions
have suffered as a result. For example in Guatemala it took time and considerable effort for the truth
commission to gain the backing of the religious and advocacy groups on which it depended to undertake its
work.”
Boraine corroborates thus: “The reason for focusing on the recommendations of the NGOs is that without
the contribution of civil society the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act would have been
considerably poorer. It would be an injustice to overlook the extraordinary contribution by representatives of
a wide variety of human rights organizations who gave of their time, energy, and expertise to ensure that the
Commission would meet the demands, as they saw it, of adequately dealing with South Africa’s past.”75

Prior experiences, with regard to the actual mandate, illustrate the fact that terms of reference should be
sufficiently broad and flexible to allow investigation into all forms of rights abuses, leaving the commission
the decision of what specific cases or practices to investigate and report.”76 The example is given of El
Salvador where the mandate was to look into, “serious acts of violence…whose impact on society urgently
demands that the public should know the truth.”77 This gave the commission the latitude to decide “to take
testimony from thousands of victims, summarize the overall patterns of violence, and report on some thirty
cases in depth, all of which went much further than what the crafters originally envisioned. The cases
chosen for in-depth investigation were intended to be representative of typical victims, perpetrators, and
types of abuse over the twelve years of civil war. The language of the El Salvador commission is a good
model…”78
This is contrasted with other mandates in other countries where there were clear and specific guidelines,
hence restricting the Truth Commissions. “For example, a number of truth commissions have been directed
to look only into disappearances, such as those in Argentina, Uruguay, and Sri Lanka; but such explicit
restrictions risk excluding a significant portion of the truth. The Uruguayan commission missed the majority
of human rights violations that had taken place during the military regime because of such a limited
mandate; illegal detention and torture, which constituted the bulk of the abuses, were ignored. In Chile, the
commission investigated disappearances, executions, torture leading to death, political kidnappings, and
attempts on life by private citizens for political purposes, but its mandate prevented it from investigating
incidents of torture that did not result in death…”79
Recommendation: The “terms of reference should be sufficiently broad and flexible to allow investigation
into all forms of rights abuses, leaving the commission the decision of what specific cases or practices to
investigate and report.”80 To avoid definitional problems (such as what is a “serious” human rights abuse)
the Task Force can outline some situations/incidences/events that the Task Force should look into as a
minimum standard.81
6. Powers of a Truth Commission
Freeman and Hayner observe that, “at a minimum, commissions generally need to be able to interview
anyone who can provide relevant information, receive the cooperation of public authorities and carry out
necessary on-site visits (ideally unannounced). Increasingly, however, commissions are being given
powers that extend well beyond those mentioned to include powers of subpoena, search and seizure
powers, and in some cases, witness protection. The conferral of such powers must be carefully balanced
against the need to preserve the non-judicial character of the commission process. Each addition of such
powers moves the process further away from that of a truth commission towards a court process.”82
Recommendation: The Commissions of Inquiry Act offers sufficient powers to summon witnesses but does
not proffer search, seizure or witness protection powers. These latter powers cannot, in my view, be vested
in a commission under the Act but the commission to establish a Truth Commission should include powers
to visit any government premises without notice and should also include directions that the Truth
Commission can refer matters related to search, seizure and to the police who shall immediately undertake
to enforce the lawful directions of the Truth Commission.
7. How long should a Truth Commission operate?
Documentation83 indicates that the duration of operation of prior truth commissions varied between 7
months (Uruguay) and 9 years (Uganda, 1986). Freeman and Hayner conclude that, “past experience
indicates that a time frame of 1-2 years of operation is generally desirable.”84

Hayner notes, “For a variety of reasons, it is important to keep a truth commission’s tenure relatively short;
one year to two and one-half years is probably optimal. Outlining a work plan, collecting and organizing
documentation, receiving and processing testimony from thousands of victims, selecting representative
cases and completing investigations, and finishing a final report within the allotted time will be difficult even
in two years’ time. The advantages of finishing quickly are worth the possible sacrifices of investigations cut
short, however. It is useful for the report to come out while there is still the momentum of transition under
way, when a spirit of reconciliation may still be in the air and recommended reforms are more likely to be
implemented. A truth commission cannot hope to document or investigate everything that falls within its
mandate; it must choose a few sample cases for investigation and only summarize the rest…Despite the
restrictions of a short deadline for completion, the alternative is worse. The Commission of Inquiry set up in
Uganda in 1986 was given no time limit; it took over nine years before it was finished, by then losing the
interest and support of the public. On the other extreme, the Salvador commission found that finishing its
work in six months was impossible; luckily, it was able to obtain a two-month extension.”85
Hayner also makes a vital observation: “Many past truth inquiries have suffered from the same problem:
they have lost much time in administrative and logistical preparations, which have cut significantly into their
stipulated operating time. Essential activities such as renting and furnishing an office, hiring staff, and
creating or adapting a data base program, as well as larger tasks such as raising funds and designing a
public outreach program, can easily consume months of a commission’s time before it even begins to take
testimony or start investigations…Those establishing future commissions should avoid this pitfall by
mandating an explicit setup time, a period of perhaps three to six months, before the commission’s
operational clock begins. During this period, resources, support, and international consultation may be
made available to assist in the commission’s preparations.”86
Recommendation: The Truth Commission should be given a 2-year period of operation with a six-month
start-up period allowed before its official operational clock begins ticking.
8. Staffing a truth commission
There is a need for a truth commission to seek to employ “persons with the experience, know-how and
emotional wherewithal to handle the subject matter…Because of the breadth of its work and the nature of its
responsibilities, a commission requires a wide range of expertise. In addition to human rights lawyers and
investigators, a commission may need social workers or psychologists, computer and information-systems
specialists, data coding and data-entry staff, logistical coordinators, interpreters, and security personnel.
Some specialized expertise that is resource intensive and needed only on a short-term basis can best be
obtained through consultancy arrangements with outside experts.”87
An illustrative experience is reported by Hayner: “The truth commission in Argentina began its work with
staff seconded from the Ministry of Interior, but these civil servants didn’t last long. They had no experience
working in human rights and had never before heard the horrific kinds of stories that the commission was to
collect. When they began to take testimony, they quickly broke down in tears, emotionally distraught.
Seeking (the right) persons…the commissioners hired staff straight out of national human rights
organizations, a decision that they say was critical to the commission’s success.” 88 In this respect, it may
sometimes have to hire international staff where there may be human capital gaps locally.
Pheroze Nowrojee points out: “I see an effective TRC needing to include in it a Medical Practitioner with
experience of torture, a Lands Office registrar, a Magistrate, and a Special Government Liaison Person.
The function of such a liaison person will be to open up government files and reports, and to overcome the
inevitable hurdles that will be placed to prevent truth being revealed. It has to be a person with access to

State House at the highest levels so that withheld documents, missing witnesses and government officers
do after all turn up before the TRC.”
The size of staff has varied from commission to commission. Chile and Argentina, for example, hired 60
full-time staff, Guatemala had 200 at its peak, and South Africa employed 300 between 1996 and 1998.89
The size of the truth commission should be based on assessment of the task at hand and advice from
human resource management experts to fine-tune this process.
It should not hire people who in the public mind are tainted with past abuses of human rights. Moreover, it
will need to ensure that all staff hired are properly trained to adequately handle the mandate, including the
psychological stress associated with the task.90
Recommendations
1. That the truth commission be given latitude to hire adequate staff to properly execute its mandate
2. That in doing so, the commission be charged to engage the assistance of human resource
management expertise
3. That the truth commission be also charged with the training of its staff
9. Period in history to be investigated
As Makau Mutua notes, a truth commission “will not be able to hear every allegation, but must hear the most
serious; it must have the power to determine which cases to hear…”91
Hence, there is a need for the mandate of a truth commission to be specific about which period in history is
to be investigated as it tries to rebuild on the basket of truth. Mark Freeman and Priscilla Hayner observe,
“The specific span of time the commission is to inquire into should be clear from the start. This is often a
controversial aspect of a commission’s mandate, particularly where there is a sense of victimization on the
part of both or all sides of a past conflict…The particular span of time will generally be chosen on the basis
of those periods in the nation’s history when the worst or the greatest number of violations took place, and
accordingly will often correspond to periods of…authoritarian rule. To avoid the appearance of bias, it is
generally important for the time span chosen to be consecutive and not broken up to focus only on selected
periods in a nation’s history.”92
Recommendation: The Truth Commission must have the mandate to investigate the gross human rights
violations and economic crimes committed from 12 December 1963, the day Kenya became an independent
republic, to December 30, 2002, the day President Daniel arap Moi handed over power to his successor.
However, the task force needs to interrogate the views it has received during its public hearings to see if
there is a demand that abuses perpetrated by the colonial government should also be investigated.
10. Should Commission hearings be public?
Freeman and Hayner note that, “most past truth commissions have not held public hearings. There is,
however, an increasing trend to give commissions a mandate to do this. This is the case for new
commissions in Peru, East Timor and Sierra Leone…”93
The strengths of having public hearings are well documented: “By giving victims and survivors a chance to
tell their story before a public audience – particularly where the hearings are aired on television or the radio

– a commission can formally acknowledge past wrongs, encourage public understanding and sympathy for
victims, reduce the likelihood of certain sectors of society continuing to deny the truth, and enhance the
transparency of its work. Public hearings can also help to shift a truth commission’s focus from product (i.e.,
its final report) to process, by engaging the public as audience, encouraging press coverage of its issues
over a longer period of time and generally stimulating an authentic national discourse about the past.”94
In Kenya, the Commissions of Inquiry Act95 sets a general rule that the proceedings of a Commission
established under it are to be public.96 It, however, also vests wide discretion in such a Commission to close
its doors to the public.97
Recommendation: The advantages of making public the conduct of truth commission hearings are clear.
Indeed, an effort should be made to engage the national and international media in the whole exercise. In
this regard, Prof. Mutua’s proposal that “truth commission proceedings must be carried live on radio and
television countrywide”98 and its establishment should include the provision that the services of the national
Kenya Broadcasting Corporation be engaged to carry out this exercise, is moot.
11. Information management by a Truth Commission
This is an area that has scarcely been explored by most commissions. Hayner writes: “Few commissioners
to date have had any experience in data management and analysis, and thus, through no fault of their own,
often begin their work with little appreciation for the centrality or complexity of information management, the
many, many detailed decisions they will have to make for that system to work well, and the degree to which
those information management decisions will determine the quality of the commission’s product. While they
are a great asset, such systems can also consume a huge amount of a commission’s time and staff energy,
and should not be set up without a full understanding of what is necessary in order to utilize them well.
Virtually every truth commission that has used a sophisticated database has run into serious technical and
methodological problems, and these problems have sometimes seemed close to strangling a commission
and consuming all its energy. Fine definitions must be discussed and carefully outlined in order to assure
accuracy in coding; even the question of exactly what information should be collected and what questions
should be asked of deponents will fundamentally shape the results of the commission. A good portion of a
commission’s staff’s energies, certainly over half, can easily be taken up with the detailed work of coding
and entering information into the database. Yet, if done well, an exacting information collection and
management system will serve as a strong foundation to a commission’s final conclusions.”99
Yet, there may be no need for an elaborate information management system. Hayner observes: “Despite
the great benefits, this sophisticated and costly approach may not be appropriate for all commissions and all
countries. Some commissions in the future may choose not to use computers for statistical analysis, or may
not have the means to do so, and not all that use computers will employ such an advanced system. It is
possible to tabulate numbers by hand, especially if the abuses are relatively few (thousands rather than tens
of thousands), although many kinds of manipulation of the data will not be possible.”100
Recommendation: The issue of what information management system will be used by a truth commission
will need to be seriously addressed at the beginning by commissioners in collaboration with information
management experts.

11. Witness protection
The likelihood exists that some potential witnesses at the truth commission will express fears for their
security and safety. Yet, there is only the South African experience to borrow from in this regard on how
and when a witness protection program operates.
Recommendation: This is another issue that a truth commission should exercise its mind to satisfactorily
deal with.101
13. Handling reports of abuse of women
Boraine expresses the concern that whereas “more women came to the Commission than men…it should
be emphasized that in many instances women played down their own suffering and spoke about that of their
families. Many women had suffered in their own right, having been detained without trial, harassed,
assaulted, insulted, raped, and tortured.”102
And Hayner warns: “Even with a flexible mandate and the intention of fairly gathering information about all
patterns of abuse, a commission may well fail to document certain widely experienced abuses. Perhaps the
most commonly underreported abuses are those suffered by women, especially sexual abuse and rape.
Many commissions have received far less testimony about sexual abuse than in the numbers or proportion
that they suspected took place.”103
There are several cultural and social reasons for this104but what is needed are mechanisms to address it. In
Haiti, the terms of reference of the truth commission directed it to pay attention to “crimes of a sexual nature
against female victims that were committed with political ends.”105
Other strategies too have been suggested. “Truth commissions should also make female statement-takers
available to female deponents, in order to put women more at ease in reporting sexual abuse and should
offer confidentiality to victims who don’t want their names to appear in print. In some countries, women
might also be more willing to report sexual abuse to non-nationals, whom they might feel less risk of running
into in their everyday lives…”106
Hayner warns again: “Yet despite these special measures, a commission should not assume that the
statements it has collected on certain crimes are representative of the total numbers. While women may
choose not to speak out, the practice of rape and other sexual crimes should be fully acknowledged in a
commission’s report where it is believed such a practice was widespread. If a truth commission does not
take special care in addressing this issue, it is likely that it will remain largely shrouded in silence and hidden
from the history books – and also likely that few policy, educational, or reparatory measures will be put in
place to assist past victims, increase the public understanding of the issue, or reduce the prevalence of
sexual abuse in the future.”107
Recommendation: Special attention should be put on the issue of abuses on women with the truth
commission’s mandate specifically spelling out how to deal with crimes of a sexual nature. The truth
commission should also be charged with implementing policies, within all its functions, that are sensitive to
crimes of a sexual nature and specifically exposing this genre of abuse in its final report.

15. Standard of proof (amount/quality of evidence required)
Hayner states that “a commission must also establish how much evidence is required for it to make a
finding, and what standard of proof must be met…Future commissions should state clearly in their reports
the amount or quality of evidence that backs up their findings (such as one or two primary or secondary
sources), as well as what level of certainty their findings represent.”108
Different past truth commissions have required different amounts/qualities of evidence. El Salvador, for
example, “established a two-source rule, requiring two credible and independent sources as confirmation of
a fact.”109 The South African commission in contrast “required only one source, both for corroborating
victims’ accounts and for deciding the culpability of perpetrators, provided the source was sufficiently
compelling.”110
Moreover, Hayner notes, “the emerging standard for commissions is to rely on a ‘balance of probabilities’
standard (in some countries called preponderance of evidence), which means that there is more evidence to
show something to be true than not to be true.”111
Recommendation: The amount or quality of evidence as well as the standard of proof required should be
clearly stated in the commission of the truth commission and its report.
16. The question of amnesty: Truth v Justice?
Charles Manga Fombad112 observes that “whilst the South African TRC amnesty process today serves to
highlight the difficulties of constructing an amnesty process that complies with international law, the Sierra
Leonean experience shows that a blanket amnesty on its own will not, as many had thought, make a
peaceful solution to the bitter internecine conflict easier.”
The question of granting amnesty is often a controversial subject.113
In her paper presentation in March 2003, Hayner warns: “There is a tendency in many parts of the world to
think of the South African Truth and Reconciliation commission as the typical example of a truth
commission, and especially to think of its amnesty-granting powers as representing a core element of a truth
commission exercise. This is not correct. I would like to stress, in fact, that the South African truth
commission was very different from most truth commissions to date, in very important ways, and should not
be thought of as the typical (or even optimal) model. Most importantly, let me note that there have been
about 25 truth commissions in existence to date, over the past twenty years or so, and only the South
African truth commission has had such power to grant amnesty to perpetrators. (A model of communitybrokered restorative justice which avoids prosecution for low level perpetrators is in place with the East
Timor truth commission, but this is not the provision of amnesty, per se.) All other truth commissions have
focused their energies on listening to victims, investigating the patterns and practices of the past, making
conclusions about institutional and sometimes individual responsibilities, and publishing a report that
outlines the causes and consequences of past rights violations – but with absolutely no powers to either
grant immunity from prosecution to perpetrators, nor to take any other judicial action in the courts. (Some
have, however, recommended judicial action, which I will describe below.) Furthermore, I should note that
the ICTJ has strongly recommended that other countries not include an amnesty-granting power within a
new truth commission, in contexts where such an amnesty power was initially proposed (such as Ghana
and Indonesia).114
The problem with amnesties is that they “generally violate the right of victims to redress and will generally be
inconsistent with a state’s obligation under international law to punish perpetrators of serious human rights

crimes. They can also subvert the rule of law by allowing only certain groups of perpetrators to escape
liability. They can undermine both specific and general deterrence, and promote cynicism and
disillusionment among victims of human rights abuses, which in turn could cause them to take the law into
their own hands and embark on acts of private vengeance.”115
Put in different words, “here is the deep moral problem of the truth commission as a substitute for the
criminal justice system: It short-circuits the mechanisms most societies have established to right wrongs by
punishing wrongdoers. And if the South African commission was to compensate victims with money…who
can say that money substitutes for justice? Why does anyone have the right to tell that woman, or Griffiths
Mxenge’s family, that the murderers of their loved ones must go free?”116
To understand this moral conundrum, one has to understand the background of amnesties. Aryeh Neier,
author of the book, War Crimes: Brutality, Genocide, Terror, and the Struggle for Justice,117 explains: “The
historic idea of amnesty was that amnesty was a prerogative of the state and it was something that the state
could do because some had injured the state…Therefore the state, having been the victim of the crimes
they committed, had the power to forgive those who took up arms against it…Now in the Latin American
context, and in the South African context, amnesty is quite different. In the Latin American context,
amnesties became popular after General Pinochet issued an amnesty in 1978…The amnesty, however,
applied principally not to those who took up arms against the government; rather it applied to Pinochet’s
own forces. It applied to those who had committed crimes against the citizenry in Chile…It seems to me that
this turns upside down the historic justification for an amnesty. Rather than an act of forgiveness for those
who have sinned against the government, it becomes a legitimation of the government’s sins against the
population. Amnesties of that sort…do not deserve the legitimacy that we accord to amnesties that we know
historically.”118
Freeman and Hayner, however, still argue that a truth-for-amnesty arrangement can be defensible where:
(a) the commission’s power has been given reasonably democratically; (b) amnesty is given on an
individual, not class, basis; (c) a form of public procedure is imposed on its recipients; (d) victims are given
an opportunity to question and challenge an individual’s claim to amnesty; and (e) reparation payments are
made to victims. An amnesty’s scope can also be narrowed by making the grant of amnesty reversible
following the commission of a new and similarly grave offence.” 119
The reasons for granting an amnesty have to be understood in the political context. Boraine notes: “The
possible granting of amnesty was based not on legal nor on the human rights argument, but on a political
decision…”120 Boraine further argues that it represents “a negotiated settlement, a political compromise” and
states that it is “morally defensible to argue that amnesty is the price South Africa had to pay for peace and
stability.”
Obviously, this is not the situation obtaining in Kenya. There is no visible or concrete reason to go the
amnesty way here. It is not unthinkable that a truth commission in Kenya could be used in tandem, rather
than as an alternative, to criminal prosecutions here. This would serve both to clarify the “broader historical
perspectives” and “deliver mere judgments in isolated cases.” 121 Indeed, as Ayreh Neier has asserted,
‘truth commissions…do serve an enormously important purpose, but it doesn’t seem to me that they
necessarily have to be accompanied by amnesties.”122 This would allow for the “creation of a historical
record while also leaving open the possibility of future judicial resolution.”123
Recommendation: Given the more open political environment and the fact that a truth commission would
have wide summoning powers, there seems to be no compelling reason to vest amnesty powers in a truth
commission in Kenya and this power should not be available for exercise.

17. The danger of retraumatization/secondary traumatization
There is always the danger that those recounting their past experiences could suffer retraumatization,
“which may be so severe as to result in a multitude of debilitating physical symptoms, such as confusion,
nightmares, exhaustion, loss of appetite, and sleeplessness.”124
Indeed, there is also a danger that a truth commission’s staff could also suffer trauma (secondary trauma)
while documenting past abuses of human rights because they are “sponges” absorbing grief, pain and
trauma of the stories they hear.125 A stark example of just how emotionally moving the experience can be is
related by Alex Boraine: “He was silent for a while and then tried to describe a particular method of torture
known as ‘the helicopter’, which involved suspending the victim upside down from a wooden stick and
beating and kicking him in the process, often until he was unconscious. Revisting this experience was too
much for Malgas and he broke down and cried. It was too much for Desmond Tutu, who put his head on the
table and sobbed.”126
Additionally, Boraine notes: “We also faced the trauma of listening to, and in some cases taking upon
ourselves, the grief, the horror, and the pain of victims and survivors. Several of the commissioners and
many of the staff sought counseling at trauma centres and from the resources within the commission
itself.”127
Those who were not members of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission but directly
worked with it were also similarly affected. Boraine observes that “many of the journalists became
personally involved, and were deeply affected by what they had to listen to in order to write their stories and
present their programmes. Many of them were disturbed, emotionally, mentally and spiritually. On more
than one occasion, Tutu and I met with the regulars in off-the-record meetings. There they opened their
hearts, hard-bitten journalists though they were, and told us of their own feelings and of their own
experiences and trauma.”128
Hence, there is a patent need for follow-up psychological support and counseling. In South Africa, the
commission hired four mental-health professionals on its staff to “ensure that the commission was
psychologically sensitive to trauma.”129
Recommendation: The truth commission should pay due attention to the danger of retraumatization and
secondary traumatization by engaging mental-health professionals on its staff.
18. The issue of reconciliation
It has been stated that “while the truth may not always lead to reconciliation, there can be no genuine,
lasting reconciliation without truth.”130 And whereas, it is true that there can be no reconciliation without
truth, it is also equally true that truth-telling can also lead to bitterness, resentment and cleavages in society.
Hence the need for a truth commission to be alive to the dynamics of reconciliation as it exercises its
mandate.131 Indeed, it should take heed to Amy Ansell’s words that, “While it is no doubt useful and
beneficial to learn more facts about what happened and who is responsible for past crimes…the link
between this process and the objectives of reconciliation in justice is less certain.”132
It should be clear from the outset that “…a single commission made up of a handful of Commissioners and a
dedicated staff cannot on its own achieve the reconciliation that is so desperately needed…”133 Boraine
asserts that, “there is no quick-fix for the healing of a nation; there are no magic formulae which will
instantaneously remedy the sickness that reached epidemic proportions over many years and left thousands

of victims in its wake. The healing of a nation cannot be achieved merely by holding a conference or
several conferences. Nor can genuine relief be obtained in the writing of books or even through the
appointment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission! Discussion, debate, analysis and the recording of
the truth can be a significant part of the healing process, but only that. The wounds incurred in the long and
bitter period of repression and resistance are too deep to be trivialized by imagining that a single initiative
can bring about a peaceful, stable and restored society.”134
He proceeds to note: “Reconciliation…is not a sure-fire escalator which takes one consistently and steadily
to new heights. It is a process of fits and starts, of going forward and going back, of reaching heights and
plumbing depths…Reconciliation without the anchor of restitution is not merely false reconciliation, not only
a travesty of justice…”135 Boraine continues to add that “while reconciliation is a worthy and necessary goal,
it is an endless pursuit and cannot be achieved instantly or comprehensively.”136 Without victims seeing real
material transformation in their lives, Archbishop Tutu has warned, “you can kiss reconciliation goodbye.”137
Hence, there is a need to understand and fully appreciate the complexity of reconciliation. As advocate
Richard Penwill observes, “Effective reconciliation is a process which requires confronting the truth and
thereafter aiming at bridging differences, healing and understanding.”138
Hayner reports that, “the degree of emphasis on reconciliation as a goal of truth-seeking has varied greatly
among commissions. Not all have framed their work around this goal, but those that have – such as the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and the National Commission on Truth and
Reconciliation in Chile – have found it to be a difficult mission…There should be a distinction between
individual reconciliation and national or political reconciliation. The strength of a truth commission is in
advancing reconciliation on a national or political level. By speaking openly and publicly about past silenced
or highly conflictive events and by allowing an independent commission to clear-up high profile cases, a
commission can ease some of the strains that may otherwise be present in national legislative or other
political bodies. An official accounting and conclusion about the facts can allow opposing parties to debate
and govern together without latent conflicts and bitterness over past lies…On an individual level, however,
reconciliation is much more complex, and much more difficult to achieve by means of a national
commission. There certainly are examples of truth commission processes leading directly to healing and
forgiveness for some individuals, but knowing the global truth or even knowing the specific truth about one’s
own case will not necessarily lead to a victim’s reconciliation with his or her perpetrators. Forgiveness,
healing, and reconciliation are deeply personal processes, and each person’s needs and reactions to
peacemaking and truth-telling may be different.”139
Recommendation: The commission of the Truth Commission should mandate it to promote national
reconciliation and healing and to undertake such activities as to achieve this end. But there should be no
expectation that the Truth Commission will bring total reconciliation in Kenya.
19. Reparations
“Victims ask practical questions: Will the TRC give us back our land? Will the TRC give us compensation?
Or help us get compensation? Will we get compensation from the Government or from the alleged
perpetrators? There must be guidance on this even if a TRC is not the medium by which reparations are
effected.”140
Hayner observes that, “international law clearly establishes an obligation on the part of the state to provide
redress for abuses by state forces. As stipulated in many foundational human rights documents, including
regional and international human rights treaties, and confirmed in decisions put forward by international

courts, states must provide reparations to victims of human rights violations. This may take many forms that
go beyond the payment of cash to the injured. Reparations is a general term that encompasses a variety of
types of redress, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of
nonrepetition. Restitution aims to reestablish to the extent possible the situation that existed before the
violation took place; compensation relates to any economically assessable damage resulting from the
violations; rehabilitation includes legal, medical, psychological and other care; while satisfaction and
guarantees of nonrepetition relate to measures to acknowledge the violations and prevent their recurrence
in future. Usually a mix of these types of redress is appropriate.141
While a state will most likely be unable to compensate each and every victim or survivor of human rights
abuses to the extent of their suffering or injury, an attempt needs to be made to put in place a reparations
program to address their needs.
In this regard, it has been noted that truth commission records be made the source on which to build a
reparations program since it has been established as being unable “to provide a final list of recommended
recipients, nor to outline the specifics of a reparations program.”142 Indeed, it has been further observed that
a truth commission “can better make recommendations and an overall assessment of need, which can
serve as the beginning point for the development of a substantial reparations program to follow.”143
There are several challenges while fashioning a reparations program. There is the question of whether that
program is fair and inclusive. How, for example, is the loss of a loved one quantified? Should all the victims
receive equal compensation, even if some suffered more? And, on the other hand, if there are distinctions
made between victims, it quickly becomes difficult to categorize degrees of suffering or loss. Another
difficulty is in regard to the implementation and administration of a reparations program as this could easily
overload a truth commission as happened in South Africa. Moreover, the “truth” may be skewed if the
commission’s mandate includes the task of awarding or recommending reparations as some victims will
embellish their depositions in order to receive compensation. 144
Recommendation: Hayner’s advice is worth reiterating: “The best path to follow is…for a truth commission to
provide general recommendations for a reparations program, and perhaps a general assessment of need,
but to leave the details and implementation of a program to a post-truth commission body, allowing the
commission to concentrate its time on broader investigations and conclusions.”145
20. The resource question
A truth commission will need adequate material and human resources. With the exception of the truth
commissions in South Africa (over USD 35 million) and Guatemala (between USD 5 to 35 million),146 truth
commissions have all been less than USD 5 million.147 However, it is observed that as the terms of
reference of truth commissions have become increasingly sophisticated, the average budget of new
commissions has risen to USD 5-10 million.148 Funding is derived from both government as well as funds
from donor states and private foundations. Office space and equipment are generally provided directly by
the national government.149
Recommendation: The commission of the Truth Commission should allow it to source funding from
government, donor states and private foundations provided that it has to declare all these sources, the
amounts involved and it will publicly account for all the resources it receives.

21. Relationship between a truth commission and a concurrent judicial investigation
There may be occasions where an issue before a truth commission could also be before a concurrent or
ongoing judicial investigation. Indeed, in Kenya, the issues before the Goldenberg Commission of Inquiry
and the Presidential Commission on Land will most likely also be relevant to the work of the Truth
Commission.
There will need to be an established practice so that there is a dual carriageway of information to all
concurrent judicial processes. In South Africa, Hayner says, “where there was an overlap in cases
investigated by a prosecutor’s office and by the truth commission’s amnesty committee, the flow of
information…went from the office of the prosecutor to the truth commission. The official policy of the South
African attorney generals’ offices was to allow the commission staff to look at its files and take notes from its
documents, although commission staff cite occasions when access was delayed or important documents
were held back. Meanwhile, prosecutorial staff attended some of the commission’s amnesty hearings in
hopes of learning information useful to its cases, pertaining either to the applicant, in case the amnesty
application were to be denied, or to other persons named.”150
Recommendation: The commission of the Truth Commission should require it to enter into open
collaboration with other relevant judicial investigations.
22. Naming names
There are two contending principles on the issue of naming names in a truth commission’s report. Firstly,
there is a due process requirement that those who are accused of crimes be given an opportunity to defend
themselves before being pronounced guilty. Given that a truth commission does not have strict legal
strictures to follow in its proceedings, this principle is likely violated when it names individuals in its report.
On the other hand, telling the truth requires naming of individuals who are responsible for rights abuses.
In answering this tussle, Freeman and Hayner assert: “Past experience seems to suggest that the best
practice is to allow commissions to name names but ultimately leave it at their discretion whether or not to
do so…As to due process entitlements that should apply, it seems that at a minimum persons who might be
named should be (a) informed without undue delay of the allegations against them and of the intention to
name them in a public report, and (b) given the opportunity to respond to the evidence against them and
offer a defence, but not necessarily through oral hearing.”
Recommendation: The commission of the Truth Commission should allow it to name names of those it holds
responsible for abuses at its discretion where it has fulfilled the two conditions stated above.
23. The question of follow-ups
Hayner notes that, “it is clear, however, that the record of implementation of truth commission
recommendations has been among the weakest aspects of these commissions to date. With no power of
enforcement, and often with no official body to watch over and promote the recommendations of a truth
commission after it submits its report and closes down, many countries have seen a fine list of
recommended reforms receive very little governmental attention. There may be ways to improve this record
in the future. The legislation for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone, for example, in
addition to committing the government to implementation of its final recommendations, calls for the creation
of a follow-up committee to track their implementation, and requires the government and the follow-up
committee to make public quarterly reports on the progress made.”

This observation suffices.
Recommendation: The task force needs to inform the Minister of this concern and strongly urge the
government to commit itself publicly at the outset to forming an independent, inclusive body that will
superintend over how the recommendations of the truth commission are implemented and make quarterly
public updates of its findings.
24. The question of economic crimes
Makau Mutua advises that, “economic crimes, such as the looting of the public purse, land-grabbing, public
corruption, and the transfer of stolen public funds into personal bank accounts off shore must be
investigated without delay.”151 In contrast, Priscilla Hayner states: “A question that would logically be raised
in Kenya, around the discussion of a truth commission, is whether it makes sense for economic crimes to be
included in a commission’s mandate, along with human rights crimes. The International Center for
Transitional Justice recently considered this question in some depth, knowing that it would likely and
logically emerge in a number of contexts, including Kenya. Based on our general experience watching truth
commissions operate in various countries around the world, we came to the general conclusion that it is
preferable to separate any inquiry into corruption and economic crimes from a broad inquiry into human
rights violations. We have set out our reasoning for this conclusion in a separate paper, which is available
to those interested.”152
There are several arguments in support and against the inclusion of the investigation of past economic
crimes in the mandate of a truth commission.153 In supporting the inclusion of economic crimes, it has been
noted that:154
•

Addressing corruption is central to addressing the fundamental problem of impunity, especially
where it has been as widespread as it is in Kenya.

•

Corruption, especially in the judiciary, can be directly linked to rights violations in the past, and
therefore it is logical to link them together in one investigating body.

•

The public is rightfully outraged at past economic crimes, and in fact one can argue that economic
crimes were more widespread and directly affected more people than did human rights violations.
Thus, excluding corruption may seem to leave out some of the more important aspects of the past
regime’s abuses.

•

Some politically-motivated crimes straddle the two worlds, such as land grabs and displacement
that occurred in the context of ethnic clashes that were instigated for political purposes. It would be
difficult for the commission to avoid addressing the economic or material side of these events
(theft, displacement, loss of property).

•

While there are a number of individual inquiries underway in Kenya pertaining to specific cases of
massive economic fraud, there is no single overview investigation to paint the big picture. This
could, theoretically, be done by a truth commission in a useful way. On the other hand, if it is
excluded from the commission’s mandate, then perhaps there should be a separate inquiry into the
breadth and full nature of economic crimes under the prior regime. A parallel inquiry, or a
permanent anti-corruption body that in part looked at the pattern of past abuses, might be a healthy
complement to a human rights-focused truth commission.

•

Even if a commission did not do a thorough and in-depth investigation into corruption and
economic crimes, it might be able to provide a general picture, and to point to the need for further
investigation – into key departments, offices, individuals, or practices. It may also be able to
identify those areas where corruption is most likely to be continuing, and where firm action is
needed – as well as those areas such as the police and judiciary where corrupt practices prevent
justice of all kinds, and where the protection of rights must depend on functioning services. (But of
course, some of this might naturally be part of a truth commission’s inquiry into lack of justice for
rights crimes.)

•

Including economic crimes within the mandate of a truth commission would be an interesting way
to start to get at economic, social, and cultural rights that are generally excluded from the focus of
truth commissions. When these crimes are massive, is there an argument for trying to address
them?

However, it has similarly been strongly argued that the inclusion of the investigation of economic crimes in
the mandate of a truth commission would be counterproductive because:155
•

Breadth of investigation: A truth commission’s task would be considerably larger if it had the dual
task of investigating rights abuses and economic crimes. The forms and levels of corruption have
been so great, in societies such as Kenya, that virtually all public offices and departments would
require investigation in some form. Bribes given to police on the street; reports of judges
auctioning off their decisions; huge levels of theft by government officials of public coffers – these
and other elements could and probably should be addressed in any decently thorough inquiry.

•

Size and capacity of commission: There is a risk that the staff size and budget of the commission
would not be significantly larger to accommodate the huge increase in workload for the
commission. This would thus strain the resources that are available for investigations into rights
abuses.

•

Distraction from human rights violations? It is possible that a close look into the scandalous levels
and forms of corruption that were taking place under the prior regime may distract the public’s
attention from the commission’s inquiry into torture, killings, illegal detention, and politicallymotivated ethnic clashes. This may or may not be true, however – it may be equally possible that
the full picture of both types of crimes and impunity will bring greater attention to the overall nature
of the past regime and the depth of impunity.

•

A different set of investigative skills? Investigating corruption would seem to require an entirely
different pool of investigators, who would have the skills, experience, and wherewithal to look into
the shady world of economic crimes and grand theft.

•

Methodologies of a truth commission: Some of the typical methodologies of a truth commission –
such as taking individual statements from “victims,” trying to get a handle of the total numbers of
abuses that took place, and holding public hearings – do not seem to match well with the kind of
commission that would work on corruption. On the other hand, other typical methodologies do fit
well – such as trying to investigate some cases at greater depth in order to paint the big picture,
and drawing conclusions as to the kind of institutional reform that would be necessary to prevent
repetition in the future. It would seem that it would be necessary to develop a corruption “branch”
into the structure of the truth commission, which would largely take on a separate kind of
investigation. Would it be useful to take individual statements, or to hold some public hearings on

economic crimes? It may be – although it might be harder to find individuals who witnessed
corruption within state structures but who did not take part in that same corruption. And virtually
every Kenyan, apparently, could tell numerous stories about the bribes and corruption that were
part of their daily life.
•

Sufficient time? Would it be possible to undertake a serious inquiry into matters that could require
access to bank accounts, tracking international flows of money, reviewing the details of company
records, etc.? It may be just impossible to get a full handle on the extent of the problem in a shortterm inquiry.

•

Reparations? It is possible that including both areas in a truth commission’s mandate could cloud
the demand for reparations for rights violations. If everyone has been the victim of state corruption,
and that is reported on equally with the rights abuses, then does that diminish the argument for
reparations for the physical (over the economic) abuses that took place?

Hayner and Bosire observe that, “most truth commissions in the past (of the more than 25 truth
commissions that have existed to date) have excluded economic crimes from the terms of reference. Only
the commission in Chad tried to fully cover both human rights and economic crimes (see annex for
description). Other commissions, such as in Nigeria and Ghana, have not focused on corruption in depth,
but have received testimony when it was seen to be part of a broader human rights violation, such as a
person being detained in Ghana and their house and property simultaneously being taken away by the
state. This is a natural link, and provides an example of a possible approach for Kenya.”156
Which way Kenya?
Recommendation: The investigation of past economic crimes should be included in the mandate of the truth
commission. It would represent such a yawning gap in the record of truth of Kenya should it be excluded
that it would be advisable rather to face the challenge of managing it. The question should not be about if it
will be done, but how it will be done.
Turning to the logistical aspect, and in recognition that this mandate includes a significant additional
workload, the truth commission should be charged with organizing itself into two chambers, one to look into
past gross violations of human rights abuses and another to deal with past grave economic crimes, which
should then organize different but harmonious work plans and operational schedules.
25. Principal activities of a truth commission
These include outreach, statement-taking, research and investigation, data processing, public hearings,
emotional support, and the final report.157
The nature and extent of a commission’s outreach will “profoundly affect its access to information, its
effectiveness in addressing the needs of victims, its ability to manage public expectations and its general
reputation in the eyes of the public. Some of these efforts can be carried out directly by the commission
through holding public meetings and through the preparation, publication and dissemination of pamphlets,
videos and publications in popular form about the role and mandate of the commission. The commission
can also achieve its outreach goals by engagement with and effective use of NGOs, local grass-roots
organizations and the media.”158

Statement-taking is normally done through “private, closed-door meetings, usually by commission staff
taking testimony from individual victims in one-to-one encounters…(it) typically involves both a meeting and
the filling out of a statement form by the deponent. Statement-taking is important in at least two ways: it
furthers the goal of establishing the truth about the past; and it provides an opportunity for victims to come
forward and recount their traumatic experiences in a sympathetic and generally safe environment.”159
Research units “tend to be relatively small but staffed by persons with strong research skills and familiarity
with national think tanks, NGOs, local archives and other key sources of information. In contrast,
investigative units may include people with legal backgrounds or even experience in law enforcement.
Many truth commissions combine research and investigation into one department…”160
Recommendation: Since truth commissions deal with large volumes of information, it must be properly
“organized and systematized. This requires…an effective database for the storage, organization and
retrieval of records and data. Generally speaking, commissions which do rigorous data collection and
analysis will be better able to defend their findings on scientific grounds. A strong data management system
will help arrive at a “big picture” analysis of historical patterns…In terms of staffing, commissions should hire
a programmer to write and maintain basic software and to extract the data in formats appropriate for
analysts. They will also need professional statisticians (or social scientists fluent in statistical methods) to
review the data before it is published, and a team of data processors to input all the information received by
the commission.”161
Mark Freeman and Priscilla Hayner say that “final reports have often constituted the enduring legacy of
commissions and have also been used as a resource for human rights education or for subsequent
prosecutions. If they are well documented and methodologically sound, final reports can serve as a critical
guard against revisionism. In many ways, however, the impact of a final report may depend less on its
content than on a variety of surrounding factors, including when and how the report is publicized, how widely
it is distributed, how much coverage it receives in the media and whether there are both traditional and
alternative presentations of the findings…final reports usually contain a section on findings and a section on
recommendations. The findings section will typically identify the causes and patterns of past violations, as
well as the victims of those violations. In some cases, individual and/or institutional responsibility for
violations may also be reported…recommendations (are) aimed variously at providing assistance or redress
to victims, making necessary constitutional, legal and institutional reforms in order to prevent future relapse
into war or authoritarian rule, and facilitating the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law. In many
cases, commissions have also made recommendations for follow-up measures to ensure their timely and
effective implementation.”162
Recommendation: The terms of reference of the truth commission should specifically include all these
principal activities.
Moreover, the commission should require the truth commission to make its findings and recommendations
public within 30 days of submitting its final report to the President.

RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The task force should use its reading of the public mind, based on its public hearings, to
recommend whether or not Kenya should establish a Truth Commission.
2. Should it recommend the establishment of a truth commission in Kenya, the task force should also
recommend the use of the Commissions of Inquiry Act to establish a truth commission in Kenya.
3. The task force should, following wide local and international consultations, develop the terms of
reference of the truth commission for submission to the Minister in its report.
4. The terms of reference of the truth commission should be sufficiently broad and flexible to allow
investigation into all forms of human rights abuses and economic crimes by the previous
governments, their officials, employees, servants or agents during the period in the past that it
concludes from its public hearings requires investigation.
5. The task force should outline but not limit the incidents/ events/occurrences that the truth
commission should investigate.
6. The task force should, following wide local and international consultations, develop criteria for the
appointment of commissioners to the Truth Commission.
7. There should recommend not more than 11 commissioners for the truth commission; three of
whom shall be non-citizens who have the requisite stature, experience and expertise to undertake
the duties required of a truth commission. No less than one-third of these members shall be
women.
8. The task force should, following wide local and international consultations, suggest names of those
it deems to merit appointment to the Truth Commission.
9. The establishment of the truth commission should guarantee its independence and from the
direction of any individual, group, authority or agency.
10. In addition to the powers proffered to the truth commission by the Commissions of Inquiry Act, the
commission establishing a truth commission should also include powers to visit any government
premise without notice and, additionally, require the police to enforce any lawful directions of the
truth commission with regard to search and seizure.
11. The truth commission should be given a 2-year period of operation with a 6-month start-up period
allowed before its operational clock begins to tick.
12. The truth commission should be given latitude to hire its own staff in consultation with human
resources experts.
13. The truth commission should be charged to train its own staff.
14. In addition to the requirement under the Commissions of Inquiry Act that it conducts its hearings in
public as it deems fit, the commission of the truth commission should require the public
broadcaster to provide live radio and television coverage under the direction of the Truth
Commission.
15. The truth commission should be charged to design and develop an information management
system that will be suitable for its needs and purposes.
16. The commission of the truth commission should require it to pay special attention to abuses of a
sexual nature, and require that it shall act with due sensitivity and regard when investigating and
exposing this genre of abuse.
17. The commission of the truth commission should state the amount or quality of evidence as well as
the standard of proof required.
18. The truth commission should be charged to pay due attention and care to trauma among witnesses
and staff and employ permanent psychological expertise to address this issue.
19. The truth commission should be charged with promoting national reconciliation while undertaking
all its functions and also be required to undertake activities that enhance social and political
reconciliation.
20. The truth commission should be required to provide general recommendations for a reparations
program, and a general assessment of needs for reparations. The truth commission should be

21.
22.
23.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

allowed to source its own funding from government, donor states, and private foundations provided
that it declares all sources of its funding and the amounts involved. It should also be required to
publicly account for all funds and other material/human resources it has received.
The truth commission should be charged with entering into open, professional collaboration with
any relevant judicial investigation.
The truth commission should have the discretion to name names of those it deems responsible for
past abuses as per its mandate provided that it has made adequate provision for those named to
make a defense as provided for under the Commissions of Inquiry Act.
When submitting its report to him, the task force should seek a public commitment from the
Minister that the government will form an independent, inclusive body to oversee the
implementation of the recommendations of the truth commission and make its findings publicly
known on a regular (quarterly) basis.
The terms of reference of the truth commission should include the functions of outreach,
statement-taking, research and investigation, data processing, public hearings, emotional support,
and the final report.
The commission of the truth commission should require it to make its findings and
recommendations public within 30 days of submitting its final report to the President.
The commission of the truth commission should include a mandate to investigate past economic
crimes.
The commission of the truth commission should charge it with organizing itself into two: one
chamber to investigate past gross human rights violations, and another to investigate past grave
economic crimes.
The truth commission should be allowed to co-opt expertise from non-members when it considers
appropriate and so long as no policy decisions are made by those non-members.
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ANNEX 8. TERMS OF REFERENCE
Gazette Notice No. 2701 The Kenya Gazette, Nairobi 17 April, 2003.
The Terms of Reference of the Task Force are:
(a) to recommend to the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Affairs whether the
establishment of a truth, justice and reconciliation commission is necessary for Kenya, and
if so—
(i)
how and when such a commission should be established:
(ii)
the membership of such a commission:
(iii)
the terms of reference of such a commission:
(iv)
what powers or privileges should be conferred upon the commission in the
execution of its mandate:
(v)
the historical period to be covered by the commission’s investigations; and
(b)

to make such further recommendations incidental to the foregoing as they may
consider necessary.

